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Foreword 
Making laws is not the only activity in which parliaments engage, 
and lawmaking may be done without parliament. Direct democracy 
is a political process in which the law of the land is made by citizens 
firsthand. In the experience of most democratic countries, direct 
legislation takes place in the form of a referendum, a procedure 
through which parliament passes on an issue of public policy to the 
citizens for their participatory approval or disapproval. British 
membership in the European Community was effectuated through 
a referendum in 1975; referenda brought about ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, France, and Ireland in the mid­
1990s, further integrating the countries of the European Commu­
nity,- a celebrated proposed constitutional settlement to resolve the 
status of French Quebec was defeated in Canada in 1992; funda­
mental majoritarian political reforms were approved through refer­
enda in Italy in 1991 and 1993; and new constitutions have been put 
into effect through referenda in as many as fifty-five countries. 
The initiative, a procedure in which citizens directly propose 
public policies which are then voted on, is a much rarer form of di­
rect legislation than the referendum. Only in Switzerland, and in 
twenty-six of the American states, is the initiative regularly prac­
ticed. A Swiss initiative in 1990 imposed a decade-long moratorium 
on the construction of nuclear power plants, and another in 1993 
declared a national workers' holiday in August to commemorate the 
creation of the Swiss confederation. National initiatives (or refer­
enda) have never been conducted in the United States, but state bal­
lots can be replete with proposals of direct legislation. Outside of 
the Swiss case, to study initiatives is to study American state poli­
tics and elections. 
vii 
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Since the thirteenth century, and perhaps before that, the process 
of making laws for a political society has unfolded mainly in the 
form of representative democracy. Representative democracy is a 
form of government in which citizens elect representatives who, in 
turn, meet as a parliament to enact laws. Accordingly, this two-step 
system of parliamentary government can be said to constitute indi­
rect democracy. Beginning in the nineteenth century, in some 
American states populism took the form of rejecting indirect, or 
representative, democracy, at least for some purposes such as chang­
ing the state constitution, or substituting electoral devices to per­
mit direct democracy by citizens. 
Direct democracy may take various forms, including the town 
meeting, in which all citizens meet together to adopt laws (as has 
been practiced in New England towns), the referendum, in which 
legislative enactments must get citizen-voter approval before taking 
effect; the initiative, in which citizens may directly propose legisla­
tion for a popular vote; and the recall, in which public officials may 
be removed from office by popular vote. This book treats only one of 
these instances of "citizens as legislators"—the initiative as it is 
practiced in the American states. 
The initiative is provided for preponderantly in the constitutions 
of states west of the Mississippi River (the notable exceptions being 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Florida). Among these states, applica­
tion of the initiative varies considerably. The chapters of this book 
illustrate many variations in the use of the initiative to make 
constitutional or statutory changes. The paradigmatic case is Cali­
fornia, where typically election ballots burgeon with initiated 
proposals—so-called propositions like the infamous Proposition 13 
in 1978 that signaled a tax revolt among many California citizens. 
More recently, in 1994 California voters were persuaded to adopt 
Proposition 187, which prohibited the provision of educational, 
medical, or social services to illegal immigrants or their children. 
The contributors to this interesting collection present several 
different analyses of initiatives like those adopted by California vot­
ers. One group of contributions focuses upon the campaigns seeking 
adoption of initiative proposals. Often, initiative campaigns today 
are highly professionalized, media-intensive, public relations ef­
forts. Once considered mainly a political process for amateurs, con­
temporary initiative campaigns are frequently lavishly funded by 
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well-heeled special interests. Given the armamentarium of modern 
political campaigning, it is not easy in the large urban states to 
mount an initiative effort without first amassing an enormous cam­
paign fund. But even special interest initiative campaigns may 
arouse and activate large numbers of citizens to participate in the 
policy-making process. 
A second cluster of contributions in this book concern initiative 
elections in the light of what the editors call "the rise of the initia­
tive industry." These chapters provide penetrating results showing 
how campaign spending influences the outcomes of initiative elec­
tions, how voters' preferences and ideological orientations affect vot­
ing, and how much endorsements by leaders (such as the celebrated 
leadership of former U.S. House Speaker Tom Foley against the term 
limits initiative in Washington State) affect initiative outcomes. 
Finally, these authors analyze and appraise the public policies 
that are the tangible product of state initiatives. This leads one con­
tributor to focus upon recent initiative campaigns seeking to change 
"state governance policies" epitomized in efforts to restrict the tax­
ing and expenditure powers of government or to lay limits on the 
terms of public officials. Other contributors carefully dissect the 
strategies of interest groups manipulating the initiative process, the 
voting behavior of racial and ethnic minority groups, and the impact 
of initiative outcomes upon toleration of unpopular or defenseless 
minorities. 
This sensitive, theoretically interesting, methodologically savvy 
collection puts the use of the initiative in America on a much surer 
empirical footing. Moreover, these studies allow the authors to raise 
important normative questions about the efficacy of direct legisla­
tion. Their work stimulates reflection about the propriety of passing 
laws without the benefit of legislative deliberation and debate. 
Above all, taken together, these contributions underscore the im­
portance of the initiative as a policy-making process, and demon­
strate the significant impact of direct democracy on the politics and 
policies of the American states. 
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON 
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An Overview of Direct Democracy 
in the American States 
TODD DONOVAN AND SHAUN BOWLER 
Direct democracy devices such as the initiative, referendum, and re­
call were adopted by many states during the Progressive Era, a pe­
riod of radical redesign and reform for many American political 
institutions. The unique institutions emerging from this era were 
expected to give citizens a greater voice in state-level policy making 
and weaken the hold of wealthy interests over state legislatures. 
Early-twentieth-century reformers hoped that by gaining more di­
rect access to the legislative process, citizens would be able to con­
trol public affairs and thereby "insure responsive as well as respon­
sible government" (Howe 1967, 171). This book is a modest attempt 
to assess direct democracy and to determine how it might make 
government more responsive or responsible. 
Direct democracy clearly was not part of America's original con­
stitutional design. In practice it was virtually unknown when the 
Constitution of 1787 was drafted, and it was abhorred by the Feder­
alists (Eule 1990). For the authors of the Constitution, the ideal 
form of democracy was representative (or republican) government, 
in which the control of legislation, in practice and theory, was insu­
lated from popular majorities by representative institutions. As 
Thomas Cronin notes (1989, 43-46), forceful agitation for greater di­
rect citizen involvement in legislation began later in the nineteenth 
century with disaffected groups and social movements such as 
1 
2 DONOVAN AND BOWLER 
grange organizations, single-taxers, socialists, labor groups, prohibi­
tionists, and evangelists—groups that often had their greatest polit­
ical influence in the western United States. Whatever differences 
existed over the particular cause of each group's disaffection, they 
could agree that unreformed state legislatures and political parties 
were corrupt, beholden to "moneyed interests" and "trusts" (Cro­
nin 1989, 45). The direct citizen's initiative would be the "gun be­
hind the door" that would force state legislatures to be responsive 
to the public's will. Taking this western metaphor further, advo­
cates argued that insulated legislatures needed the "spur in the 
flanks" of the initiative and the "bit in the mouth" of the referen­
dum (Johnson 1944, 291). 
To its advocates, then, direct democracy would provide an end-
run around partisan legislatures, mitigating the corrupting influ­
ences thought to operate within them, and would also improve the 
quality of public life. Voter interest would be stimulated as citizens 
participated directly in drafting and approving legislation. The new, 
open process would thus instill civic virtue by simultaneously edu­
cating and involving the mass public (Haynes 1907; Barnett 1915; 
Beard and Schultz 1912; Key and Crouch 1939). 
Although unique direct-democracy coalitions formed in each 
state that adopted these devices, it was the Populists, prolabor De­
mocrats, and middle-class Progressive reform groups who finally se­
cured amendments to many state constitutions in the early twenti­
eth century. In California, the Progressives launched the direct 
democracy movement to break Southern Pacific Railroad's hold on 
the state legislature (Sutro 1994, 945; Lee 1978, 88). In Oregon, the 
initiative and referendum emerged from a coalition of dissident 
free-silver Republicans, some Democrats, and Henry George-
inspired Populists (Mason 1994, 26-29). In Washington, a coalition 
of labor, farmers, and urban Progressives fought for direct democ­
racy (Warner 1995, 54; Benedict 1975). In all, 24 states adopted some 
form of the citizen's initiative, with only a handful being enacted 
after the Progressive period. 
The institutions of direct democracy provide the opportunity for 
groups and individuals to draft legislation directly, to overturn laws 
adopted by legislatures, and to recall recalcitrant representatives. 
This book focuses primarily on one commonly used feature arising 
from the Progressive Era: the citizen's initiative. With this device, 
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broad-based, "grassroots" groups outside of the legislative arena can 
draft their own laws, then petition to have citizens vote directly 
on the proposed legislation in a statewide election. In adopting this 
device, states opened a door to the legislative process for groups 
who had previously failed to gain access. In the next section, we 
provide a sketch of how direct democracy works, since the process 
will only be familiar to those who live in states that allow it. Then 
we address some of the theoretical and normative issues that direct 
democracy presents—issues that we examine further in the chap­
ters that follow. 
Use of the "Citizen's" Initiative 
Since South Dakota adopted the initiative in 1898, hundreds of 
these "citizens-drafted laws have appeared on ballots in American 
states. David Magleby notes that from 1898 to 1992, over 1700 ini­
tiatives were placed before U.S. voters. Among states using initia­
tives, the most during this period, 274, appeared in Oregon, with 
232 appearing in California, 160 in North Dakota, 150 in Colorado, 
133 in Arizona, and 91 in Washington (Neal 1993). Hundreds of ad­
ditional petitions were filed yet failed to qualify, and hundreds of 
additional referenda were placed before voters by legislatures. Most 
initiatives were rejected by voters, yet 38% passed from 1898 to 
1992 (Magleby 1994, 231). 
As we will show, voters have approved many initiative proposals 
that have had great impact on state politics and policy, and in vari­
ous chapters in this volume we assess how direct democracy makes 
the politics in these states somewhat unique. One reason to expect 
differences between direct and representative democracy states is 
that the initiative creates an additional point of access to the policy 
process—not only for "narrow" or "special" interests that have tra­
ditionally enjoyed influence within an elected legislature, but also 
for broad-based groups. Direct democracy states provide an arena in 
which broad-based popular groups and well-financed interests can 
compete in a different setting than in representative states, and 
where major policy conflicts can take place outside of the legisla-. 
ture and beyond party politics. 
It has probably been like this since the earliest days of the initia­
tive. States such as Oregon and Washington witnessed the immediate 
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use of the device by broad-based, populist reform groups working 
outside of the legislature to promote policies extending women's suf­
frage, limiting child labor, establishing the eight-hour work day, and 
enacting Prohibition. At the same time, there were numerous direct 
legislation attempts by some of the era's dominant industries—such 
as fishing and brewing—to establish their own industry regulations. 
Conflicts between industry and broad-based reform groups were also 
contested outside of the legislature. For example, several initiatives 
were placed on ballots by railroad and liquor interests in response to 
laws drafted by newly influential reform groups (Mason 1994, 
196-97; Washington Secretary of State 1994). 
Although the players have changed since the earliest days of 
American direct democracy, the contemporary era also demonstrates 
that broad-based and narrow groups continue to use the initiative in 
tandem. In a single California election in 1988, voters were pre­
sented five separate, competing initiatives dealing with automobile 
insurance and drafted by industry groups, trial lawyers, and con­
sumer activists (Banducci 1992; Lupia 1994b). In 1996, labor unions 
and citizen activists laying claim to populist roots placed initiatives 
on California's ballot that would raise the minimum wage, limit and 
regulate campaign contribution, and repeal affirmative action. At 
the same time, one group qualified initiatives that would allow 
casino gambling in a limited area, and another qualified a measure 
drafted on behalf of a San Diego attorney that would rewrite rules re­
garding the type of lawsuits in which he specialized (Scott 1996). 
Variations in Provision for Use of the Initiative 
Not all states have used the initiative in the same way. Consider­
able variation exists across states in the conditions under which the 
process can operate. According to the Council of State Govern­
ments, 16 states that use direct initiatives allow citizens to amend 
the state's constitution.1 Most of these states also allow direct ini­
tiatives dealing with statutes. In direct initiative states, once the re­
quired number of signatures are verified, initiatives are placed on 
the ballot without being submitted to the legislature for a decision 
or revision. 
Two more states, Massachusetts and Mississippi, allow indirect 
constitutional initiatives only, with Massachusetts also providing 
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for indirect statutory initiatives. These must be submitted to the 
legislature before being placed on a ballot. The legislature may 
adopt the law, send the original proposal to the people for a vote, or 
revise the law and put their version before the people for a vote. 
A few state constitutions allow citizens to change statutes but 
not to amend the constitution. Some allow this only by direct ini­
tiative (Alaska, Idaho). Others allow only direct and indirect statu­
tory initiatives (Washington and Utah), while Maine and Wyoming 
allow only indirect statutory initiatives. Table LI lists states that 
allow the popular initiative and the types of initiatives used in each 
state. Figure 1.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of states 
using the initiative. 
Table 1.1 Types of Initiatives in the U.S. States 
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
State Constitutional Constitutional Statute Statute 
Alaska X

Arizona X X

Arkansas X X

California X X

Colorado X X

Florida X

Idaho X

Illinois X X

Maine X

Massachusetts X X

Michigan X X

Mississippi X

Missouri X X

Montana X X

Nebraska X X

Nevada X X X 
North Dakota X X

Ohio X X X 
Oklahoma X X

Oregon X X

South Dakota X X

Utah X X 
Washington X X

Wyoming X
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Figurel.l The Geographic Distribution of States Using the Initiative 
States with initiative 
Apart from restricting initiatives to constitutional or statutory 
measures, almost anything that could be considered by a legislature 
can also be placed on a state ballot by petition. Half of the states 
that allow initiatives place no substantive restrictions on the poli­
cies that direct legislation may address. The restrictions that do 
exist typically prohibit measures involving state revenues and 
spending, and measures dealing with health and public safety. In 
theory each initiative can deal with only a single subject, but as we 
see in chapter 2, many state courts have interpreted this rule fairly 
liberally. 
Given the few restrictions on subject matter and the wide lati­
tude granted for drafting statutes and amending state constitutions, 
the topics addressed by initiatives have varied widely. According to 
Magleby, in the early 1990s nearly 30% of qualified initiatives dealt 
with governmental or political reform (i.e., term limits and cam­
paign finance measures). This number represents an increase in the 
use of such measures from previous decades, when reform measures 
represented 19% of initiatives. In chapters 7 and 8 we pay particular 
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attention to the adoption of these increasingly important reform 
initiatives. 
Of the remaining initiatives on modern ballots, Magleby deter­
mined that over 25% dealt with revenue and tax measures, 15% 
with "public morality" (issues such as abortion and gambling), and 
nearly 10% with environmental and land-use issues. Initiatives af­
fecting the regulation of business—a category of measures often 
eliciting the largest campaign expenditures—accounted for 16% of 
qualified initiatives (Magleby 1994, 238; see also S. Thomas 1984). 
There is some consistency across states regarding the initial 
phases of the direct legislation process. Requests for circulatirig an 
initiative petition are typically submitted to the secretary of state, 
or in some states the attorney general or lieutenant governor, who 
then sets an official title and description to appear on the public pe­
tition. Typically, the state's attorney, or the attorney general or sec­
retary of state, sets ballot titles and ballot summaries for initiatives 
once they are qualified.2 Only four states actually allow the propo­
nent of the initiative to develop the title and summary of the pro­
posal as they will be listed on the petition.3 
Beyond this, there is substantial variation across states in the 
procedural rules affecting the number of initiatives that can appear 
on the state's ballots in any given election. Each state's constitution 
sets provisions for how petitions are circulated, how long petitions 
may circulate, and how many signatures are needed to qualify. As 
we see in chapter 5, these factors explain some of the variation in 
initiative use across states. 
We should note here that as the population of some direct 
democracy states has exploded, these qualification requirements 
have tended to remain static. Where thousands of signatures were 
once sufficient to qualify a measure, today hundreds of thousands 
must now be gathered in the same time period. The rise of for-profit 
petition management firms has corresponded with new demands 
for gathering greater numbers of signatures. In response to paid sig­
nature gathering, some states passed rules banning its use (see chap­
ter 2); however, a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court ruling nullified these 
regulations. This means that no state can ban the operation of for-
profit petition firms. For groups with sufficient financial resources, 
these firms provide an opportunity for ballot access. They are also 
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responsible in part for the first resurgence in initiative use since the 
low point of the 1940s-1950s (Magleby 1994; Lee 1978), and could 
provide a means for future accelerated use in states where initia­
tives have rarely appeared. 
Signature requirements vary greatly across states. Within each 
state, constitutional measures typically require that proponents ob­
tain more signatures than are needed for statutes. The number re­
quired for placing a proposal on state ballots ranges from the equiva­
lent of 3% to 15% of the votes cast in the previous general election. 
At the lower end, Massachusetts requires 3% of votes cast in the 
previous gubernatorial election (with the requirement that no more 
than 25% of signatures be gathered in any one county), and Col­
orado requires 5% of votes cast in the secretary of state election. Pe­
titions for statutes in North Dakota can qualify with signatures of 
only 2% of the resident population. At the higher end, Utah statutes 
require signatures equal to 10% of the votes cast in the governor's 
race, with 10% of that number from a majority of each of the state's 
counties. Wyoming has perhaps the most onerous qualification hur­
dle, requiring signatures equivalent to 15% of the vote total from 
the previous general election, with signatures obtained from at least 
two-thirds of the state's counties. Oklahoma and Arizona also re­
quire 15% of general election votes for a petition to be qualified 
[The Book of the States, 1994-95). 
Time constraints can also present a significant challenge to plac­
ing direct legislation on a state's ballot. At least 11 states allow pro­
ponents to have a petition in circulation for a year or more. Some, 
however, limit efforts to only a few months: Oklahoma restricts pe­
titioning to three months after the initiative is filed; California, to 
five months,- and Colorado and Washington, to six months. 
To place these demands into perspective, consider the raw num­
bers of signatures needed to get an initiative on ballots in various 
states. Using election turnout from 1994, a proposed law could 
reach the ballot in Idaho—a state where only 14 initiatives have 
been listed since 1912—with just under 40,000 signatures. In Ore­
gon, the most initiative-prone of the American states, a constitu­
tional initiative petition would require roughly 75,000 signatures 
(fewer are required for statutes). Missouri, a state having only 10 
more initiatives in its history than Idaho, requires 117,000 signa­
tures collected over the course of 20 months for an initiative statute 
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to be placed on the ballot. These modest requirements are perhaps 
not radically different from the Progressives' goal of establishing a 
system that could allow ill-funded "popular" groups to place issues 
before the public for a vote. 
In contrast, given Michigan's requirements and population in 
1994, just over 300,000 signatures would have to have been gathered 
within 6 months in order to place a measure on the ballot. In Cali­
fornia, proponents needed to collect 630,000 signatures in 150 days 
to propose an amendment to the constitution in 1996. Clearly, in 
these states the effort to qualify an initiative will require substantial 
financial resources, organizational skill, and massive volunteer ef­
forts. In all states, these efforts are further complicated by the need 
to "overqualify," obtaining excess signatures to compensate for the 
invalid signatures inevitably detected when any petition is filed. 
Apart from highlighting the difficulties involved with ballot ac­
cess, these signature requirements also illustrate an issue that we 
will discuss in greater detail in a later chapter. While signature re­
quirements affect how many initiatives reach the ballot, there are 
other state-level factors that explain why states such as Oregon and 
Missouri, in spite of relatively low hurdles for qualifying direct leg­
islation, have radically different experiences with the use of it, the 
initiative being more common in Oregon than in Missouri. 
It is important to understand that the rules and conditions facili­
tating the use of the initiative vary from state to state, and that 
these factors in turn play some role in affecting how much the state 
comes to rely upon direct rather than representative procedures 
when setting policy. As we illustrate in chapter 8, in "populist" 
states where initiatives are used most frequently, public policy is 
more likely to constrain the discretion of elected legislatures. In 
various chapters, we examine how this creates differences between 
direct and representative democracy states. In the end, we suggest 
that use of the initiative may cause governments to be more respon­
sive to some public demands, but that it is another matter to say 
that the resulting policies are more "responsible." 
Variations in Initiative Use Over Time 
Use of the initiative declined in the middle part of the twentieth 
century, only to be revived in recent decades. Virginia Graham's 
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(1976) compilation of statewide initiative use from 1900 to 1976 il­
lustrates that initiatives were used with great frequency between 
1910 and 1920, when over 250 reached state ballots, and use re­
mained close to this level through the 1930s. However, as the popu­
lation of western states expanded during and after World War II, the 
use of popular initiatives plunged. In the politically tumultuous 
decade of the 1960s, fewer than 90 initiatives appeared on all state 
ballots. Magleby (1994) and Thomas (1984) noted an upswing in ini­
tiative use by the 1970s and 1980s, with Magleby (1994) estimating 
that rates in the 1990s would exceed those of the Progressive Era. It 
would seem that state-level direct democracy has been rediscovered 
near the end of the twentieth century. 
Several factors are associated with the expanded use of popular 
initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. One reason is that opponents of 
some initiatives are now much more likely to resort to the initia­
tive process themselves. As we discuss in chapters 3-5, the evolu­
tion of opposition tactics has led to much greater use of counter-
propositions, a rapidly qualified initiative designed to deflect 
attention from an opponent's initiative. Dozens of these measures 
have reached state ballots, particularly since the late 1980s. In Ore­
gon, for example, a tax on tobacco to support health care and anti­
smoking programs (Measure 44) qualified for the 1996 ballot and 
quickly attracted a rapidly qualified counterproposition backed by 
the tobacco industry. By qualifying measures that would, among 
other things, require insurers to pay for the services of chiropractors 
and "alternative healers/7 the industry hoped that health care 
providers would have to deflect resources away from the anti­
tobacco measure to defend their own interests. 
Rapid qualification of these counterproposals would not be possi­
ble without petition management firms and the maturation of a 
campaign industry that has made it easier for "grassroots" and in­
dustry alike to get on ballots in populous states (see chapter 3). 
Using subcontractors who specialize in hiring clipboard-wielding 
crews paid by the signature (or sometimes by the hour), these firms 
can estimate costs for qualification given the subject, the number of 
other initiative petitions in circulation, and the time remaining in 
the qualification period. Firms can virtually guarantee qualification 
(and do so in trade advertisements) if a proponent is willing to pay 
top price per signature. 
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Magleby notes an additional factor contributing to the renewal of 
initiative politics: the rediscovery of direct democracy by conserva­
tive and liberal issue-activists since the 1970s (Magleby 1994, 233). 
Groups that might look more akin to the non-elite (or nonindustry) 
"citizens'' that the Progressives had hoped to empower have used 
the initiative to qualify a variety of measures, including coastal man­
agement (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1983); statewide land-use mea­
sures; antitax measures (Sears and Citrin 1982); nuclear freeze pro­
posals; public expenditure limitations,- abortion measures; "death 
with dignity" proposals; victims rights policies,- medical marijuana 
use; "three strikes/7 tough-on-crime laws; and term limitations—to 
name a few.4 
Critiques of Direct Democracy 
At the time direct democracy was adopted, not all observers were as 
sanguine about its prospects as the early Populists and Progressives 
were. Early critics chose several lines of attack. Echoing classical 
democratic theorists, some feared that direct democracy would pro­
duce policies hostile to the interests of unpopular minorities, or 
simply further the political nostrums of "faddists" (Lowrie 1911; 
Croly 1914). Others feared that direct democracy would increase the 
power of narrow interests as it weakened parties, leaving groups 
with money to control the political agenda, defeating initiatives 
that threatened them while placing their own legislation on ballots 
(Eaton 1912). 
As the debates continued over adoption of the initiative in the 
American states, additional questions were raised about voter com­
petency (see Haynes 1907; Barnett 1915). In 1915, for example, Bar­
nett observed that "to submit these matters to popular vote is to 
strain the interest and intelligence of the citizen and invite the most 
haphazard way of legislation" (1915, 538; also Renisch 1912). Vot­
ers, the critics argued, will be uninterested or unable to learn 
enough about propositions to vote intelligently (Haynes 1907). 
Contemporary critics of the process have echoed all of these 
concerns (e.g., Lawrence 1995; Eule 1990; Bell 1978). Citing changes 
in politics over the course of the twentieth century, in addition to 
the original critiques of direct democracy, these critics see reason 
to doubt that the process might create responsive and responsible 
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politics at the end of this century. Perhaps the most significant new 
critique is that American direct democracy has fallen short of the 
Populist-Progressive goal—the creation of a process whereby broad-
based groups can create public policy that better serves the public. 
Some critics point to the professionalization of what was suppos­
edly an "amateur" process. An "initiative industry" has evolved, 
seemingly supplanting the original ideal of a populist system that 
provides access to the legislative process. Composed of law firms 
that draft legislation, petition management firms that guarantee 
ballot access, direct-mail firms, and campaign consultants who spe­
cialize in initiative contests across several states, the industry is 
visible in nearly all states where initiatives are used frequently. Al­
though the "industry" has been active in California since at least 
the 1930s (Lee 1978; McWilliams 1951), it has evolved and grown in 
importance as campaigns have relied more heavily upon electronic 
media and direct mail. 
Thus, in addition to reflecting confusion or randomness, critics 
note that voter choices might reflect outright manipulation by well-
financed "industry" campaigns. If this is the case, we should not 
necessarily expect that public policy in direct democracy states re­
flects any heightened responsiveness to popular preferences. In this 
book, particularly in chapters 3 and 4, we detail the evolution of the 
initiative industry in order to examine how grassroots democracy— 
or anything akin to the Populist-Progressive vision—can coexist 
with it. 
Many studies of American direct democracy voting have pro­
vided empirical evidence to support the old contention that voters 
may be unable to deal with the complexity of choices placed before 
them (see Bowler and Donovan n.d.; Magleby 1984; and Cronin 
1989 for reviews). Nearly 70 years after the early critics expressed 
concern about voter ignorance and apathy, a major contemporary 
study of voting on ballot measures (Magleby 1984) suggests in its 
conclusion that most voters who have not learned about a measure 
"before entering the booth will play a form of Russian roulette, cast­
ing affirmative and negative votes at random" (198). These conclu­
sions are based on the view that, lacking an informed understanding 
of the factual and legal details of an initiative, voters will be ill 
equipped to make decisions that reflect their underlying preferences 
about policies—if they indeed have some consistent preferences 
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that can be expressed in initiative voting (see also Hensler and 
Hensler 1979; Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968, 767). 
This is not to say that voters in direct democracy never figure out 
what they are for or against, but that they might be forced to choose 
on the basis of racist feelings, ethnic ethos, undefined moods, 
whims, campaign manipulation, alienation, symbolism, and a host 
of factors only indirectly related to their understanding of how poli­
cies affect their own personal interests (see for example Gamson 
1961; Horton and Thompson 1962; McDill and Ridley 1962; Wilson 
and Banfield 1963; Boskof and Zeigler 1964; Mueller 1965; Wolfin­
ger and Greenstein 1968; Mueller 1969; Durand 1972; Lowery and 
Sigelman 1981; Cataldo and Holm 1983). 
Yet not all research has been dismissive of the idea that ill-
informed voters can figure out how to cast votes for initiatives that 
further their policy preferences. Lupia (1994, 1992) has shown that 
poorly informed initiative voters can emulate the behavior of well-
informed voters if they simply have cues about who is backing an 
initiative (also see Bartels 1996). Such cues can help voters sort 
through several measures dealing with the same topic that appear 
on a ballot simultaneously. Bowler and Donovan (1994c, n.d.) also 
show that many voters make use of elite cues (such as endorse­
ments) to figure out what they are for or against, and that these cues 
can even help voters to evaluate issues in terms of their underlying 
partisanship. The emerging research on initiative voting, however, 
has yet to establish if voters7 preferences have any coherent struc­
ture (or ideological constraint) across multiple initiatives. Nor have 
scholars fully examined the sources of the elite cues that people use 
to figure out how to vote for their preferred policies. 
In chapters 6 and 7 in this volume, we reexamine the voter's abil­
ity to reason in direct democracy. Chapter 6 demonstrates that elec­
toral choices across multiple ballot propositions can be constrained 
by some underlying attitudes, and chapter 7 demonstrates that vot­
ers are able to learn elite positions from various media sources, then 
vote on the basis of such cues. 
Institutional Effects of Direct Democracy 
One central question structuring much of this volume is, What dif­
ference does direct democracy make? The "rediscovery" of institu­
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tions by political scientists, and the development of tools by which 
to analyze them, have led to widespread interest in and examination 
of the effects of institutional forms. As a unique institution that 
creates its own set of incentives and opportunities for political ac­
tors at the mass and elite levels, the initiative process can be ex­
pected to create substantial differences in policy outcomes between 
direct and representative democracy states. One primary effect of 
direct democratic institutions, for the Progressives, was that state 
policies would be made more responsive to mass preferences. 
As Riker (1982) notes, many formal theories consider political in­
stitutions as vehicles for aggregating the preexisting preferences of 
citizens into policy outcomes. Given the same set of underlying 
mass preferences, different political institutions can produce differ­
ent policy outcomes.5 Some research on legislative organization por­
trays legislatures as an arena where logrolling can produce policies 
that deviate from the preferences of the median voter. Logrolling in 
legislatures allows a member to gain support for her preferred pro­
grams by trading votes with others who support programs she might 
not prefer—thus creating legislative majorities for some programs 
where electoral majorities might not exist. This perspective sug­
gests that a legislative setting can sometimes produce policies dif­
ferent from those that mass preferences might otherwise demand 
(Weingast and Marshall 1988; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). 
Conversely, one of the main claims of the Populist and Progres­
sive advocates of the initiative was that direct legislation should 
make politics more responsive, that is, more reflective of mass pref­
erences for policy. In practical terms, voters in two states might be 
equally disposed to support term limits, or tax limitations, or abor­
tion rights. If variation in institutional design affects policy out­
comes such that initiatives translate preferences into policy, we 
might expect different policy outcomes when we compare initiative 
states to pure representative states. As we see in chapters 8 and 9, 
there are reasons to expect that public policies will more closely 
match citizen preferences in direct democracy states. Both institu­
tional rules (direct v. representative government) as well as the na­
ture of citizen preferences about policies affect the policies that a 
government might adopt. 
In some policy arenas, the relationship between direct democ­
racy and policy outcomes is less than straightforward. As Matsu­
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saka (1995) illustrates, institutions of direct democracy create a pol­
icy process that largely nullifies logrolling and vote trading, creating 
a different fiscal environment from that found in states with pure 
representative government. He finds evidence that government 
spending is lower in initiative states than noninitiative states. Con­
versely, Zax (1989) found that initiatives lead to greater spending, as 
they allow citizens to punish legislatures for any "sins of omission" 
when popular items are left out of the state budget (see Blair 1967). 
Finding different spending levels between direct and representa­
tive democracy states says little about an institution's ability to 
translate preferences into policies, however. Lascher et al. (1996) 
conducted a study of state budgets that included an actual measure 
of each state's mass preferences for policy. Like Matsusaka, Lascher 
et al. show that initiative states might have less-progressive taxes 
than would purely representative states. Initiative states also spend 
less on Aid to Families with Dependent Children and public educa­
tion, and have less-liberal policy outcomes overall. However, the 
data actually suggest that the citizen's initiative might cause spend­
ing policy to be less responsive to mass preferences in these areas, 
in spite of initiative advocates' pronouncements to the contrary.6 
Lascher et al. do not attribute this to direct democracy's muting 
or distorting the translation of spending preferences into policy, but 
their findings do suggest a possible conservative policy bias associ­
ated with direct democracy institutions,7 something which we ex­
amine further in chapter 12. Their results also conflict with what is 
demonstrated in chapter 9—that state policies about parental con­
sent for abortion more closely reflect public preferences in direct 
democracy states. In chapter 12, we also examine why these studies 
might draw contradictory conclusions about the effects of direct 
democracy. 
In addition to affecting policy outcomes directly, or indirectly by 
influencing how legislators behave, direct democracy is also able to 
shape the institutions that produce policy. Direct democracy states 
appear more likely to adopt governance policies—laws that change 
the way legislatures do business. The process can therefore possibly 
be seen to reflect the influence of mass preferences over institu­
tions, not just over policy. Some of these "governance" issues in­
clude term limits or tax and expenditure limits. In at least some of 
these areas it seems reasonable to suppose that legislators will have 
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a hard time reforming and regulating themselves. Hence, the direct 
democracy process provides, at least in principle, some means by 
which institutional changes can be introduced. 
As an institution, then, direct democracy is an interesting one, 
for not only can it shape policy outcomes directly but it can also 
shape future institutions. In our concluding chapter we suggest that 
direct democracy, in being fairly responsive to demands to cut taxes, 
can create a paradoxical outcome by rendering initiative states less 
able to respond to mass preferences for public spending. 
Direct Democracy and Minorities 
Any evaluation of direct democracy's responsiveness to mass prefer­
ences must face the issue of majority abuse of unpopular minorities. 
Fearing majoritarian tyranny, America's original republican institu­
tions were designed with a measure of protection for minority 
rights, and included institutional safeguards (elections staggered 
over time, indirect elections, separation of powers, judicial review, 
etc.) that offered minorities broad protection from popular majori­
ties. Direct democracy's critics have long stressed that legislatures 
(or republican government) are better equipped for accommodating 
minorities, given that legislatures provide an environment that fa­
cilitates face-to-face contact and bargaining. Much of the contempo­
rary disdain for direct democracy centers on the fear that it is abu­
sive of minorities (Magleby 1984, 182,- Gamble 1997; Linde 1994; 
1992; Eule 1990; Bell 1978). Critics point to highly contentious bal­
lot measures affecting the civil rights of immigrants, gays and les­
bians, and racial minorities as an example of abuse, while implying 
that representative government will better protect minorities. 
Gamble (1997, 262) reflects this perspective in concluding that di­
rect legislation "separates us as a people" and "only weakens us as a 
nation." Others note that state courts—being subject to voter con­
firmation in nearly all direct democracy states—provide little refuge 
for minorities targeted by initiatives (Eule 1994, 1990). 
Cain (1992b, 270) has suggested further that minorities lose by 
initiative what they might gain in the legislature. Minority elec­
toral legislative districts created in the spirit of the Voting Rights 
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Act have accounted for substantial policy gains by racial and ethnic 
minorities; however, these gains are repeatedly threatened by the 
popular initiative (i.e., California's anti-immigrant Proposition 187 
of 1994; California's civil rights initiative, Proposition 209 of 1996). 
The latter part of the twentieth century does provide numerous 
examples of initiatives targeting unpopular minorities. We will ex­
amine the political dynamics of these initiatives in several chapters. 
In our conclusion, we examine evidence about antiminority policies 
and state-level direct democracy. We argue that it is wrong to point 
to these high-profile initiatives and conclude that policy outcomes 
from direct democracy are more abusive of minorities than are out­
comes from legislatures. State and federal courts have struck down 
nearly every state initiative that critics cite as being abusive of mi­
norities. In many cases, state voters are less likely to pass initiatives 
targeting minorities than they are to approve initiatives in general. 
We also concur with Richard Briffault (1985), who suggests that 
comparisons between direct and representative processes are often 
flawed, since critics may have overly idealized views of state legisla­
tures. Cronin (1989) has illustrated that elected legislatures can pro­
duce policies that are also outrageously abusive to minority rights. 
This does not mean that we find state-level direct democracy 
flawless in its treatment of minorities. The act of deliberating about 
the fate of minorities can have a negative effect on the mass public's 
attitudes toward the group targeted by the initiative. It is important 
to note that in the real world, citizen preferences about policies—or 
about groups of people—might not always be stable or preexisting. In 
contrast to the assumption of many formal models that preferences 
are exogenous to the process of deciding on policies, preferences 
might not be totally independent of political institutions. March and 
Olsen, for example (1984, 739), suggest that institutions5—that is, the 
rules and processes by which policies are debated and adopted— 
have an important role in the formation of citizens' attitudes and 
preferences about policies. 
Just as elites might use representative assemblies, elections, or 
political parties to move mass opinions (Carmines and Stimson 
1989; Zaller 1992; Gerber and Jackson 1993), so too might campaigns 
associated with ballot initiatives. This possibility adds another 
dimension to the criticism that direct democracy breeds majority 
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tyranny of unpopular minority groups. If the institutions of direct 
democracy can shape preferences as well as policies, then we must 
be concerned about how initiatives affect opinions about unpopular 
minorities. The initiative device allows citizen groups to draft legis­
lation singling out unpopular minorities, then wage campaigns that 
subject these groups to scrutiny, criticism, and moral judgment. Di­
rect democracy can thus create an environment where public atti­
tudes about these groups (and attitudes about policies associated 
with the group) become more hostile. 
The courts might block policies from being implemented, but 
they cannot easily undo shifts in opinions about minorities brought 
about by some campaigns. Most statewide antigay initiatives in the 
1980s and 1990s failed (Donovan and Bowler 1997), and much of 
California's anti-illegal immigrant Proposition 187 was overturned 
in the courts. But for the groups targeted by these initiatives, the 
significance of direct legislation might not be the actual policy out­
comes but the way in which ballot contests stigmatize certain 
minorities. 
In chapter 11, we present evidence that mass opinions about im­
migrants (and policies associated with gays and immigrants) turn 
more hostile over time in places where the groups were targeted by 
popular initiatives. We preface this in chapter 10 with an examina­
tion of the contextual/racial forces affecting support for English 
Only measures and California's anti-immigrant Proposition 187. 
Direct Democracy: More Responsive 
and Responsible? 
In the end, we wish to assess how well contemporary direct democ­
racy matches up to the Progressive vision of reform. We have noted 
that the Progressives hoped that direct democracy would produce 
policies that were more responsive to public opinion, and more re­
sponsible than what legislatures would produce. There is no easy 
way to determine whether this is the case. We can begin by asking 
questions about the sort of groups that are able to use direct democ­
racy today. This can bring us some way toward assessing whom the 
process might be responsive to. The process is clearly professional­
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ized, but this is not an entirely new development. In the chapters 
that follow, we illustrate that from the earliest days of American di­
rect democracy, there existed elements of what is now referred to as 
the modern "initiative industry/7 
Yet the contemporary era is marked by changes that might fur­
ther remove this "citizen-legislation process from the grassroots. 
As the initiative industry matures and as gaining ballot access be­
comes more costly for all groups, it becomes increasingly difficult 
for an observer to distinguish the efforts of "citizen" groups from 
the methods used by narrow "interest" groups. Put differently, 
while direct democracy provides access to legislation for groups 
who might lack influence in a legislature, we find that many of the 
major players in initiative politics are often the same actors who 
wield influence in legislatures. Vast amounts of money involved 
with these campaigns might lead some to conclude that narrow in­
terests can buy favorable legislation through direct democracy. 
But we will argue that the process is not particularly responsive 
to the best-financed interest groups—at least not in a way that lets 
them pass policies furthering their goals. Money is critically impor­
tant in affecting outcomes, as we show in chapter 5. However, if we 
examine the role of well-financed interests in the direct legislation 
arena, we find that their primary advantages are defensive. Big 
money might affect how the process translates the public's prefer­
ences into policy by facilitating the defeat of measures that might 
have otherwise appealed to broad interests. It is far more difficult— 
and takes far more cash—for big money to buy a victory. 
Another aspect of responsiveness involves how well the process 
of direct legislation translates mass preferences into policy. We can 
ask, Do voters who show up at the polls make decisions in a way 
that is informed? If this is the case, we might assume votes can re­
flect their preferences. But do they have coherent preferences? We 
offer some evidence that suggests the answer to each of these ques­
tions is yes. 
In spite of the professionalization and commercialization of the 
process, several chapters in this volume demonstrate that it does 
have a substantial effect on state politics and policy. The effect, 
moreover, occasionally appears to be one that makes these states 
more responsive to the mass electorate in certain policy arenas. 
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Perhaps the most noteworthy examples of this effect are the mod­
ern political reforms we call "governance" policies, such as term 
limitations, tax and expenditure limitations, and supermajority re­
quirements that affect the way representative legislatures can gov­
ern. Furthermore, it is only in direct democracy states that voters go 
to the polls to decide the fate of minorities—a process that can 
change mass opinions. Direct democracy thus remains a unique ve­
hicle for institutional change, opinion change, and policy making. 
A process that is responsive to certain mass preferences, how­
ever, is not necessarily one that produces responsible policy. Highly 
effective responsiveness to majority opinions that are hostile to a 
minority, for example, should not be seen as leading to responsible 
policy. But what is responsible public policy? It is easier to docu­
ment responsiveness—in terms of who uses the process, how people 
are motivated to vote, which things pass—than it is to assess how 
responsible the outcomes might be. Indeed, in the chapters that fol­
low we do not really address this issue of responsible policy. There 
is simply no easy, straightforward way to define responsible policy 
without offering normative considerations. 
In our concluding chapter, we suggest that outcomes can be con­
sidered responsible if, over the long haul, they are consistent with 
democratic principles of tolerance of minorities, and if they are not 
fiscally imprudent. This is but one possible definition of responsible 
policy, and it is likely a narrow one. But on these terms, we will sug­
gest that state-level direct democracy at the end of the twentieth 
century has produced mixed results, and that irresponsible out­
comes might be more evident in the fiscal arena than in the treat­
ment of minorities. We conclude that it is hard to support the argu­
ment that outcomes under direct democracy, while unique and 
potentially more responsive to public preferences, are vastly more 
responsible or irresponsible than those of elected legislatures. 
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NOTES 
1. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illi­
nois, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota {The Book of the States, 1994-95, 
table 5.16). 
2. Alaska and Vermont place these responsibilities with the lieutenant 
governor. 
3. These states are Florida, Maine, Nevada, and South Dakota [The Book 
of the States, 1994-95). 
4. With three of these examples, there is also evidence that the "grass­
roots" initiative efforts were eventually financed by deep-pocket contribu­
tors. On term limits in Washington, the billionaire Koch brothers of Kansas 
funded qualification after activists' initial efforts floundered. See Olson 
(1992). The National Rifle Association financed "three strikes" efforts in 
some states after efforts were started independently by citizens. And med­
ical marijuana was given a financial boost by a single wealthy donor. 
5. Riker (1982) also points out that where preferences are ill formed, sta­
ble political outcomes result only under certain representative designs, 
rather than under direct democracy. 
6. Some of the relationships we discuss from the Lascher et al. study 
(1996) are based on significance tests of p < .10, though the authors did not 
discuss relationships at this level of significance. In the areas of education 
and spending, their data indicate a  p < .05 relationship, but this was not 
noted in their article. 
7. Although their data suggest this, Lascher and Matsusaka do not draw 
this conclusion. 

Part I

The Context of Direct 
Legislation Campaigns 

This book covers three stages of the initiative process and is di­
vided into parts dedicated to each stage of the process. In part 1, we 
examine rules that regulate how various policies reach the ballot, 
and provide information about the industry and actors involved 
with drafting initiatives and waging direct democracy contests. In 
part 2, we examine election results and assess how voters behave 
when making decisions on some of these issues. These chapters 
examine when initiatives are used, when they pass, how voters 
cope with competing propositions, whether there is consistency in 
voter evaluations of propositions, and what sources of information 
are used by voters. In part 3, we examine policy outcomes that 
often distinguish direct democracy states from non-direct democ­
racy states. We examine the direct effect of the use of initiatives on 
the adoption of term limits and tax and expenditure limitations, 
and the indirect effects associated with the initiative's constraint 
of legislative behavior. This part also gives special emphasis to 
prominent antiminority initiatives that reached state ballots in the 
1990s. We conclude by discussing the long-term consequences of 
these policies for direct democracy states and compare direct to 
non-direct democracy states. 
Election law defines how direct democracy may be used, but 
federal court decisions affect how the process is used in every state, 
particularly in terms of how campaigns may be regulated. Rulings 
about campaign spending and paid signature gathering have, to 
some extent, created national standards that prevent or substan­
tially limit state regulation in these areas. But direct democracy 
still looks quite different from one state to the next. Much of this 
variation is a function of state law and state court rulings. Chapter 
2 provides a basic overview of the electoral rules that determine 
how direct democracy may be used. Readers interested in discover­
ing the nuances of each state's rules should consult the literature 
25 
26 PART I 
referred to in chapter 2, as well as Daniel Lowenstein;s book on 
election law. 
In chapter 3, we begin to look at how initiative proponents 
operate within these rules. We trace the rise of California's initia­
tive campaign "industry/7 and then interview people within the 
industry to assess the specialization of tasks that has developed. 
California's campaign professionals reveal that there is little left— 
if anything—of the pure amateurism or grassroots politics that 
many associate with direct legislation. 
In chapter 4, we examine the initiative campaign industry's role 
in various types of direct democracy contests. We suggest that for a 
large portion of "majoritarian" policies, which place broad groups 
in opposition to each other, the industry might have a fairly muted 
role in affecting outcomes. We find that the campaign industry can 
provide well-financed interests with some defensive advantages, 
but that narrow interests rarely pass "clientele" policies that dif­
fuse costs at the general public's expense. In fact, there are more 
examples of broad interests defeating narrow interests than of nar­
row defeating broad. 
Election Law and Rules 
for Using Initiatives 
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, 
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, 
AND TODD DONOVAN 
As with most political institutions, the nature and consequences of 
the initiative depend in large measure on the legal rules that define 
and govern it. Under American federalism, it is up to each state to 
decide whether it will include the initiative among its legislative 
procedures and, if so, what the ground rules will be. Approximately 
half the states do provide for the initiative in one form or another, 
and in those states the rules governing the process vary consider­
ably. In this chapter, we consider the rules governing the qualifica­
tion of initiatives for the ballot; the subject matter that may be in­
cluded in an initiative proposal; the effects of spending in initiative 
election campaigns and the efforts that have been made to regulate 
the flow of campaign finance,- and the review of initiatives by the ju­
diciary when they are challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Although each state can set its own rules and procedures for the 
initiative, all such rules are subject to the constraints of the United 
States Constitution. As we shall see in this chapter, the Constitu­
tion, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, precludes 
certain forms of regulation of the initiative process, particularly reg­
ulation of the use of money. 
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Qualification of Initiative Measures 
Signature Requirements 
The most basic requirement for qualifying an initiative measure 
for the ballot is obtaining a specified number of signatures on peti­
tions. The rules and procedures for obtaining signatures vary from 
state to state, including, most fundamentally, how many signatures 
are required. Typically, the required number of signatures is defined 
by law as a percentage of the vote for governor or secretary of state 
in the most recent general election. Signature requirements some­
times vary depending on whether the measure is a proposed statute 
or constitutional amendment. The percentage ranges from a low of 
2% in North Dakota to a high of 15% in Wyoming, in each of these 
cases for statutory initiatives (see table 2.1). 
The data in table 2.1 suggest that the stringency of a state's peti­
tion requirement is, not surprisingly, inversely related to the fre­
quency of measures qualifying for the ballot. Massachusetts and Ari­
zona are exceptions, but in general the initiative is used more 
frequently in the states with lower signature requirements. As we 
shall see in chapter 5, multivariate analysis suggests that other 
structural and political factors also affect frequency of initiative use. 
Time Limitations . 
The length of time permitted for gathering signatures also affects 
the difficulty of qualifying an initiative. As indicated in table 2.2, 
states vary greatly in how much time they allow. Five states— 
Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah—have no time limit 
for signature gathering. Theoretically, a petition drive in one of 
these states could begin in 1998 and be completed in 2098. Ohio re­
quires a two-stage petition drive, with the first stage of unlimited 
duration and the second limited to 90 days. At the other extreme, 
Oklahoma, California, and Massachusetts have the briefest signa-
ture-gathering periods. Six states—Arizona, Colorado, Massachu­
setts, Missouri, Nevada, and Washington—require all initiative pe­
titions to be circulated simultaneously (Public Affairs Research 
Institute of New Jersey 1992a). One study asserts that in these 
states, each initiative campaign must compete with every other ini­
tiative campaign for volunteers, and signature-gathering firms may 
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Table 2.1 Stringency of Signature Requirements 
Avg. No. 
State 
Statutory 
Initiative 
Constitutional 
Initiative 
Year of 
Adoption 
No. since 
Adoption 
(to 1994) 
per Cycle
since 
Adoption 
North Dakota 2 5 1914 160 4.0 
Massachusetts 5 5 1918 41 1.1 
Colorado 5 8 1910 150 3.6 
California 5 8 1911 232 5.5 
Oregon 6 8 1902 274 6.0 
Missouri 5 — 1908 60 1.4 
Washington 8 10 1918 91 2.2 
Montana 5 10 1906 56 1.3 
South Dakota 5 10 1898 42 0.9 
Ohio 6 10 1912 58 1.4 
Nebraska 7 10 1912 35 0.9 
Michigan 8 10 1913 •54 1.3 
Arkansas 8 8 1910 80 1.9 
Florida — 8 1968 12 0.9 
Illinois — 15 1970 4 0.3* 
Oklahoma 8 — 1907 79 1.8 
Alaska 10 15 1959 22 1.2 
Arizona 10 — 1911 133 3.2 
Idaho 10 — 1912 17 0.4 
Maine 10 10 1908 27 0.6 
Nevada 10 — 1912 27 0.7 
Utah 10 12 1900 16 0.3 
Mississippi — — 1992 0 0.0 
Wyoming 15' 10 1968 3 0.2 
Source: "Historical Use of the Initiative Process," in Tolbert 1996 and Neal 
1993. Signature thresholds from The Book of the States, 1994-95. Average signa­
ture threshold from Magleby 1994. Year of adoption from Cronin 1989. 
* Illinois has unusual restrictions on initiative use. See text. 
be able to charge premium rates if there is sufficient demand (Kehler 
and Stern 1995). However, in some instances the effects may be the 
opposite, because a single circulator can efficiently carry several dif­
ferent petitions at once. 
Geographic Distribution Requirement 
Table 2.3 identifies 10 states that require some form of a geo­
graphic distribution of signatures. The goal of a geographic distribu­
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Table 2.2 Maximum Period of Time to Gather Signatures 
to Qualify a Statutory Initiative 
State Signature-Gathering Period 
Alaska 1 year 
Arizona 20 months* 
Arkansas Unlimited 
California 150 days 
Colorado 6 months* 
Florida No statutory initiatives 
Idaho Unlimited 
Illinois 2 years 
Maine 1 year 
Massachusetts 3 months, then 1 month* 
Michigan 180 days 
Missouri 20 months* 
Montana 1 year 
Nebraska Unlimited 
Nevada 289 days* 
North Dakota 1 year 
Ohio Unlimited, then 90 days 
Oklahoma 90 days 
Oregon Unlimited 
South Dakota 1 year 
Utah Unlimited 
Washington 6 months* 
Wyoming 18 months 
Source: Public Affairs Research Institute of New Jersey survey of 
election officials, in Initiative Petitions 3 (June 1992). 
*A11 initiative petitions are circulated during a single designated 
time period. 
tion requirement is to ensure that a proposal has broad support 
across the state and to force proponents to extend their efforts out­
side the most highly populated counties. The effect in several 
states, however, is an antiurban bias in the signature-gathering 
process (Kehler and Stern 1995). The presence of a geographic distri­
bution requirement appears to hamper proponents' efforts to place 
their measures on the ballot. 
The geographic signature requirement is probably vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge under the "one-person, one-vote" princi­
ple. Although some state courts have upheld such requirements 
Table 2.3 Geographic Distribution Signature Requirements 
for Statutory Initiative Petitions 
State Requirement 
Alaska At least one signature must be provided by voters resi­
dent in each of at least two-thirds of Alaska's 27 
election districts. 
Arkansas Signatures equal to 4% of the total votes cast for gover­
nor in the previous gubernatorial general election 
must be gathered in each of at least 15 counties (out 
of a total of 75 counties). 
Massachusetts No more than 25% of the required number of signa­
tures can be provided by voters of any single county. 
Missouri Signatures equal to 5% of the total votes cast for governor 
in the previous gubernatorial general election must 
be gathered in each of at least 6 congressional dis­
tricts. Missouri has a total of 9 congressional districts. 
Montana Signatures equal to 5% of the total votes cast for gov­
ernor in the previous gubernatorial general election 
must be gathered in each of at least 34 legislative 
districts. Montana has a total of 100 legislative 
districts. 
Nebraska Signatures equal to 5% of the total votes cast for gover­
nor in the previous gubernatorial general election 
must be gathered in each of at least 38 counties. Ne­
braska has 93 counties. 
Nevada Signatures equal to 10% of the total votes cast in the 
previous general election held in an even numbered 
year must be gathered in each of at least 13 counties. 
Nevada has a total of 17 counties. 
Ohio Signatures equal to VA% of the total votes cast for 
governor in the previous gubernatorial general elec­
tion must be gathered in each of at least 44 counties. 
Ohio has a total of 88 counties. 
Utah Signatures equal to 10% of the total votes cast for gov­
ernor in the previous gubernatorial general election 
must be gathered in each of at least 15 counties. 
Utah has a total of 29 counties. 
Wyoming At least one signature must be provided by voters resi­
dent in each of at least 8 of Wyoming's 23 counties. 
Source: Public Affairs Research Institute of New Jersey survey of election officials, in 
Initiative Petitions 3 (June 1992). 
Note: Florida does not provide for the statutory initiative, but does impose a signa­
ture distribution requirement for constitutional initiative petitions. 
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(Public Affairs Research Institute 1992a), the issue has not yet 
reached the Supreme Court. In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 
(1969), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an analogous 
geographic distribution requirement for nominating petitions for 
candidates for public office. 
Title and Summary 
Because the text of an initiative measure is that of a proposed 
statute or constitutional amendment, it can be very lengthy and 
technical. All states provide a short summary of the proposal and a 
short title to appear on the ballot, written in most states by public 
officials. Not surprisingly, the language of the title and summary is 
often controversial and, in states such as California and Colorado, 
frequently becomes the subject of litigation (Smith 1996; Legisla­
tive Council of the Colorado General Assembly 1992). 
One example occurred in 1996 in connection with California's 
Proposition 209. Proponents wanted the title to describe the mea­
sure as a prohibition of racial and gender "preferences," while oppo­
nents wanted the title to refer to "affirmative action." Survey 
evidence suggests "affirmative action" is more popular than "pref­
erences," but the text of the measure prohibited preferences and 
said nothing at all about affirmative action. In a display of common 
sense not always seen when judges intervene in elections, a Califor­
nia court let stand the title written by state officials, which referred 
to "preferences." 
Circulating Petitions 
Circulators and Their Activities 
In most initiative states, the person gathering signatures must at­
test that he or she witnessed each signing. Typically, the circulator 
must meet certain requirements, such as being a registered voter or 
residing in the county in which he or she is circulating the petition. 
However, in eight states—Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, Mas­
sachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, and Washington—the separate 
signature of a circulator is not required. 
The requirement that each petition part be signed by a circulator 
does not necessarily interfere with innovative methods of circula­
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tion. For example, proponents of a few propositions in California 
have had good success collecting signatures by mail (Magleby 1984, 
64-65; Lowenstein and Stern 1989, 205-9). Even if only a single ad­
dressee signs the petition part and mails it back, the addressee can 
also sign as the circulator. On a measure that draws unusually in­
tense support, such as the Proposition 13 property tax initiative, the 
mailings can serve the dual functions of circulation and fund rais­
ing. In Washington, petitions are sometimes printed as advertise­
ments in newspapers for voters to clip, sign, and mail to the mea-
sure's sponsors. 
What typically happens when a circulator solicits signatures? We 
shall present two dramatically different accounts. The first is taken 
from the testimony in Meyer v. Grant, discussed below, of Paul 
Grant, the proponent of a Colorado initiative to deregulate the 
trucking industry. 
[T]he way we go about soliciting signatures is that you ask the 
person—first of all, you interrupt the person in their walk or what­
ever they are doing. You intrude upon them and ask them, "Are you 
a registered voter? ["] 
If you gtt a yes, then you tell the person your purpose, that you 
are circulating a petition to qualify the issue on the ballot in No­
vember, and tell them what about, and they say, "Please let me 
know a little bit more." Typically, that takes maybe a minute or
 N 
two, the process of explaining to the person that you are trying to 
put the initiative on the ballot to exempt Colorado transportation 
from [State Public Utilities Commission] regulations. 
Then you ask the person if they will sign your petition. If they 
hesitate, you try to come up with additional arguments to get them 
to sign. 
[We try] to explain not just the deregulation in this industry. . .  . 
[Two paragraphs follow summarizing the substantive arguments 
that, according to Grant, were used to try to get people to sign.] 
[Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 n. 4 (1988). 
The following contrasting account is by the late Ed Koupal, the 
most successful manager of volunteer petition drives in California 
during the 1970s: 
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" Generally people who are out getting signatures are too god­
damned interested in their ideology to get the required number in 
the required time/7 Koupal said. "We use the hoopla process. First, 
you set up a table with six petitions taped to it and a sign in front 
that says, SIGN HERE. One person sits at the table. Another person 
stands in front. That's all you need—two people. 
"While one person sits at the table, the other walks up to people and 
asks two questions. (We operate on the old selling maxim that two 
yesses make a sale.) First, we ask if they are a registered voter. If 
they say yes, we ask them if they are registered in that county. If 
they say yes to that, we immediately push them up to the table 
where the person points to a petition and says, 'Sign this/ By this 
time the person feels, 'Oh, goodie, I get to play/ and signs it. If a 
table doesn't get 80 signatures an hour using this method, it's moved 
the next day." 
Koupal said that about 75 percent of the people sign when they're 
told to. "Hell no, people don't ask to read the petition and we cer­
tainly don't offer," he added. "Why try to educate the world when 
you're trying to get signatures?" (Duscha 1975) 
The Issue of Professional Circulators 
Because the number of signatures required is typically a percent­
age of turnout in specified statewide elections, the difficulty of 
qualifying initiatives increases over time as the population of a state 
grows. Furthermore, recruiting and motivating volunteers to circu­
late petitions is more difficult in a society that lacks the cohesive 
urban neighborhoods and strong political organizations of the early 
part of the twentieth century. For these reasons, initiative propo­
nents have increasingly turned to the use of paid circulators in sev­
eral states, most notably California. 
Paid circulators are recruited and organized by a small number of 
specialized commercial firms. These firms make up the most dis­
tinctive portion of what is now known as "the initiative industry" 
(Magleby 1992; Cronin 1992; Citrin 1996). The initiative industry 
has professionalized the politics of direct democracy with special­
ized professionals to draft measures, circulate petitions, manage 
campaigns, provide polling, and produce commercials (California 
Commission on Campaign Financing [CCCF] 1992; Magleby 1988; 
Neiman and Gottdiener 1985; Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1991). 
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Professional signature-gathering firms in California date back at 
least to the 1930s, but through about the end of the 1970s they co­
existed with frequent initiative-circulation drives that relied en­
tirely or primarily on volunteer circulators. In the past two decades, 
virtually all successful drives have relied, at least predominantly, on 
professional circulation firms. One study concluded, "Professional 
signature-gathering firms now boast that they can qualify any mea­
sure for the ballot (one "guarantees" qualification) if paid enough 
money for cadres of individual signature gatherers, and their state­
ment is probably true. Any individual, corporation or organization 
with approximately $1 million to spend can now place any issue on 
/theballot;  (CCCF 1992, 265). 
As the same report pointed out, the money to qualify the 1984 
initiative that created the California lottery was put up almost en­
tirely by one company, Scientific Games of Atlanta—a vendor of 
lottery materials—which contributed $1.1 million, or 99.6% of the 
total raised for the qualification effort. But the reliance on paid cir­
culators is now universal. Groups that have relied on professionals 
include not only businesses, but environmental, consumer, antito­
bacco, education, and, perhaps ironically, campaign finance groups. 
As stated in the California report, "Qualifying an initiative for the 
statewide ballot is thus no longer so much a measure of general cit­
izen interest as it is a test of fundraising ability" (CCCF 1992, 265). 
It is not surprising, then, that a few states banned the use of paid 
circulators in initiative qualification drives. However, in Meyer v. 
Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), the Supreme Court ruled that such bans 
violate the First Amendment. Writing for a unanimous Court, Jus­
tice Stevens stated that the paid circulator ban infringed upon 
speech in two ways. First, circulators engage in political speech 
when they solicit signatures. As in the case of campaign spending, it 
is just as unconstitutional to suppress speech indirectly by prohibit­
ing payment for dissemination of the speech as it would be to pro­
hibit the speech directly. Second, by making it more difficult to 
qualify initiatives for the ballot, the ban suppresses the debate that 
occurs when measures are voted on. 
Neither of these assertions can withstand scrutiny. On the first 
point, even circulators using the "hoopla method" described above 
by Ed Koupal can no doubt be said to engage in speech, and it surely 
would be unconstitutional to prohibit the employment of individuals 
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to stand in public places and engage in such speech to passersby, in­
cluding the solicitation of signatures on petitions that express views 
on issues or on desired legislation. But no such activity is prohibited 
by a ban on paid circulation of initiative petitions. What is distinc­
tive about an initiative petition is that is a legally efficacious docu­
ment that triggers state action, i.e., placing a measure on the ballot. 
The ban on paid circulators is no more than a decision by the state 
that its own ballot allocations will be influenced only by signatures 
obtained from volunteers. The speech activity is paying people to 
circulate petitions, and the ban does not prevent anyone from doing 
that. The ban simply establishes that the state's ballot allocation 
will be unaffected by the speech activity in question. 
Justice Stevens's second point, that the political speech that 
would surround a measure is discouraged if the ban prevents the 
measure from qualifying, can hardly be taken seriously. The First 
Amendment prevents suppression of speech but does not require 
states to place measures on the ballot in order to encourage speech. 
As we have seen, a variety of procedural requirements impede the 
qualification of initiatives. Indeed, that is the very purpose of the re­
quirements, since the state obviously is not required to place every 
measure that may be proposed by anyone on the ballot. We shall see 
below that various restrictions on the content of initiatives are in 
effect in different states. If Justice Stevens's position were correct, 
such content restrictions would be especially offensive to the First 
Amendment. Finally, about half the states do not allow for initia­
tive measures at all. It is hard to see how making it more difficult to 
qualify a measure can violate the First Amendment in one state 
when another state is permitted to make it impossible. 
Whatever the deficiencies of Meyer v. Grant the ban on paid cir­
culators is clearly not an option for states in the foreseeable future. 
Evidence suggests that, as Ed Koupal stated, a high percentage of in­
dividuals will sign a petition upon request (Lowenstein and Stern 
1989, 194-200). The result is that positions on the ballot are for sale, 
with the proceeds not even going to the state. This is hardly a ratio­
nal policy, nor one in tune with the original purpose of the initia­
tive: to provide a more popular means of legislating. 
Meyer v. Grant does not necessarily preclude all remedies. One 
proposal is for a two-tier system in which proponents could use 
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both volunteer and paid circulators. However, a multiplier would be 
applied so that signatures obtained from volunteers would count 
more toward qualification. The use of volunteers would be encour­
aged, and it would be more difficult to succeed with paid circulators 
alone. Nevertheless, paid circulators could be used and the signa­
tures they obtain would count, obviating any First Amendment 
problems (Lowenstein and Stern 1989, 219-23). A two-tier system 
was included in a package of initiative reforms considered by the 
Nebraska state legislature in 1995, but the package was ultimately 
defeated. 
Verification of Petition Signatures 
After the signature-gathering process is complete, the initiative 
petitions are submitted to election officials for verification. In North 
Dakota, which has no voter registration, the state must assume that 
all of the signatures and names are legitimate. The remaining states 
allow only registered voters to sign petitions. Because a substantial 
number of signatures turn out to be those of nonregistered voters, or 
duplicates, or otherwise ineligible, proponents need to obtain sub­
stantially more than the actual required number of signatures, typi­
cally by a 25% to 50% margin. 
States vary in how they verify petition signatures, ranging from 
verifying each signature to verifying a random sample of signatures. 
The latter is increasingly the more common procedure because of 
the large number of signatures necessary to qualify a measure for 
the state ballot. 
Defining what constitutes a valid signature can be controversial. 
The voter's name must be the one listed on the voter registration 
statement, though states—and. possibly counties within states— 
probably vary as to how close the match must be. In Colorado, sig­
natures have been disqualified if an individual signed with a nick­
name or an abbreviated version of his or her name, rather than the 
name as it is listed on the voter registration rolls. In California, the 
petition signer is also required to provide his or address, and if 
the voter's address on the petition does not match the address on the 
voter registration rolls, the signature is presumed to be fraudulent 
and is invalidated (Public Affairs Research Institute of New­
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Jersey 1992a). Occasionally the verification process has brought to 
light fraud or other improper practices in the circulation of petitions, 
sufficient to warrant criminal prosecutions (Lowenstein and Stern 
1989, 188-92). 
Vote for Enactment 
The vote needed for enactment of an initiative also varies among 
states. Some states require a majority of those voting on the mea­
sures while others require a majority of those voting in the election. 
In 1996, a failed referendum on the Colorado statewide ballot would 
have required a supermajority (60%) vote of the electorate for adop­
tion of constitutional initiatives. The intent of the legislation was 
to make it more difficult for sponsors to amend the constitution 
than to change statutory law. One study estimated that roughly half 
of all constitutional initiatives adopted in Colorado over the past 
century would not have passed if a 60% vote had been required (Leg­
islative Council of the Colorado General Assembly 1996). No state 
currently requires a supermajority vote of the electorate for passage 
of constitutional or statutory initiatives. Yet the state of Nevada re­
quires a majority vote in two consecutive elections for a constitu­
tional initiative to take effect; thus, voters had to approve a term 
limit amendment in both the 1992 and 1994 statewide elections. 
When Minnesota voted on whether to adopt the initiative process in 
1980, 53.2% of those voting on the question voted for the proposal, 
but a quarter of a million persons who voted in the election failed to 
vote on the ballot measure. Thus, only 46.7% of all voters in the 
election approved of the measure. Since Minnesota law requires 
that a majority of those voting in the election vote affirmatively to 
change the state constitution, the amendment failed. 
Subject Matter Constraints 
In most states initiatives can and do cover a wide range of substan­
tive issues. In recent years in California alone, initiatives have dealt 
with issues including taxation, political and governmental reform, 
civil rights, education, the environment, auto insurance, and to­
bacco policy. However, probably all states have at least some re­
strictions on what may be included in an initiative measure. In 
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some states, an initiative cannot appropriate funds. Some states pro­
hibit initiatives from dealing with "administrative" as opposed to 
"legislative" questions, and a few prohibit the reversal by initiative 
of a decision that already has been made by a legislative body. One 
state, Illinois, limits initiatives to a narrow range consisting of some 
aspects of the legislature. We begin by considering the Illinois limi­
tation and then proceed to the two most important restrictions on 
content in some other states. 
The Case of Illinois 
In Illinois, the initiative is permitted only for the purpose of al­
tering the legislative process: "Amendments to Article TV [the leg­
islative article] of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition 
signed by a [specified number of electors]. Amendments shall be 
limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article 
IV" (Illinois Constitution, art. 14, sec. 3). The rationale for this very 
limited scope has been explained as follows: "[The initiative provi­
sion in the constitution] recognizes that the General Assembly is 
unlikely to propose any changes in its basic structure, but that some 
changes may appear to be necessary. Thus, a method of constitu­
tional revision other than through the General Assembly is neces­
sary" (Helman and Whalen 1993). 
Legislative term limits, adopted by Illinois voters in 1994, pro­
vide an example of the process being used to alter legislative insti­
tutions. But the success of the term limits initiative is the excep­
tion rather than the rule in Illinois. The Illinois provision for the 
initiative, narrow to begin with, has been interpreted strictly by the 
Illinois courts. In Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of 
Elections, 359 N.E. 2d 138 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled 
that an Illinois initiative must make both structural and procedural 
changes to the legislative process. On this basis it struck down 
three initiative proposals, including one that prohibited legislators 
from voting on bills in which they had conflicts of interest. Presum­
ably, the court regarded that as a procedural but not a structural 
change. In Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections, 561 
N.E. 2d 50 (1990), the court struck down a proposal that would have 
required a three-fifths vote in each house for any bill that would in­
crease revenues and would have required a special revenue committee 
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to be created in each house. The court concluded that the proposal 
was not limited to structural and procedural changes, because 
"[wjrapped up in this structural and procedural package is a sub­
stantive issue not found in article IV—the subject of increasing 
State revenue or increasing taxes/'1 
Curiously, although in Illinois the initiative is limited to alter­
ations of the legislative process, in at least two other states, Califor­
nia and Massachusetts, the courts have found ways to prevent an 
otherwise broad initiative power from being used to alter legislative 
rules (Lowenstein 1995, 271-277). 
Initiatives That Amend Rather Than Revise 
the Constitution 
In some states the initiative may be used to amend the state con­
stitution but not to revise it. This distinction, as explained in Raven 
v. Deukmejian, 276 CaL Rptr. 326 (1990), is said to be "based on the 
principle that 'comprehensive changes7 to the Constitution require 
more formality, discussion and deliberation than is available 
through the initiative process." 
Not surprisingly, California's Proposition 13 was challenged on 
the ground that it revised rather than amended the constitution. 
Proposition 13, a constitutional initiative adopted by voters in 1978, 
sharply reduced the level and growth of state and local government 
expenditures by restricting the use of the property tax as a source of 
government revenue. Proposition 13 rolled back property tax rates 
and capped property assessments. The measure reduced local gov­
ernment revenue by $7 billion in just one fiscal year (Schmidt 1989; 
Sears and Citrin 1982; Tolbert 1996). 
The California Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 13 was 
valid as a constitutional amendment. In Amador Valley Joint Union 
High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 149 CaL Rptr. 
239 (1978), the court ruled the proposition was not a revision of the 
constitution'because its "changes operate functionally within a rel­
atively narrow range to accomplish a new system of taxation which 
may provide substantial tax relief for our citizens/7 
However, in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990), the California court 
struck down as a "revision" a provision in Proposition 115 that re­
quired the state courts, in construing the rights of criminal defen­
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dants under the state constitution, to follow the U.S. Supreme 
Court's interpretations of corresponding rights under the federal 
Constitution. Although following the federal constructions had pre­
viously been a "general principle" for the California courts, the 
state supreme court regarded the transformation of that general 
principle into a mandatory rule as an improper constitutional revi­
sion. Two years later, in Legislature v. Eu 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, cert, 
denied 503 U.S. 919 (1992), the California Supreme Court consid­
ered Proposition 140, which limited the terms of legislators and 
statewide elected officials and which cut the state legislature's bud­
get by about a third. Proposition 140, the court held, was an amend­
ment rather than a revision. 
In the three cases described above, the California court has 
found: 
l.That Proposition 13, which dramatically lowered property 
taxes, greatly increased the difficulty of increasing taxes in the 
future, and predictably effected a major shift of power from 
local to state governments, is not a sufficiently "comprehen­
sive change" to constitute a revision; 
2. Proposition 115, which converted a general principle of inter­
pretation of certain rights into a mandatory principle, is a revi­
sion,- and 
3. Proposition 140, which adopted term limits and slashed the 
legislative budget, is not a revision. 
Perhaps judges are more sensitive to intrusions on their own 
powers than on those of the coordinate branches of government. 
The Single-Subject Rule 
Most state constitutions provide that laws passed by the state 
legislature must be limited to one subject. Such provisions are only 
occasionally enforced by the judiciary. Several states have similar 
provisions applicable to initiative measures. Because initiatives are 
typically controversial and are often wide-ranging, serious single-
subject challenges to initiatives are more common than those to 
statutes passed by legislatures and, in at least one major state, have 
had more success. 
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What is the purpose of the single-subject rule? Two answers are 
commonly given: to avoid voter confusion and to prevent logrolling. 
But the single-subject rule is at best an extremely crude means of 
achieving either of these purposes. Furthermore, if aggressively in­
terpreted, the single-subject rule gives to the judiciary what for all 
practical purposes is a discretionary veto power, because the deter­
mination of what constitutes a "subject" is a function of conve­
nience, not of applying some naturally predetermined taxonomy. 
One of us has argued that a more plausible purpose of the single-
subject rule is simply to avoid massively comprehensive initiatives. 
In this view, the rule serves a function analogous to that of the rule 
against constitutional "revisions/7 and it should be applied only 
against extremely comprehensive initiative measures (Lowenstein 
1983). 
Single-subject challenges to initiatives have had the greatest suc­
cess in Florida. For example, in 1994, the Florida Supreme Court 
removed two tax-limitation initiatives from the ballot on single-
subject grounds, though voters responded by passing a constitu­
tional initiative setting aside the single-subject rule for initiatives 
dealing with fiscal policy (Tolbert 1994a). Also in 1994, the Florida 
court removed from the ballot a proposed constitutional initiative 
amendment that would have prevented new antidiscrimination 
laws based on characteristics other than "race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, handicap, ethnic background, marital status, or 
familial status." Supporters of this proposal argued that it dealt with 
the single subject of discrimination. The Florida Supreme Court, il­
lustrating our assertion that "subjects" exist in the eye of the be­
holder, saw it differently. In In re Advisory Opinion, 632 So. 2d 
1018 (1994), the court stated that the proposal 
enumerates ten classifications of people that would be entitled to 
protection from discrimination if the amendment were passed. The 
voter is essentially being asked to give one "yes" or "no" answer to 
a proposal that actually asks ten questions. For example, a voter 
may want to support protection from discrimination for people 
based on race and religion, but oppose protection based on marital 
status and familial status. Requiring voters to choose which classifi­
cations they feel most strongly about, and then requiring them to 
cast an all or nothing vote on the classifications listed in the amend­
ment, defies the purpose of the single-subject limitation. 
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In no other state have the courts applied the rule as strictly as in 
Florida. Indeed, Florida appears to be the only state in which the 
standard for applying the single-subject rule is overtly declared to be 
more strict for initiatives than for statutes passed by the legislature 
(Lowenstein 1995, 282-83). One commentator, in the course of crit­
icizing the California courts for their permissive application of the 
single-subject rule, describes some of the techniques used by the 
courts: "The supreme court uses several artifices to avoid invalidat­
ing initiatives under the single-subject rule. Indeed, with these 
methods it can avoid altogether a meaningful application of the 
rule. These artifices include the broad manner of defining ''subject/' 
the loose relationship allowed between the measure's provisions 
and its "subject/7 the failure to distinguish between a measure's 
subject and objective, and the preference for delaying review until 
after an election. These artifices allow the court to sidestep serious 
review of complex initiative measures" (Minger 1991, 899-900). 
Even in a state that interprets the rule liberally, anyone draft­
ing an initiative—and anyone looking for a way to invalidate an 
initiative—should bear the single-subject rule in mind. For example, 
in Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Deukmejian, 
27& Cal. Rptr. 128 (1991), a California appellate court struck down 
an initiative whose proponent defended it as addressing the single 
subject of "disclosure." The measure required labeling of household 
toxic products,- disclosure of the affiliations of certain marketers of 
insurance to seniors,- disclosures in contracts of nursing homes; dis­
closure of the major funding source in advertisements for or against 
statewide ballot propositions,* and disclosure to investors if the is­
suer of securities was doing business in South Africa. 
Campaign Finance 
The past quarter century has been a time of intense debate over reg­
ulation of campaign finance practices. Most attention has been given 
to the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA) of 1971, which created a system of publicly financed presi­
dential elections and limits on campaign finance practices in all fed­
eral elections (Corrado 1996). There are no federal ballot measure 
elections; therefore, there has been no occasion for federal regulation 
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of campaign finance in such elections. However, state regulation of 
campaign finance has been prolific, and in initiative states attempts 
have been made to extend the regulations to ballot measure cam­
paigns. However, as we shall see, the United States Supreme Court 
has struck down regulations of ballot measure campaign finance 
that would have been upheld if applied to candidate elections. Ac­
cordingly, beyond public disclosure of receipts and expenditures, lit­
tle regulation of campaign finance in initiative campaigns is 
presently in force. 
Limits in Candidate Races 
Almost before the ink was dry on the FECA, virtually all of its pro­
visions were challenged under a variety of constitutional theories. In 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court handed down 
a treatise setting forth its view of the constitutional principles relat­
ing to campaign finance regulation, and upheld some while striking 
down other of the FECA provisions. The Court has decided several 
important issues in the past two decades, but Buckley remains the 
cornerstone of constitutional doctrine for campaign finance.2 
The portion of Buckley most relevant for present purposes con­
sidered the extent to which limits on campaign contributions and 
expenditures are consistent with First Amendment rights of speech 
and association. The key principle established by the Court was a 
sharp distinction between limits on contributions and limits on ex­
penditures. Although the Court found that both types of limits im­
pinged on First Amendment rights, it found that expenditure limits 
did so to a far greater degree than contribution limits. 
Given a large and technically advanced society in which all 
forms of mass communication are expensive, expenditure limits 
put a direct limit on the amount of permissible political speech, in 
the Court's view. Limiting contributions imposes no such direct re­
striction on speech. Although the Court conceded that making a 
contribution to a candidate communicates a message of support, it 
regarded the amount of the contribution as only tenuously related 
to the message. The Court denied that the FECA contribution lim­
its would indirectly limit the amount candidates could spend, 
pointing out that candidates could make up for the lack of large con­
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tributions by soliciting more small contributions, and supported its 
conclusion by empirical analysis that might charitably be described 
as casual. On the other hand, the Court concluded that contribution 
limits impinge on freedom of association, though only to a limited 
degree, since the contribution as a means of association had been 
limited but not eliminated, and all other means of association were 
unaffected. 
The result of this analysis was that both contribution limits and 
expenditure limits would be unconstitutional unless they could 
withstand "strict scrutiny" by the Court. However, because of the 
sharp difference the Court found in the degree to which the two 
types of limits affected First Amendment rights, the scrutiny ap­
plicable to expenditure limits appeared to be considerably stricter 
than that applied to contribution limits. In any event, the Court 
found contribution limits justified by the government's desire to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Court con­
cluded that the anticorruption purpose was satisfied by contribu­
tion limits, such that expenditure limits were superfluous for that 
purpose. The Court rejected the contention that spending limits 
could be justified as a means of controlling campaign costs, on the 
ground that in a free-speech regime the government has no legiti­
mate interest in controlling such costs. Finally, the Court rejected 
equality as a government interest that could justify expenditure lim­
its. Supporters of FECA had argued that spending limits would nar­
row the gap between rich and poor in their ability to influence polit­
ical debate. Equality presumably is not an improper objective, but in 
the Court's view it could not be achieved by limiting the speech of 
some in order to enhance the relative effectiveness of others. 
In subsequent decisions involving candidate campaigns, the 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed both the permissibility of contribu­
tion limits, in California Medical Association v. Federal Election 
Commission (FEC), 453 U.S. 182 (1981), and the unconstitutional-
l  y of spending limits, in FEC v. National Conservative Political 
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985); has upheld the prohibition 
of contributions and expenditures by corporations, in FEC v. Na­
tional Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), and Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); and, in a 
split decision whose implications are still uncertain, has suggested 
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that campaign finance practices of political parties may receive spe­
cial constitutional protection, in Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Committee v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). 
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns 
Two years after its Buckley decision, the Supreme Court, in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), struck 
down a Massachusetts statute that banned corporate expenditures 
in ballot measure campaigns. For First Amendment specialists, the 
Bellotti decision is noteworthy as the first decision that unequivo­
cally extended free-speech rights to corporations, on the theory that 
such rights protect the public's right to receive speech as well as the 
individual's need for self-expression. For our purposes, Bellotti is 
more important as the Court's first opportunity to extend its consti­
tutional doctrine on campaign finance to ballot measure elections. 
It will be recalled that in Buckley, contribution limits had been 
upheld as a means of preventing corruption or the appearance of cor­
ruption. In Bellotti, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, pointed 
out that no such rationale could justify campaign finance regulation 
for ballot measures: "Referenda are held on issues, not candidates 
for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving 
candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a pub­
lic issue." In defense of its statute, Massachusetts argued that cor­
porate expenditures needed to be controlled lest funds from enor­
mous corporate treasuries dominate ballot measure campaigns. The 
Court rejected this argument as a defense of the Massachusetts 
statute because the state had produced no evidence that domination 
was a realistic threat. 
The Court was oddly equivocal on whether such a defense could 
support future efforts to justify such regulations. Out of one side of 
his mouth Justice Powell said: "According to [the state], corpora­
tions are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out 
other points of view. If [the state's] arguments were supported by 
record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened im­
minently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating 
rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments 
would merit our consideration." From the other side of Justice Pow-
ell's mouth came these words: "To be sure, corporate advertising 
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may influence the outcome of the vote,- this would be its purpose. 
But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a 
reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which 
is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.'" 435 U.S. at 
790 (quoting Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v, Regents, 360 
U.S. 684, 689 [1959]). In the ensuing decades, practitioners and 
scholars alike have spent many happy but not entirely fruitful hours 
contemplating what, if any, empirical showing might justify regula­
tion of corporate spending in ballot measure campaigns, in light of 
these two passages (Shockley 1985). 
Finally, in Bellotti, the Court considered and rejected two addi­
tional justifications proposed by the state: that the funds of the cor­
poration belonged to the stockholders, some of whom might dis­
agree with the position taken on a ballot measure by the corporate 
management; and that the state had the right to regulate a corpora-
tion's use of its assets because of the advantages—limited liability 
for stockholders, for example—conferred by the state's corporate 
law (Lowenstein 1992, 405-13). 
Bellotti concerned the limit on corporate expenditures in ballot 
measure campaigns, and Buckley had made it clear that expenditure 
limits would be hard to justify. Would limits on contributions to 
ballot measure campaigns fare better? The Court answered this 
question in the negative in Citizens Against Rent Control (CARC) 
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), in which it struck down an 
ordinance limiting contributions to ballot measure campaign com­
mittees to $250. Unlike the statute in Bellotti the CARC ordinance 
applied to all contributors, individuals as well as corporations and 
other organizations. As in Bellotti, the Court observed that the anti­
corruption rationale, which had provided the justification for con­
tribution limits in Buckley, was inapplicable in ballot measure elec­
tions. Responding to the claim that the limit was "needed to 
preserve voters' confidence in the ballot measure process/' the 
Court stated that there was no evidence in the record to support this 
contention. 
In the 1990 Austin decision, noted above, the Supreme Court up­
held on anticorruption grounds a state ban on independent spending 
by corporations in state legislature campaigns. But the idea of cor­
ruption underlying Austin—scornfully dubbed the "New Corrup­
tion" by Justice Scalia in dissent—was quite different from that in 
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Buckley and other earlier cases, of using campaign contributions to 
improperly influence elected officials. According to the Austin 
court, this new conception of corruption consists of "the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac­
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little 
or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's politi­
cal ideas" [Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652,660(1990). 
Austin undermines the rationale of Bellotti (Lowenstein 1992, 
402-5). If the "corruption" that can justify limits is political distor­
tion caused by aggregated corporate wealth rather than improper in­
fluence over public officials, then the corruption rationale is just as 
applicable to ballot measure campaigns as to candidate campaigns. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that Bellotti and Citi­
zens Against Rent Control will soon be overruled. The Court's cam­
paign finance decisions have been characterized by consistency in 
their adherence to particular rules far more than by conceptual con­
sistency. Still, Austin might open the door for certain forms of regu­
lation that have not specifically been struck down in cases already 
decided. For example, a reasonably high limit on the size of corpo­
rate contributions to a ballot measure campaign committee would 
have a good chance of being upheld under the Austin rationale. 
The Effects of Spending in Direct Democracy 
In Bellotti and CARC, the Court noted that there was no evi­
dence in the record to defend the challenged regulations. Since 
those cases were decided, a substantial body of empirical research 
has addressed the issue and produced considerable evidence that 
large spending against a measure has significant influence on elec­
tion results (Magleby 1994; Lowenstein 1982; Zisk 1987; Bowler 
and Donovan n.d.; CCCF 1992. Conversely, see Owens and Wade 
1986). Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume also show that narrow inter-
ests—typically corporate interests—are likely to be the groups mak­
ing greatest use of the costly "initiative industry" and associated 
campaign techniques in California. Chapter 5 provides additional 
evidence consistent with the findings of most earlier studies—that 
heavy spending against initiatives has a far greater impact on vote 
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margins than spending in favor of measures. Whether such evidence 
would have changed the results in Bellotti or CARC, and whether it 
would result in the upholding of any future regulations is hard to 
say, given the delphic nature of Justice Powell's opinion for the ma­
jority in Bellotti. 
Assuming that at least some forms of regulation might pass con­
stitutional muster, is regulation desirable, and if so, what form 
should it take? Lowenstein (1982, 1992) notes two conceptions of 
fairness that might inform our evaluation of spending in campaigns. 
First, there is an equality standard of fairness that regards a cam­
paign as fair when each side has an equal ability to advance its argu­
ments, regardless of the group's size. Second, there is an intensity 
standard, under which the ability of one side to communicate its ar­
gument reflects the number of people (initially) supporting that 
side. Lowenstein writes that the two fairness standards may be in­
compatible. If one side is apathetic while the other side is actively 
campaigning, "under the intensity standard the result is regarded as 
fair although voters are exposed to a relatively one-sided debate. On 
the other hand, if measures are taken to assure a relatively even­
handed debate, the intense feelings on one side will not signifi­
cantly enhance that side's chances of success" (1982, 515-16). 
If all groups had equal resources and were equally susceptible to 
or free from collective-action problems, then the intensity standard 
of fairness would be satisfied without the need for regulation. Since 
these conditions often are not present, regulation to promote the in­
tensity standard would typically take the form of some limitation 
on the ability of well-organized groups with large resources to uti­
lize these advantages. Such regulations could result in a move from 
one-sided campaigns to virtually no campaign at all. This is not a 
pleasant choice, but it is difficult to believe that the First Amend­
ment or, indeed, the public interest, would tolerate a high degree of 
suppression, even in the name of fairness. 
Public financing would be the most straightforward means of 
promoting the equality standard of fairness. In typical cases in 
which one-sided spending results from organizational and resource 
advantages rather than one-sided enthusiasm, public financing 
would also promote the intensity standard. Public financing of bal­
lot measure campaigns would present certain technical problems 
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that are not present in public financing given to candidates. These 
problems are soluble (Lowenstein 1982). Nevertheless, although 
some states have adopted public financing for candidates, there is 
no prospect that any state will do so for ballot measures in the fore­
seeable future. 
Disclosure of the flow of money in ballot measure campaigns is 
an important and relatively noncontroversial means of regulation 
(Gerber and Lupia 1995; Lupia 1992). Most if not all states already 
have successful disclosure systems in place. The Supreme Court un­
doubtedly is an obstacle to further regulation, but perhaps no more 
so than the intrinsic difficulty of finding a solution that will work 
not only reasonably well and reasonably fairly, but that will be able 
to muster enough political support to be adopted. 
Judicial Review 
Statutes passed by the initiative process are subject to judicial re­
view under the state and federal constitutions, and state constitu­
tional amendments passed by initiative are reviewed under the 
United States Constitution. Of course, the likelihood of a judicial 
challenge and, most important, of the success of such a challenge 
will depend on the content of the measure. Some highly visible re­
cent examples illustrate the centrality of judicial review to the ini­
tiative process: 
1. Colorado's 1992 Amendment 2 attempted to prevent munici­
palities from prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orien­
tation. A challenge to Amendment 2 reached the United States 
Supreme Court, which struck down the measure in Romei v. 
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
2. California's Proposition 187, the 1994 Illegal Immigration Ini­
tiative, is discussed later in this book. The measure attempted 
to deny public education, nonemergency medical care, and 
other social services to illegal immigrants. Soon after Proposi­
tion 187 was passed, a federal judge enjoined its enforcement. 
As of this writing, almost three years after the election, major 
portions of Proposition 187 have yet either to go into effect or 
to be finally declared constitutional or unconstitutional. 
Election Law and Rules for Initiatives 51 
3. California's Proposition 208, passed in 1996, imposed a variety 
of regulations on campaign finance and other election prac­
tices. Five separate lawsuits have been filed challenging vari­
ous aspects of Proposition 208.3 A federal judge declined to 
grant preliminary relief in March 1997, but set a consolidated 
trial for October. Depending on the outcome of the trial, all or 
parts of Proposition 208 might be suspended for the 1998 elec­
tion campaign, though a final ruling on the constitutional is­
sues will probably come later. 
4. California's Proposition 209, approved in 1996, prohibits most 
preferences based on race or gender in public education, public 
employment, and public contracting. A federal judge enjoined 
implementation of Proposition 209 soon after the election, but 
his injunction was vacated in 1997 by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. Proposition 209 thus was reinstated, but its ulti­
mate fate must await a full trial and subsequent appeals. 
The Guaranty Clause 
A threshold contention has been that the initiative process itself 
violates the Guaranty Clause, article 4, section 4, of the Constitu­
tion, which states that: "The United States shall guarantee to every 
state in this union a republican form of government, and shall pro­
tect each of them against invasion." Those who believe the initia­
tive process violates the Guaranty Clause maintain, relying in part 
on Madison's Federalist No. 10, that the "republican form of gov­
ernment" guaranteed must consist of a representative government, 
in contrast with a "democratic" form relying on direct action by the 
voters. The constitutionality of a tax adopted by initiative in Ore­
gon was challenged on this theory in Pacific States Tel. eD Tel. Co. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The Supreme Court declined to reach 
the merits of this challenge, holding instead that questions raised 
under the Guaranty Clause are "nonjusticiable," i.e., not subject to 
judicial review. 
State courts may not be required to follow the lead of the Supreme 
Court on questions of justiciability. Hans Linde, a distinguished 
scholar and former member of the Oregon Supreme Court, has ar­
gued that state courts should declare that the submission to the vot­
ers of certain types of measures, particularly those that stigmatize 
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particular groups, violates the requirement of a republican form of 
government (Linde 1993, 1994). Colorado's Amendment 2 and Cali-
fornia's Proposition 187 might be examples, though their supporters 
would emphatically disagree. Nevertheless, state courts to date 
have followed Pacific States and declined to pass on whether the 
initiative process violates the Guaranty Clause. A recent example 
was in Justice Linde's own state of Oregon, Lowe v. Keisling, 882 P. 
2d91(Or.App. 1994). 
Standards of Judicial Review 
A challenge to a particular initiative measure may take one of 
two forms, though both may be and frequently are combined in one 
action. The first, which we have already considered, contends that 
the measure is not a proper one for adoption by initiative. For exam­
ple, the measure may be outside the subject matter contained 
within the initiative power in the state, or it may be a constitu­
tional revision or contain more than one subject. The other form of 
challenge contends that the measure violates some substantive pro­
vision of the federal or state constitution. 
Some critics of the initiative process have proposed that when 
initiatives are challenged for substantive unconstitutionality, they 
should be subjected to particularly rigorous review. In the words of 
the late Julian Eule (1990), they should receive a "hard look." Eule 
based his argument on the constitutional system of checks and bal­
ances, which he contended is largely circumvented by the initiative 
process: "Where courts are but one of many checks on majority 
preferences, they serve predominantly as a safety net to catch those 
grains of tyrannical majoritarianism that slip through when the 
constitutional filtering system malfunctions. . . . Where, however, 
the filtering system has been removed, courts must play a larger 
role—not because direct democracy is unconstitutional, nor be­
cause it frequently produces legislation that we may find substan­
tively displeasing or short sighted, but because the judiciary stands 
alone in guarding against those evils incident to transient, impas­
sioned majorities that the Constitution seeks to dissipate" (Eule 
1990, 1525). 
Eule proposes that the "hard look" is particularly important 
when opponents claim that an initiative measure infringes on indi­
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vidual rights or equality interests. In contrast, in initiatives where 
the electorate acts to improve the processes of legislative represen­
tation, the justification for heightened judicial vigilance is absent: 
"Measures to enforce ethics in government, regulate lobbyists, or 
reform campaign finance practices pose no distinctive threat of ma­
joritarian tyranny" (1990, 1559-60). 
A skeptic might suggest that Eule's position on when a "hard 
look" is desirable reflected his own political preferences. Certainly, 
many have believed, including many courts, that governmental 
ethics requirements and regulation of lobbyists and of campaign fi­
nance have seriously infringed on individual rights and equality in­
terests. More generally, critics of Eule's "hard look" approach argue 
that it is unnecessary, a misplaced remedy for the defects of the ini­
tiative process, and may hinder rather than further the constitu­
tional system of checks and balances (Charlow 1994; Baker 1991). 
Conclusion 
In the last three or four decades, the field of election law has ex­
ploded, as legislatures have subjected major portions of the political 
process to regulation and courts have dramatically extended the 
ways in which the Constitution constrains that process. As this 
chapter has shown, the initiative process has by no means been im­
mune from these trends. 
Plainly, it behooves those who must deal with initiatives— 
whether as proponents, campaigners, or challengers—to inform 
themselves of all the applicable legal requirements in the particular 
state, in far more detail than this chapter has been able to provide. 
Aside from its practical importance, consideration of the rules of 
the initiative game is central to the great normative and policy 
questions surrounding the process. The debate over whether the ini­
tiative should exist will no doubt continue into perpetuity, but for 
those who live in initiative states, the more immediate question is 
not whether the process should exist but how it does and should 
work. The ground rules have a major effect on how the process ac­
tually works. To change the ground rules is the most efficacious 
means of making it work better—or, if we are not very careful, of 
making it worse. 
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NOTES 
1. Rules requiring a legislative supermajority vote to raise state taxes 
have been adopted by initiative in Arizona, Colorado, California, and Wash­
ington (Tolbert 1994; see also chapter 8 of this volume). 
2. For edited versions of the major decisions, together with commentary 
and extensive references to the large scholarly literature, see Lowenstein 
1995, 507-797. 
3. One of the coauthors of this chapter represents the plaintiffs in one of 
these actions. 
California's Political Warriors: 
Campaign Professionals 
and the Initiative Process 
DAVID MCCUAN, SHAUN BOWLER, 
TODD DONOVAN, AND KEN FERNANDEZ 
Opponents of the initiative process have long criticized its ama­
teurism. Direct democracy gives the power of writing laws over to 
ordinary citizens, as opposed to keeping it where many believe it 
can be sensibly wielded, in the hands of legislators. Whatever other 
flaws legislators may have, runs the argument, they are at least fa­
miliar with the demands of drafting, writing, and amending legisla­
tion in modern societies—while ordinary citizens are not. It should 
come as no surprise, then, to find a series of arguments that criticize 
the initiative process on the ground that voters are easily fooled by 
slick ad campaigns and the like, since they lack the depth of knowl­
edge of professional legislators. 
Somewhat surprisingly, some supporters of the initiative process 
can arrive at similar conclusions from a very different set of as­
sumptions. For them, amateurism meant that "professional" politi­
cians could be bypassed by citizen-sponsored initiatives, and that 
narrow and sectional interests could thus be defeated by supporters 
/of the "common good.;  In fact, a major cause of dismay for contem­
porary supporters of the initiative process has been the perceived 
decline in its amateur status. From this perspective, what was once 
the province of good government amateurs has recently been taken 
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over, and possibly subverted, by big-money special interests and 
their hired-gun campaign firms. In consequence, while critics of the 
initiative process target its amateurism, supporters bemoan its lost 
"innocence" and newfound professionalism. 
As an example of the latter view, California's Jerry Brown, a sup­
porter of political reform efforts and of the initiative process, de­
clared that "[t]he initiative was an instrument to give the people the 
power to make their own laws, but it is very rapidly becoming a tool 
of the special interests" (California Elections and Reapportionment 
Committee 1972, 48). 
The former view was expressed in the same hearings by a politi­
cian more sympathetic to representative than direct democracy. 
Henry Waxman, then a member of the California Assembly, com­
mented that "PR firms and advertising agencies are packing these 
highly complex constitutional amendments and statutes with jin­
gles challenging the creative witticisms of Alka-Seltzer commer­
cials. Any legislator would be embarrassed to utter on the floor of 
the legislature the simplistic slogans we find on television, radio 
and billboards" (California Elections and Reapportionment Com­
mittee 1972, 2). Even more vehement were the words of Charles 
O'Brien, a representative of Citizens Against Higher Taxes (a pop­
ulist antitax group): "It seems to me we are witnessing in proposi­
tion after proposition a repeated and deliberate misleading of the 
public and a debasement of the very . . . process" (California Elec­
tions and Reapportionment Committee 1972, 24). 
These comments, from very different "players" in the California 
political system, speak to the same general argument; namely, that 
professionalism, especially professionalism in campaigning, some­
how undermines the initiative process. These comments, more­
over, have been frequently echoed since then. Outcomes of the ini­
tiative process, it is argued, may represent the impact of "big 
money" more than "good ideas" (Lawrence 1995, 74), and likely rep­
resent the triumph of the narrowly interested professional over the 
broad-based, grassroots amateur. 
A crucial element in this unequal battle is the campaigning pe­
riod. During this period, citizens, often facing complex constitu­
tional and policy issues for the very first time, are subject to the 
blandishments of rival campaigns. How these campaigns are con­
ducted, and by whom, might shape eventual election outcomes. 
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Given the absence of traditional guides to voting, such as party la­
bels, the effects of ballot proposition campaigns will possibly be 
more consequential than the effects of candidate campaigns, where 
partisanship anchors loyalties and voter assessments. 
In this chapter and the next, we shift our focus to the role of the 
campaign industry in direct democracy—both as a player in its own 
right, and as a vehicle through which battles between "special in­
terests" and the "public interest" are fought. We examine three is­
sues relevant to these debates. First, we offer a brief history of the 
evolution of the initiative campaign industry in California, the 
state best known for innovations in political campaigning. Second, 
through a series of interviews with professional campaigners en­
gaged in the initiative process, we detail how these professionals 
perceive their own role in direct democracy. Third, we then exam­
ine how different types of groups make use of these professionals 
and suggest that, at least in California, seeing initiative campaigns 
as a fight between narrow professional interests who use the indus­
try and broad-based amateurs who do not is too simple. 
We begin with a look at the campaign industry itself. Although 
much of the discussion surrounding the influence of interest groups 
and their hired-gun campaigners becomes heated very quickly, little 
is known about the actual campaign industry. In particular, it is lit­
tle recognized that the campaign industry has been a feature of the 
initiative process almost from the very start. 
Political Marketing in California: The Early Years 
The contemporary criticism of excessive spending and excessive 
professionalism found a voice/ as we saw, in assembly hearings held 
twenty-five years ago. As complaints in 1972 anticipated those 
heard today, they also echoed themes heard a full fifty years before. 
In the 1920s, investigations of direct democracy by the Jones Com­
mittee of the California Senate disclosed two outstanding features: 
"(1) Startlingly large expenditures in campaigns on such measures 
(2) Campaign methods and practices that constitute a menace to our 
electoral system" (California Senate Journal [CSJ] 1923, 1782). 
By "startlingly large," the Committee was referring to seven 
propositions on the 1922 ballot that, combined, saw in excess of 
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$1 million being spent on campaign activity. Over $660,000 was 
spent that year contesting the Water and Power Act, mostly by the 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company's campaign against the proposal. 
In addition to these seven propositions, another six saw an addi­
tional $21,000 in spending. All figures, it should be stressed, are in 
1922 dollars—which means that tremendous sums of money were 
being spent. These figures led the committee to conclude that "the 
power of money in influencing public opinion . . . presents a prob­
lem in direct legislation which the citizens of this State cannot 
safely ignore" (CSJ 1923, 1783). 
In noting the expenditure of such large sums before the televi­
sion era, it is intriguing to ask what kinds of campaign activities 
took place. Before TV, of course, there was radio, and radio broad­
casts on propositions were advertised in the Los Angeles Times at 
least as early as 1928; but there were many other campaigning out­
lets. In 1936, for example, the chain stores and independent mer­
chants organized into two groups to fight a chain-store license mea­
sure (Proposition 22 of that year): "Both [sides] spent huge sums on 
advertising in newspapers, on billboards, over the radio, from sound 
trucks, on motion picture screens, on automobile stickers, by air­
plane or dirigible trailers and sky-writing, and by premiums to cus­
tomers in the various stores. Programs were broadcast with such 
headliners as Conrad Nagel as master of ceremonies" (Cottrell 
1939, 44). 
At this point we should make clear an important analytical dis­
tinction between political marketing techniques and the political 
marketing industry. Although the two are related, they are also dis­
tinct features on the electoral landscape. Marketing techniques, the 
use of pollsters, spin doctors, direct mailing, and the like can be 
used by party bosses, interest groups, corporations, or professional 
campaigners. But the existence of an enduring professional cam­
paign industry provides a potential campaign organization to any 
episodic initiative contestant who wishes to fight in an election, 
whether he or she is part of the normal political structure or not. 
The development of the political marketing industry was, of 
course, tied to the development of the commercial marketing sec­
tor, and the adoption of political marketing techniques closely 
paralleled the development of mass marketing in the commercial 
sector (Bowler, Donovan, and Fernandez 1996). Early on, many indi­
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viduals found short-term paid employment conducting such cam­
paigns: "[T]here were managers, party hacks and volunteers to stuff 
envelopes, raise money and write copy. But always, [after election 
day] the posters came down, the headquarters were swept out and 
campaign workers packed off to whatever fate awaited them 'off­
year7" (Rapaport 1989, 418-19). 
This seasonal rhythm changed with the formation of the first per­
manent organization devoted to political campaigning. Whitaker &. 
Baxter's Campaigns Inc. was founded in California in 1930. One of 
the first campaigns the new firm worked on was a referendum on a 
Central Valley water project in 1933;1 thereafter they handled five or 
six initiatives in each election (McWilliams 1951, 348; Kelley 1957, 
chap. 2). With this increase in professionalism came a series of ini­
tiative campaigns demonstrating the serious presence of what we 
now call political marketing techniques. In 1939 Cottrell wrote, 
"[T]here has grown up a professional class of persons who spend 
their entire time in managing campaigns for this or that [ballot] mea­
sure" (Cottrell 1939, 43). The phrase has grown up is quite revealing, 
since it implies the existence of firms that predate 1939. 
Writing in 1936, V. O. Key also noted the existence of Campaigns 
Inc. He found the firm handling all phases of campaigns for candi­
dates, as well as for organizations interested in constitutional 
amendments or other issues. Key viewed the establishment of such 
a firm operating successfully on a commercial basis as extremely 
significant, since it indicated a trend away from personal politics of 
the precinct variety toward a reliance on mass propaganda tech­
niques (Key 1936, 719 n.15). 
Key also noted that campaigning associated with initiatives such 
as Proposition 22 was not exceptional for the period. The same 
methods were employed in 1938 for and against the "$30 Every 
Thursday" plan, repeal of the sales tax and adoption of a form of 
single tax, the revenue bond act, the labor control initiative, and the 
highway and traffic safety commissions. The year of the chain-store 
tax initiative, total expenditures on all proposals exclusive of expen­
ditures for candidates would exceed $2 million (Cottrell 1939, 44). 
The industrial scale of initiative campaigning can be seen in just 
one 1948 California initiative that involved the distribution of 1 mil­
lion pamphlets, 4.5 million postcards and 50,000 direct-mail tar­
geted letters, and 3,000 radio spots on 109 stations, in addition to 
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bumper stickers, campaign buttons, sound trucks, outdoor bill­
boards and posters, theater and cinema slides (which may have 
played to as many as two million people), newspaper ads, and TV 
spots. Through these means, such campaigns could reach the mil­
lions of voters necessary for a proposition or candidate to succeed 
(McWilliams 1951, 420). 
By the 1950s Whitaker & Baxter were not alone as political con­
sultants in the state—perhaps "dozens" of firms were in operation 
in California by this time [California Commission on Campaign Fi­
nancing [CCCF] 1992, 199), at least several of whom started out as 
employees of Whitaker &. Baxter (Pritchell 1959). As the political 
marketing industry matured, it also developed greater specializa­
tion. Whitaker &. Baxter initially offered a one-stop shop for all 
kinds of political consultations.2 But specialization soon led to 
more firms being formed. King Research, for example, provided 
polling data to Whitaker & Baxter, while Robinson & Co. helped to 
collect, for a fee, the signatures required to place an issue on the bal­
lot for them—a service now termed petition management, but a 
common feature of initiative campaigns even before World War I 
(see Bowler, Donovan, and Fernandez 1996 for review). 
A major factor in the rise of the modern campaign industry lies 
in the effects of the initiative process and other election laws intro­
duced by the Progressives that were directed at political parties 
themselves. These reforms subverted the traditional electioneering 
function of the party and provided the opportunity for private (i.e., 
nonparty) organizations to offer advice and conduct campaigns. As 
V. O. Key wrote, "[T]he more intelligent campaign managers are 
finding that money spent for radio time, newspaper space, bill­
boards and direct mail advertising is more wisely invested than 
money paid to self-styled potentates of petty bailiwicks [party 
bosses]" (Key 1936, 720). 
By adopting civil service reforms, direct democracy, nonpartisan 
(local) elections, candidate primaries, cross-filing in primaries, and 
other such laws, California's parties lost much of their influence as 
organizations contesting elections (Bell and Price 1984). In fact, un­
less the major political parties were to line up as opponents on bal­
lot propositions, then the role for parties in direct democracy was 
strictly limited, more or less by design. Party organizations, particu­
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larly those weakened by progressive reforms, are simply not as rele­
vant when contesting ballot propositions as they are in contesting 
candidate contests. This left those who did support (or oppose) 
propositions without the traditional organizational infrastructure of 
campaigning. Weak party organizations and a steady demand for 
campaign services begat by frequent initiatives thus provided the 
basis for the development of an enduring campaign industry, inde­
pendent of parties (see Bowler, Donovan, and Fernandez 1996 for a 
longer elaboration of this argument). 
As this brief review has shown, critiques of the excessive prof es­
sionalization of a supposedly amateur process have been around for 
a very long while, but so have the particular objects of criticism— 
the use of political marketing techniques and the existence of a po­
litical marketing industry. Thus, the critique of excessive profes­
sionalism and of the "special interest" nature of direct democracy 
legislation has been in existence almost as long as the initiative 
process itself. This is not entirely surprising, since the incentive to 
form a campaign industry is, at least in part, a consequence of the 
initiative process itself. Once formed, the campaign industry is dif­
ficult to disband. The large number of elections—both candidate 
and proposition—in places like California, Arizona, Colorado, and 
Oregon have meant a large number of paying customers desperate 
for advice on how to win their election. 
California's Initiative Campaign Professionals 
in the 1990s 
Since the 1950s this initiative campaign industry has grown even 
more specialized—so much so that we may talk of it as a mature in­
dustry. Exact and consistent figures of the size of the California 
campaign industry in general, let alone that part of it devoted to di­
rect democracy elections, are hard to come by. One reason for some 
uncertainty over exact numbers is that political professionals from 
out of state do play a prominent role in statewide candidate elec­
tions. In 1990, for example, Dianne Feinstein's gubernatorial cam­
paign retained KRC Research & Consulting of New York for its 
polling services. Similarly, Pete Wilson's campaign hired Don Sipple 
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of Strategic Communications, Inc. to produce media advertise­
ments (Hagstrom 1990). In our interviews with initiative campaign 
consultants, none mentioned the presence of non-California-based 
operations as significant players in the initiative business. It is im­
portant to keep in mind, though, that several firms maintain offices 
in California as well as in Washington, D.C., or New York City. 
General consultants include those who handle all aspects of a 
campaign, typically contracting out with vendors for services such 
as polling, direct mail, and field operations. By our estimates, there 
are eighty-nine consultants in the state who fall into this category 
(see appendix). Approximately three dozen polling firms throughout 
the state engage in some form of survey research, voter contact list 
generation, and targeting. For six of these firms, polling services are 
secondary to primary services as general consultants, media and 
communications duties, or direct-mail services. Firms engaged 
solely in direct-mail production number in the mid-thirties as well. 
Those professionals who advertise services solely as field operations 
and organization consultants (activities often offered as part of a 
complete package of services by full-service campaign firms) num­
ber less than ten.3 
Consultants engaged solely as initiative and referendum consul­
tants number less than twenty. There is some degree of overlap be­
tween those consultants employed as professional signature gather­
ers and those working as public-relations and issues-management 
professionals. It is not uncommon for a consultant to develop an 
area of campaign expertise as a by-product of other experience in the 
political process. Thus, former press and legislative staff members 
can find themselves employed with "public affairs" firms. These 
concerns often handle the governmental relations of trade associa­
tions and narrowly based interests because of these groups' long as­
sociation with politics generally, and campaigns specifically. Other 
campaign professionals develop expertise in specific policy areas. 
One consultant, for example, has become an expert on health and 
tobacco issues. A colleague adds, "[T]he . .  . process which gives rise 
to initiatives, gives rise to consultants who get involved in initia­
tives who get real good at them. . . . One of my best friends has de­
veloped an expertise and reputation fighting tobacco concerns. He is 
sought out by these people" (Interview, 18 January 1995). 
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As part of a general trend in the consulting industry nationwide, 
California's campaign professionals were able to regroup in the 
1990s after several election cycles of consolidation and separation 
among firms. Opposition research, or "oppo" (others refer to this as 
"strategic research" or "competitive intelligence"), has appeared as 
a newer specialization as campaigns seek more information on is­
sues and actors associated with ballot measures. Opposition re­
searchers culling through fund-raising reports and campaign disclo­
sure statements now number around half a dozen firms engaged 
solely in this business. Any organization can also contract with 
press-clipping services in order to analyze the number of times an 
issue has appeared in the print media. Others provide background 
information on key players of campaign committees or voting 
records (Guskind 1990). Two areas, fund-raising and opposition re­
search, have emerged as campaigns have become more professional. 
By our estimates, more than two dozen fund-raising operations also 
conduct business in the state to help groups raise the resources to 
pay for these services. 
One consultant interviewed for this project provides the follow­
ing estimates for the size of the industry in California. "For 'hard­
core' consultants, the number is probably in the fifty to seventy 
range, but there are a lot of local groups and activists out there" 
(Anonymous interview, 19 January 1996). 
One area not included in this long list of firms and specializa­
tions is that of political law. This has become an important element 
of initiative campaigns. The California Political Attorneys Associa­
tion (CPAA) is a loose-knit trade group of some fifty-five to sixty 
attorneys who provide legal advice on advertising disclaimers, cam­
paign contribution compliance, conflict-of-interest law, and disclo­
sure. These attorneys work with candidates and proposition coali­
tions often in a fee-for-service capacity. More often than not, these 
individuals work on and off with campaigns and are generally not as 
deeply involved as consultants themselves (Interview, 13 September 
1996). Adding in these firms produces yet another layer of special­
ization to the overall picture of the campaign industry. 
Most general consultants have a relationship with vendors such as 
pollsters, voter list providers, or signature-gathering firms. By our es­
timates, less than half a dozen firms operate professional signature­
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gathering operations, with Kimball Petition Management (KPM) 
and National Petition Management (NPM) carrying the bulk of the 
work. Grassroots organizations typically involve their members in 
registration drives, although this too is changing. 
Paid signature gathering has been a part of the initiative process 
since the very first initiatives. Robinson's firm, dating from the late 
1930s, was the first (and for a long time the only) for-profit full-time 
firm devoted to this business. By the 1990s two large firms (KPM 
and APM in particular) had established routines in which they con­
tracted for signatures with subcontractors ("crew chiefs'7), who in 
turn contracted with those who actually gathered the signatures 
outside supermarkets, inside malls, or in other public places. Those 
gathering the signatures are paid approximately 25 to 35 cents per 
signature; the crew chiefs earn 5 to 10 cents per signature. KPM and 
APM then add in their own percentage on top of this when charging 
their clients. Prices and payments rise as the fixed period draws to a 
close (Price 1992b).4 
One common theme among both candidate-centered campaign 
personnel and direct-democracy campaign personnel is the homo­
geneity of their employers. Most consultants are typecast early on as 
working for one general ideological perspective or the other in cam­
paigns, although some vendors might be less typecast this way. This 
is partly a product of the training received by consultants through 
their work experience. As careers take shape, elites—composed of 
party leaders, staffers, and contributors—steer candidates toward 
certain consultants. This arrangement continues throughout the 
campaign process. Media consultants with a track record in the state 
are joined by pollsters and direct-mail specialists they have worked 
with before, while field operatives, fund-raising specialists, and op­
position researchers complete the formidable team. This team is 
usually hired by specific issue-group or corporate concerns. 
In one narrow sector, for example, Larry Tramautola, a political 
consultant based in the San Francisco Bay Area, has carved out a 
niche statewide. After the passage of Proposition 13 by California 
voters in 1978, local property taxes that previously funded many 
local government functions became squeezed as municipalities 
struggled with the impact of fiscal stress. School districts were hit 
hard by this trend, notably in the areas of facility maintenance and 
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new construction. The passage in 1986 of Proposition 62 required 
that local governments and districts obtain a two-thirds majority of 
votes in a referendum to approve new taxes or increases in taxes 
that were often used to service bonds. Many school districts, fearing 
further erosion of services, sought professional help after several 
early ballot measures did not clear the two-thirds majority hurdle. 
Tramautola stepped forward with his experience working for then 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Bill Honig (Lindsay 
1996). With experience in more than thirty local bond campaigns 
from northern California to the southland, Tramautola became reG­
ognized as an expert in voter targeting and message delivery in local 
ballot measures. One observer relates, "Everybody uses Larry now, 
he's sort of cornered the market" (Lindsay 1996). 
While most general consultants typically work for interests 
broadly located at only one "end" of the political spectrum, there 
are several vendors that provide fee-for-service operations regardless 
of ideology. These firms make up legal representation for reporting 
compliance, voter database and list generation, and signature gath­
ering. One consultant adds, "We provide services to whoever gener­
ally wants to use our service. There are very limited circumstances 
under which we wouldn't provide services. . . . We always have to 
analyze conflict-of-interest situations" (Interview, 13 September 
1996). Still another professional adds, "As a vendor, I work to pro­
vide resources to implement the poll numbers. I service consul­
tants, and most consultants know that they can call me and I will 
talk to them" (Interview, 19 January 1996). 
Thus, from its start in the 1930s the political marketing industry 
associated with the initiative process has matured substantially. The 
most important marketing innovation is perhaps not simply the use 
of commercial techniques in politics (TV ads, direct mail, polls, 
focus groups, Web pages), but rather the existence of this stand-alone 
industry, independent of parties. Once this industry developed, a 
major traditional function of political parties—contesting elec-
tions—was taken away and, to some extent, given to "hired guns." 
The existence of this profession has led to criticism, as we saw, of 
excessive professionalism in what is supposedly a grassroots (ama­
teur) political process. This has led to a related set of criticisms ar­
guing that professional campaigners are readily able to manipulate 
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public opinion, often against the general good and toward narrow, 
sectional, private interests. Needless to say, those who work in the 
campaign industry argue that their role is a largely passive and tech­
nical one. For example, at the same California Assembly hearings 
that decried the manipulative and dishonest behavior of political 
campaigns, Whitaker5 stated that when they are hired 
we devise a plan of campaign. We lay it out for them and ask them 
is this the way that you would concur in going at the issue? Then 
we go through the total research, the independent analysis, shop it 
out, farm it out, bring it back, and then lay it out one, two, three, 
four, this is how we propose that this thing be done. 
In the campaigns that we are involved [in], we have two critical 
committees. One is the finance committee, the other is the steering 
committee. The steering committee approves every bit of copy that 
goes out that we propose: sometimes they change it or suggest that 
we go back and do it differently. So this is not something we conjure 
up in the middle of the night and drop on a billboard. (California 
State Assembly 1972, 125-26) 
These, and similar, statements paint a picture of a large and so­
phisticated industry of professionals, devoted to supplying technical 
advice to anyone who may pay the bills. Against this, however, 
must be set the views of those critics who argue that this campaign 
industry is far from a passive actor, but rather is an active and dam­
aging player in what was once an amateur process. In the next sec­
tion, we focus upon the activities of the campaign industry to ex­
amine whether or not the initiative process is failing in its original 
intent. Among other things, we focus on how professionals see their 
services being used by "special" narrow interests as opposed to 
broad "public" or grassroots interests. 
Views from the Campaign Professionals 
In order to assess the initiative campaign industry, we conducted 
structured interviews over an eighteen-month period with general 
consultants, pollsters, media producers, lawyers, and direct-mail 
specialists, many of whom specialize as initiative and referendum 
consultants in local and statewide races. All interviews were 
recorded and notes transcribed immediately afterwards, and some 
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who spoke did so only on the condition of anonymity. Individuals' 
names are thus not listed with their quotations. The average inter­
view was 55 minutes long. 
Waging Initiative Campaigns 
In some ways, ballot proposition contests mark a very different 
campaign environment from candidate campaigns. In both kinds of 
election, however, consultants emphasize dealing with "the per­
suadables" in an election. While a special election campaign aims to 
garner the so-called "fourteen-percenters" or activists who most fre­
quently vote, most campaigns concentrate on the remaining 
"eighty-six-percenters" for votes. A different campaign is required 
for each type of election and, often, for each type of proposition. 
This means there are no "cookie-cutter" campaigns, where a candi­
date or group can apply some type of standardized chart to navigate 
the waters of a campaign. Campaign conditions are often idiosyn­
cratic, and typically very changeable. As one professional put it, the 
substance of the campaign can be determined by the policy issues in 
an initiative: 
Initiatives are a device for enacting legislation.. .. You are voting on 
an actual piece of state law and part of what the proponents or oppo­
nents of a measure do is . .  . make an assessment of whether the 
public is going to be favorably or unfavorably disposed towards 
them. So, most initiatives' campaigns really are processes of both 
one side and then the other side attempting to educate voters about 
different aspects of the measure. And as people get more informa­
tion that tends to influence their attitudes about them [the ballot 
measures]. There typically is considerable attitudinal flux during the 
course of an initiative campaign. (Interview, 13 February 1997, Santa 
Monica, Calif.) 
A familiar refrain throughout our interviews was the important 
mutual relationship between consultants and the media. Campaign 
professionals seek to put their candidate or measure in the most 
positive light before the voters, while reporters become dependent 
on feeding the media's need to inform the public. In the words of 
one consultant, "I don't think that there would be any political 
news if it weren't for consultants . . . they [the media] need us, we 
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need them" (Interview, 2 May 1996). But however much the media 
need or like campaign consultants, the campaigns these consultants 
work on also need media coverage. When working on a ballot mea­
sure campaign, one firm makes its Sacramento office responsible for 
"just going out and securing endorsements and arranging for editor­
ial board meetings with newspapers. This is a major box that needs 
to get checked" (Interview, 19 January 1995). 
Another commonalty between candidate-centered and direct 
democracy campaigns is the use of a baseline or benchmark poll 
early in the cycle, often prior to a campaign's official start. Noted 
pollster Bill Hamilton, commenting on the phases of a political 
campaign, has described this stage as "early, when the campaigns 
are getting organized, strategy is developed, staff is hired, and the 
candidate is reviewing his or her issue material, but the vast major­
ity of voters are unaware of any candidate or campaign activity" 
(Thurber and Nelson 1995, 171). This poll is used to test voter reac­
tions to issues and name recognition. Perhaps more important, 
though, is the drafting of messages designed to gain support or test 
likely objections for a ballot measure. Analysis of the content of an­
swers provided by the sample, typically in the range of 500 to 1,500 
registered voters, is exhaustive in order to provide as complete a 
view as possible of the challenges ahead. In the words of one con­
sultant, "[W]e test what the public believes to matter" (Interview, 
13 September 1996). This is a somewhat simpler matter in initiative 
campaigns than it is in candidate campaigns. 
There are fewer variables in a ballot measure campaign. You can do 
a benchmark poll with a ballot measure at the outset of the cam­
paign, and pretty much devise a strategy and play it out without any 
significant alteration right through Election Day. With a candidate 
campaign, there is an additional variable of at least two candidates 
and their personalities which you have only a limited amount of 
control over. You never get through a candidate campaign without 
having to make some major adjustment in strategy. (Interview, 19 
January 1995) 
The campaign waged by activists against three major AIDS ini­
tiatives is a case in point. Gay and lesbian activists waged an ex­
haustive statewide campaign seeking out key endorsements to per­
suade voters of the dangers inherent in the passage of any of the 
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three measures. These endorsements, from"doctors representing the 
California Medical Association (CMA) and nurses representing 
the California Nurses Association (CNA), were used because of the 
public's respect for opinions offered by members of these profes­
sions. As one consultant relates, "Before we did a thing in the AIDS 
initiatives campaigns, we did extensive polling on the issue and we 
really found that the only people who really had credibility to the 
public on the issue of AIDS were the doctors and nurses. So, we ran 
a campaign, in all three cases . . . completely driven by the medical 
establishment" (Interview, 2 May 1996). 
Without exception, the consultants we interviewed believe that 
an effective fund-raising base, combined with early access by the 
consultant to develop the framework of a ballot measure, provide 
the greatest potential for electoral success. These interviews further 
showed that the involvement of professional campaign advice came 
at a later stage for grassroots groups. Consultants in California are 
generally retained at an earlier period by trade and interest groups as 
compared to the practices of more amateur-based organizations. 
Based on our interviews, trade and industry groups, such as the 
CNA, the California Teachers Association (CTA), or the California 
Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA), approach a legal team to draft a 
proposal in order to clear the hurdle of the actual ballot language. 
For measures these groups are involved with, this process usually 
occurs twelve to eighteen months prior to the actual election. Most 
of the work at this stage includes coalition building and circulation 
of draft measures among the group's members. In some cases, this 
first stage can include the filing of incorporation or nonprofit status 
for tax purposes. 
One organization that provides legal services on the actual ballot 
language used in statewide propositions has a multiphase campaign 
strategy. The first stage includes the drafting of the ballot measure. 
Typically, clients are presented with the motivations of likely oppo­
nents of the measure. These arguments are built from information 
gathered by pollsters and the findings of focus groups. In the words 
of one professional, "I draft the arguments for the 'no' side. Some­
times you'll see the clients' eyes open wide. I want to show them 
how nasty it could get out there" (Ainsworth 1990-91). 
After ballot language has been drafted and agreed upon, "typically 
that is when you realize that you need some kind of professional 
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help. And if you are serious, you end up with a consultant right 
around that juncture" (Anonymous interview, 19 January 1995). 
The next step includes organizing and further coalition-building 
activities. 
The early stage of the process also includes presentation of the 
proposed measure to the state attorney general's office. At this step, 
the attorney general's office provides a title and summary of the 
measure. This critical juncture often involves group members in a 
long negotiating process with the state's attorneys. One consultant 
relates his experience: "The title and summary end up, for many 
measures, being critical to your ability to pass them. And if you 
can't get a title and summary that is satisfactory, oftentimes the 
supporters will go back and redraft the entire initiative just to try to 
get a more favorable title and summary from the attorney general" 
(Interview, 18 January 1995). Representatives of a measure's sup­
porters work diligently to put the best face on the proposed initia­
tive. In the words of one, "The whole idea is to try to draft some­
thing that is a fair description of the measure, but also shows that it 
[the draft initiative] would have a positive impact and would appeal 
to voters" (Ainsworth 1990-91). 
A consultant who has been involved in numerous statewide bal­
lot campaigns adds: 
In most instances, I am brought in before the drafting begins [of an 
initiative]. When people are doing what might be called a feasibility 
study I am asked, "If an initiative like this were on the ballot, would 
it be possible to win? What would be necessary to put together a 
winning campaign?" And those questions are usually asked before 
the initiative is written. I am there playing a role in the writing of 
the initiative itself.... It also depends on what capacity people bring 
me into a campaign for . .  . if they bring me in as a campaign man­
ager, then it is usual that I play a role in the drafting of the initiative,-
if they bring me in as a media consultant, I am often brought in after 
the initiative has been written and given the task of developing com­
mercials to help pass or defeat it. (Interview, 19 January 1995) 
Another important step in ballot measure campaigns involves 
the analysis offered by the legislative analyst on the fiscal impact of 
a proposed measure. By this point in a campaign, a substantial in­
vestment in resources has usually been made. Consultants claim to 
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provide the strategic tools needed to ensure the goals of a group are 
met. As one relates, "It takes you a good year to get qualified for the 
ballot. You have to start a year ahead of time or more. We spend a 
great deal of time ensuring that the legislative analyst is presented 
with a fair and accurate picture of what the measure entails" (Inter­
view, 13 September 1996). 
Is There Anything Left of Grassroots Democracy? 
The traditional view of ballot propositions noted above can help us 
think about the type of groups that compete in the direct democracy 
arena. A major reason offered by advocates to explain why the ini­
tiative process is a good thing is that it helps provide a voice for the 
"grassroots/' and for ordinary citizens. Such voices might not be 
heard by legislators who may be too timid, too insensitive, or too 
tied to special interests to respond to popular appeals. One of the 
main normative arguments in favor of the initiative process, then, 
is that it represents a means by which the amateur may best the 
professional politician. Direct democracy should thus provide ac­
cess to "outside" groups. 
However, election campaigns on behalf of candidates and ballot 
measures have become increasingly professionalized and ever more 
expensive as pollsters, media consultants, and PR people all take up 
their roles in campaigns. With an established but expensive indus­
try available for waging campaigns, well-financed groups who have 
a presence in electoral politics also have a vehicle for competing in 
the direct democracy arena. 
This might suggest that initiative campaigns are frequently 
likely to embody a clash between amateur "outsiders" pitted 
against established interests who rely on campaign professionals. 
"Citizen" initiatives would, from this perspective, be placed on the 
ballot by grassroots insurgents who are likely to resent a profession­
alized political elite, or who at least have different policy goals. 
Lacking many resources beyond their electoral size, the citizen 
groups would make minimal use of professional help. On the other 
hand, the "elite" or "special" interests would serve as the opposi­
tion, using the initiative industry to defeat "citizen" proposals. 
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From our interviews it did become clear that broad-based, "ama­
teur" organizations have a different approach to campaigning when 
compared to many trade- and industry-based groups, but they too 
cannot avoid relying on the machinery of the campaign industry. 
One difference lies in how early in the process either type of 
group hires professional help. Trade associations and those "backed 
by special interests or business interests, or groups that have been 
through the process before" usually involve consultants earlier than 
less-established groups (Interview, 19 January 1995). On the other 
hand, community-based "grassroots" groups, usually formed at the 
local level, are less likely to hire a consultant early. One consultant 
who has witnessed this notes that "the ones [groups] at the state 
level approach me way ahead of time . . . whereas at the local level, 
they may approach me only a few months out" (Interview, 19 Janu­
ary 1996). It is interesting to note, however, that both types of 
groups will use consultants. 
Our interviews provided further insights into the advantages 
gained by involving professional consultants early, even for groups 
with a populist agenda. Asked about his role when approached by 
interests early on, one consultant related how he helped one group 
in a campaign: "In Proposition 186, which would have established a 
single-payer health care system, some people drafting that initiative 
wanted to make health services in California available to anyone 
who asked for them. And I felt that if that were the case, the oppo­
sition would point out that illegal aliens and people from other 
states would come here to get medical assistance that taxpayers 
would have to pay for. And as a result, it would be very easy to de­
feat the initiative if that clause were in it. So, that clause was 
changed and the initiative was written to cover only legal residents 
of California" (Interview, 19 January 1995). 
Other interviews provided further insights into the differences 
between the use of the initiative industry by well-established and 
less-established groups. One of the deans of California elections ex­
pressed some of the frustration that professionals have when work­
ing with less-established groups. He observed that "sometimes 
when a interest doesn't know a lot about politics, they tend to get 
involved... but a lot of times they get involved in the nitty-gritty of 
the campaign, so they argue over every sentence of the press release. 
. . . [T]he small, amateur groups do tend to be more meddlesome 
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than the professional groups, especially those who have been 
through the mill before. The amateur groups tend to think that they 
know as much or more than you do" (Interview, 24 February 1995). 
However, other campaign professionals volunteered that changes 
in California's political environment no longer allow for any mean­
ingful distinction between amateur " citizen" efforts and those "pro­
fessional" campaigns that rely heavily on the services of the initia­
tive industry: 
There is no such thing as an amateur one [initiative]. The best ex­
ample is this affirmative action one [Proposition 209 of 1996], Two 
amateurs came up with the concept. And they wrote i t . .  . but, be­
hind the scenes there are a lot of professionals involved in making 
sure it happens. I don't remember the last "amateur" one [initia­
tive]. Prop. 103, Rosenfield's insurance initiative from '88, well, 
'he was an amateur/ [But] when you look at his background . .  . it 
wasn't an amateur deal.... [Y]ou go to a local race . .. you have a 
district attorney who has been around a long time and has run cam­
paigns, you have a sheriff who has done the same, you have three or 
four unions, I am coordinating, too.. . . [I]s this an amateur initiative 
or is this a professional one? The last amateur campaign was Prop. 
13. (Interview, 19 January 1996) 
Putting these viewpoints together with the brief history of the 
campaign industry presented above, we can see an evaluation of di­
rect democracy that blurs the distinction between an originally 
"amateur" process and a newly professional one. Not only have 
marketing techniques been used in initiative contests about as soon 
as they were used commercially, and not only has the political con­
sulting industry existed since these early days, but modern cam­
paigners of all stripes—grassroots and narrow interests—are often 
sophisticated enough and have enough resources to pay for the as­
sistance of professionals. Contemporary differences between ama­
teur and professional campaign efforts may thus be differences of 
degree rather than of kind. But some differences in approach do 
seem to exist between the two types of groups. 
Overall, the results of different groups7 use of campaign profes­
sionals can be surmised by the remarks of one consultant inter­
viewed for this project. Such professionals, not surprisingly, see 
their importance in terms of affecting "election results: 
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A lot of times candidates don't bring you in until they file [but] ini­
tiatives usually come in before they start the whole process.. . . 
[B]ecause I am on the local level... I have seen the contrast be­
tween those that do [hire campaign professionals] and those that 
don't.... I can tell you that there is a huge difference. The possibil­
ity of winning when you have a consultant goes way up because it is 
not just what amount of money you spend, it is how you spend it. A 
lot of times "amateur" consultants or people who are very well in­
tended that help someone, end up wasting a lot of money. .. . They 
don't know the value of taking the soul of that message and framing 
it in a way people will read. (Interview, 28 August 1996) 
The desire to have a helping hand at the earliest stages of the 
process appears to be one of the primary factors affecting whom 
consultants choose to work with. Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 
(1993) argue that "most candidates . .  . fall somewhere in between" 
on the degree of control given to campaign professionals [99). Con­
sultants interviewed in our study do appear to appreciate discretion 
in running the campaign, if not control. After general ideological 
compatibility with a client, the most frequently mentioned factor 
in deciding whether to join a campaign was the consultant's degree 
of responsibility. This finding is in line with the work of others who 
have studied campaign professionals (Sabato 1981; Luntz 1988). 
Through our interviews, consultants also noted that many local, 
less-established interests are generally not very knowledgeable 
about the role of political advisors in campaigns. In one telling in­
terview, a consultant offered: "They [clients] usually come here like 
babes in the woods. They're really not too sure who does what  . . . 
and even when we explain to them the process and who does what 
and how to do it and how it will work best, they still don't always 
get it. They are just unfamiliar with the process and how technical 
and detailed and professionalized it is, they really don't know ex­
actly how best to do things. . . . Campaigns are really not mom and 
pop operations" (Interview, 13 September 1996). 
Overall, then, campaign professionals see themselves as provid­
ing a technical service that they believe allows their clients—grass-
roots or narrow-interests—an enhanced opportunity of victory. 
They do not see their job as promoting good or bad legislation, but 
helping their clients win. Their clients may be anyone willing and 
able to buy their advice—given general ideological common ground. 
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We also get a sense from these interviews that campaign profession­
als might be more comfortable working with well-established inter­
ests, since those groups grant the consultant greater discretion in 
running the campaign. But less-established "amateur" groups fre­
quently work with these professionals, even in local contests. 
"Grassroots" groups tend to ask for less help, and might ask later 
than more organized trade groups, but they do ask. The impact of 
these professionals may have as much to do with the timing of their 
intervention in campaigns as with the simple fact of intervention. 
At least so far as the campaign professionals themselves are con­
cerned, the earlier they are hired, the more they can affect the elec­
tion outcome. 
Rigorous empirical research on the real impact of these campaign 
professionals on the success or failure of ballot propositions is 
clearly needed, but will likely prove somewhat difficult. We can, for 
example, measure the role of spending on proposition election re­
sults (see chapter 5). If the professionals we interviewed are correct, 
however, their impact is more subtle than aggregate spending totals 
would reflect. Future studies might consider measuring not only 
spending effects, but the stage in the process that professionals were 
brought in and the discretion that groups granted them. 
The initial distinction between narrow and broad (grassroots) 
groups discussed above suggested that initiative campaigns often pit 
special interests against broad, grassroots groups, with narrow 
groups having a structural advantage due to the assistance they re­
ceive from campaign professionals. This sort of distinction is seen 
in many of the common criticisms of the initiative process. For 
example, politicians such as Jerry Brown suggest that initiative pol­
itics is a process whereby special interests push forward their leg­
islative agenda at the expense of the common good. "Genuine grass­
roots" initiative attempts are said to be undercut by the high-priced 
opposition campaigns of "special interests." Discussions with cam­
paign professionals suggest that this perspective might be too sim­
plistic, as it is increasingly difficult to determine who the genuine 
grassroots groups are. 
In the next chapter, we pose two counterarguments to the gen­
eral notion of initiative campaigns as a series of one-sided battles 
between grassroots groups and special interests. The first is that this 
is only a partial view of the range of disputes and groups that fight 
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each other through the initiative process. "Narrowly based" special 
interests can fight each other just as they may fight some "grass­
roots" citizen effort to advance a "general public good." A second 
counterargument is that a more meaningful way of looking at cam­
paigns is to distinguish between proponents and opponents in terms 
of each group's size and financial resources, and also in terms of 
when the group plays its hand in a campaign. Although the profes­
sional campaign industry might grant substantial advantages to cer­
tain groups in the initiative process, these advantages lie more with 
opponents than proponents. 
Conclusion: The New Professionalism 
in Direct Legislation 
Professional campaign consultants have become meaningful actors 
in California's political environment. Directing which proposals are 
put to the voters, designing campaign strategies, and guiding the di­
rect democracy process, California's "mercenaries of the political 
wars" have become intimate cousins behind the scenes of the 
state's politics (Green 1992, 413). Some contend that the initiative 
process has become a haven for special interests who are checked by 
a legislature doing its job well. One legislative leader has remarked, 
"Usually [a surge in initiatives] means we're doing our jobs and 
turning down ill-advised proposals that are little more than special 
interest efforts" (Scott 1996, 17). 
California's political environment requires professional assis­
tance in qualifying and operating a successful ballot measure cam­
paign, but this is not something that is unique to California. In the 
fall of 1996, all but one of the statewide ballot measures that 
reached the ballots in Washington (four measures), Oregon (seven­
teen measures), and California (twelve measures) made some use of 
professional signature-gathering firms. It is hard to find volunteer 
efforts anymore in any of these states. But the costs are particularly 
high in California. As one interviewee relates, "In California, it 
takes money and lots of it. In order to win, you need to start early, 
have direction and fund-raising . . . this is our role" (Interview, 13 
September 1996). 
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In California, groups who typically have a "capitol presence/7 
such as trade associations, unions, major public-interest organiza­
tions, and the like, have all developed a degree of sophistication 
about statewide initiative campaigns. They play in the legislative 
arena and the direct legislation arena with equal professionalism. 
Consultants who gather signatures, conduct voter surveys, and for­
mulate media messages serve this constituency and provide them a 
service. The days of party bosses controlling access to legislation dis­
appeared long ago. Campaign professionals working on direct 
democracy reflect a newer form of access to legislation. They reflect 
a subtle, circuitous level of access to the (direct) legislative pro­
cesses. These personnel, engaged in the art of modern campaigns, 
offer the tools of mass political communications to groups willing to 
pay for the services. From their perspective winning in California re­
quires not only money, but money coupled with a team of skilled ad­
visors who know how to craft a successful strategy. One consultant 
spoke of the skill he believes is required to conduct these campaigns: 
"You are trying to get inside the head of the voter. . . . [Y]ou are try­
ing to figure out what they're thinking so you can communicate to 
them in language that they understand.... It goes past that bullshit, 
though. What really matters is you called up 400 people and you 
asked them a series of relatively objective questions, and they gave it 
back to you. And you want to look at their language, almost the tex­
ture of the way that they see the world so that you can figure out 
who you are talking to and why" (Interview, 19 January 1995). 
Initiatives and ballot measure campaigns are an important nexus 
in the battle over California's politics. These ballot measures, the 
associated campaign themes, and the methods of campaigning often 
portend future trends in electoral politics nationwide. Much is 
known about the national diffusion of issues from California's bal­
lots. In 1978, Proposition 13 ushered in a new era of antitax politics. 
The battle over adoption of a California lottery preceded campaigns 
to legalize gaming establishments in states throughout the country. 
In the 1990s, California ballot measures on term limits, tougher sen­
tences on criminals, services for illegal immigrants, affirmative ac­
tion, and medical marijuana stirred debate throughout the country, 
affecting the discourse of presidential elections. Direct democracy's 
campaign professionals have also been exported from the Golden 
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State, setting up shop in Florida, Washington, Oregon, and many-
other states. The diffusion of their techniques and campaign tools 
might have as much impact on politics in these states as the issues 
on the ballot. 
APPENDIX 
Composition of the Industry 
Estimates of the size of the professional campaign industry in California 
were compiled from several sources. This method was used in order to fully 
capture the consulting universe and to account for redundancy in estimat­
ing the number of professionals engaged in direct democracy. Our estimate 
of roughly ninety regular, full-time professionals includes individual firms 
who assist initiative campaigns in the following areas: ballot signature 
gathering/petition management services, database and list management, di­
rect mail, field operations, fund-raising, general consulting, legal services 
(including drafting of ballot language and compliance measures), media 
consulting and production, and polling. 
We arrived at our estimate of the size of the industry by tracing its de­
velopment through three sources. First, we culled through the listings of 
the trade publication, Campaigns and Elections, in their annual collection 
of sources of information for more than 300 firms. This publication lists po­
litical professionals nationwide and segments these individual firms into 
areas of specialization. Second, we utilized the annual listing of political 
consultants for California published in the newsletter The Political Pulse. 
This trade journal, published by Bud Lemke, is billed as an insiders guide to 
California government and politics. Third, we referred to the work of jour­
nalists who have given political consultants greater attention in coverage of 
California politics. Two publications serve this purpose, California Journal 
and the California Political Almanac. Annual selections from this later 
work on state lobbyists and political "insiders" proved invaluable in pro­
viding a framework with which to conduct our interviews. 
Conduct of the Interviews 
Much of the material in this chapter is based on impressions of the in­
dustry we received from campaign professionals. These professionals were 
surveyed in open-ended interviews. A copy of the survey is available from 
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the editors of this book upon request. Each interview was tape-recorded and 
notes transcribed immediately after each interview. Recordings were also 
transcribed. Interviews lasted, on average, 55 minutes. 
N O T E  S 
1. In the California Assembly's 1972 Public Hearings on the Initiative 
Process (still one of the few detailed sources of information on the initiative 
campaign industry), the head of the Whitaker & Baxter firm noted that 
Whitaker Sr. had began freelance campaigning on initiatives as early as the 
1920s. 
2. Indeed, they seem to have exercised enormous influence over every 
aspect of the campaign, from planning the basic message to writing checks 
(Kelley 1956)—a situation modern managers might find quite enviable. 
3. One consultant who specializes in local ballot measures relies more 
heavily on grassroots organizing than using technological means to get out 
the vote. He adds, "You've got to get people who are potential 'no7 votes to 
vote 'yes.7 And the only way I know to do that is persuasion77 (Lindsay 
1996). While sometimes retaining pollsters, most of the campaigns handled 
by this consultant are "in-house" operations. 
4. See also California Assembly 1972 for an extensive, albeit dated, dis­
cussion of this industry and the techniques it used in order to get people to 
sign up. Also see Cronin 1989. 
5. This is the son of the original husband-and-wife team who founded 
Whitaker & Baxter. 
Contending Players and Strategies: 
Opposition Advantages 
in Initiative Campaigns 
TODD DONOVAN, SHAUN BOWLER, 
DAVID MCCUAN, AND KEN FERNANDEZ 
The last chapter illustrated that the all-volunteer statewide ini­
tiative, or "grassroots" effort, is largely a thing of the past. We demon­
strated that a highly specialized industry has developed to contest 
ballot measures, and that few contemporary statewide initiative cam­
paigns, if any, are conducted without some assistance from this polit­
ical marketing industry. At first glance this conclusion might seem to 
lend support to those who see the direct legislation process as having 
been completely taken over by the wealthy, narrowly based interests 
that the process was ostensibly designed to counterbalance. 
This is not necessarily the case. Although it is becoming increas­
ingly costly to gain ballot access and run initiative campaigns in gen­
eral, and although some initiatives generate tremendous amounts of 
spending pro and con, our evidence suggests that wealthy interests 
are rarely able to use campaign professionals to promote policies fa­
vorable to their interests. Their success lies in defeating initiatives, 
but this success should not be overestimated. However, in terms of 
marginal returns per dollar, money spent by narrow interests is prob­
ably better used defending than advancing their interests. We will 
examine the role of campaign spending pro and con in greater detail 
in chapter 5. 
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Despite the escalating costs of direct democracy, we find that or­
ganized groups with modest resources1—groups who represent 
fairly broad, diffuse constituencies—continue to place measures on 
the ballot that do pass. In California, in fact, measures that are pro­
moted by representatives of broad constituencies are more likely to 
pass than other initiatives, and the groups backing these policies are 
by no means the best-financed players in the direct democracy 
arena. A respectable proportion of these measures pass in spite of 
the fact that they threaten well-organized, wealthy interests who 
wage expensive opposition campaigns. 
This chapter examines how efforts to pass policies affecting ei­
ther broad or narrow constituencies might succeed or fail. We argue 
that the policy content of each initiative presents a certain type of 
political conflict. Different policies mobilize and affect different 
types of groups, causing unique intergroup conflicts in any individ­
ual initiative campaign. The nature of this intergroup conflict, and 
of which group "moves first" in proposing an initiative, affects 
the extent to which money and the initiative industry might shape 
outcomes. 
Types of Players 
We illustrate intergroup conflict between proponents and oppo­
nents by developing a simple typology of initiative campaigns that 
represents the different groups (or potential beneficiaries) that 
might contest a specific measure. The typology draws from the 
"policy determines politics" theme found in much of the public 
policy literature (Lowi 1972). For the purpose of simplifying the dis­
cussion, we borrow heavily from Wilson's (1980) method of classify­
ing the politics surrounding different policy issues (for very similar 
policy typologies, see Meier 1987; Ripley and Franklin 1987; Gorm­
ley 1983). Where Wilson focused on the perceived distribution 
of costs and benefits surrounding a policy, we focus on the types 
of groups that organize to advance or defeat certain public poli­
cies. Campbell (1997) has also used Wilson's typology to classify 
Colorado's ballot initiatives, but in a manner somewhat different 
than we employ here. 
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We assume that there are two types of groups (or players) that en­
gage in using the initiative: (1) Those who represent a broad, diffuse 
constituency who might benefit or be harmed by a measure, and 
(2) those who represent narrower interests who might benefit or be 
harmed by a measure. These players can propose or oppose a mea­
sure. Initiatives are classified in our typology on the basis of the 
"breadth" of the constituency of these proponent or opponent 
groups. We recognize, however, that as with nearly all political ef­
forts, relatively small groups bear the burden of organizing almost 
all "yes" and "no" initiative campaigns (Michels 1915). Group 
"breadth" is thus defined also to include the groups who stand to be 
affected by the policy, and by the constituencies represented by the 
groups contesting the initiative. The concept of a group's breadth 
goes beyond mere size by considering how unified or diffuse the 
constituency affected by an initiative might be. 
First, there are narrow-based, well-organized groups who seek to 
protect clearly identifiable interests and seek exclusive, divisible 
benefits for members (i.e., protection of profits, exemptions from 
regulations, tax breaks, etc.). They are likely to be smaller, more ho­
mogeneous, and have well-established political activities if not for­
mal political action committees (PACs). Since the benefits they 
seek are exclusive and highly visible, they may have a small num­
ber of actors or firms shouldering the organizational burdens of 
maintaining the group's political efforts (i.e., the tobacco industry, 
beer and wine distributors, oil companies, trial lawyers, rice farm­
ers, etc.; see Olson 1965). Business groups might also have advan­
tages in organizing politically as a "by-product" of their preexisting 
business organizations (Downs 1957). 
Compared to broad-based groups, these narrow groups should be 
most likely to have access to a legislature on a regular basis, and 
might often have some success in advancing their goals via the 
legislature (we will refer to these as type A players). Having well-
maintained, enduring political organizations representing their inter­
ests, these groups can raise the money to hire professionals skilled at 
engaging in initiative politics. As noted in the previous chapter, these 
trade and industry groups typically employ campaign professionals 
early in the process of developing and promoting an initiative. 
Second, there are other groups associated with diffuse con­
stituencies that, as a result of having no clear threat to their inter­
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ests or having no consensus about goals and threats, experience col-
lective-action problems that cause them to be less well organized 
(we refer to these as type B players). We assume these groups often 
seek nondivisible benefits, collective goods, or both. As such, they 
lack an ability to maintain the sort of enduring, well-financed politi­
cal organizations that might provide regular, enduring influence in a 
legislature (examples would included consumer groups, some envi­
ronmental groups, antinuclear activists, homeowners, etc.). Some of 
these broad-based groups do have enduring political organizations 
that could promote or resist various ballot initiatives. However, 
they (or entrepreneurs trying to mobilize them) may engage in poli­
tics on a sporadic basis, thus leaving the group ill equipped at 
rapidly mobilizing financial resources to respond to proposals that 
threaten their interests. 
We can think of campaigns in direct democracy as variants of 
simple games played between these actors. The first move of the 
game involves one actor proposing an initiative that changes some 
status-quo course of events. The second phase of the game involves 
response to the proposed change. The campaign, and the initiative 
industry's role in the campaign, are structured by the nature of the 
initial proposal, by the type of actor(s) threatened by the proposal, 
and by the ability of competing actors to mobilize financial re­
sources pro or con. To simplify things quite a bit, we can conceive 
that four general types of initiative contests defined by these criteria 
are represented in figure 4.1. We suggest that the role of the initia­
tive industry is most evident in one specific type of contest (type 1), 
and is somewhat important, though less so, in two others (types 
2 and 3). In other initiative contests (type 4), campaigns are less 
likely to be dominated by political marketing professionals. 
Type 1. Interest Group Contests: 
Narrow Group Challenges Narrow Group(s) 
On some rare (though increasingly common) occasions, initiative 
contests reflect a battle between two well-organized type A groups 
(or coalitions of such groups), each fighting to defend itself from 
perceived incursions by the other. Since proponents and opponents 
alike maintain long-standing political fund-raising, lobbying, and 
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Figure 4.1 A Simple Classification of Initiative Contests 
Opposition or Affected Interests 
NARROW BROAD, DIFFUSE 
Type 1 Contest Type 3 Contest 
Interest - Group Politics Vlienf Politics 
Trial attorneys v. Repeal smoking regs. 
insurance companies 
QC 
Professional regs 
Rival fishing groups 
Industry regulatory Securities lawyers v. proposals 
corporations 
Type 2 Contest Type 4 Contest 
Entrepreneurial/ Majoritarian Politics 
Populist Politics 
Criminal justice. 
Bottle bills 
Social issues/ 
Environmental regs. moral issues 
Tax the rich Political reform 
(governance policy) 
Insurance rebates 
Broad tax & 
Minimum wage spending issues 
campaign organizations, these intra-interest-group conflicts can be 
characterized by extremely high levels of spending. Given the re­
sources available to each side, the players can end up engaging in a 
qualification-and-advertising arms race, since each player has the 
resources to match the other player's campaign moves. Given the 
narrow electoral base of these groups, the proponent's petition ef­
forts are unlikely to benefit much from volunteer efforts, and will 
rely nearly exclusively on hired help. 
These conflicts are often spillovers from legislatures unable to 
broker a compromise between interest group titans. By definition, 
type A groups are more likely than type B groups to enjoy access to 
legislatures and are more frequently successful in achieving legisla­
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tive policy goals. By virtue of the access available to these type A 
groups, there are moments when they might come into conflict 
with each other within a legislature. On some occasions they reach 
a stalemate. The initiative industry and the direct legislation 
process provide them an alternative. 
In California in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the legislature 
had on repeated occasions been unable to broker deals between busi­
ness, insurance interests, and trial lawyers regarding torts and auto­
mobile insurance. In November 1988 negotiations between trial 
lawyers, insurance firms, and consumer groups aimed at brokering a 
regulatory compromise failed. This led the insurance industry to 
qualify three rival auto insurance measures, with one (Proposition 
106) specifically targeting trial lawyers. Lawyers responded by spon­
soring their own initiative targeting insurers (Proposition 100). In 
the end, over $82 million was spent contesting five insurance-
related measures—with nearly 98% spent by trial lawyers and insur­
ance interests (Lupia 1994b). 
In March of 1996 similar groups clashed again. Sensing they were 
victims of frivolous securities lawsuits, Silicon Valley business in­
terests spent over $12 million promoting two tort-reform initiatives 
that would limit attorneys' contingency fees and bar certain law­
suits. The measures were awkwardly linked to a third initiative 
proposing no-fault auto insurance. Trial lawyers matched the propo-
nent's $12 million in campaign spending and defeated all three mea­
sures [California Journal, May 1996, 9). But the conflict did not stop 
there. In addition to spending millions of dollars on media in 
March, lawyers opposing the Silicon Valley-backed initiatives em­
ployed a counterproposition strategy and drafted their own mea­
sures designed to protect contingency fees and securities lawsuits. 
Designed to weaken support for the March initiatives, the lawyers' 
countermeasures qualified late and appeared on the November 1996 
ballot2 (Borland 1996). By November, tort reformers had been placed 
in the same position in which they had once put trial lawyers. Busi­
ness concerns spent another $40 million in the 1996 fall election 
against the lawyers' initiative in an attempt to maintain the status 
quo [California Journal, Dec. 1996). 
These narrow-interest-group conflicts are not limited to Califor­
nia, or the modern era. In Oregon, some of the earliest initiatives 
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were rival measures filed by distinct groups competing over the 
same fish stock. In 1908, after they were unable to reach a compro­
mise in the legislature, rival regional groups qualified initiatives de­
signed to block the other from fishing (Eaton 1912). Eighty-eight 
years latter, Oregon voters were presented with a tobacco industry-
funded initiative relating to health care. The tobacco industry spent 
$750,000 to help qualify an initiative (Measure 39) to counter an­
other initiative sponsored by health care interests and insurers that 
would increase taxes on tobacco in order to fund public antismok­
ing programs. The tobacco-backed initiative would have required 
health plans to cover "alternative health providers/' such as chiro­
practors, acupuncturists, and naturopaths. Tobacco interests hoped 
that the health care industry would be forced to spend resources 
defending themselves, rather than promoting "yes" voting on the 
tobacco tax. A second measure sponsored by an ophthalmologist 
(Measure 35) also diverted potential health care industry (or HMO) 
funds away from advocating the tax. 
Given the resources that each type A group can bring to these 
contests, the utilization of the initiative campaign industry is most 
pronounced here. Each side can respond to proposals and campaign 
moves by the other—making use of law firms to draft and challenge 
measures, petition management firms for rapid qualification of 
counterproposals, and media consultants for production of ads and 
purchasing of airtime. Given the narrow electoral base of support 
for a type A group, and the tendency for negative spending to have 
greater impact than proponent spending (see chapter 5 in this vol­
ume), type A opponents should enjoy substantial advantages over 
type A proponents. The ability to qualify countermeasures can ad­
vantage opponents if it confuses voters, but it also advantages oppo­
nents by forcing the proponent to divert potential "yes" campaign 
spending into fighting other measures. 
All of this suggests that interest group initiative-politics often 
leads to a stalemate (or continues an existing stalemate), where vast 
amounts of money are spent but few measures are passed. In the 
California "businesses v. lawyers" example noted above, all nine of 
the initiatives sponsored by these rival groups were defeated.3 The 
only measure to pass from these battles was a consumer group's in­
surance proposal (Proposition 103, which we classify as a type 2 
contest).4 In the Oregon "health care v. tobacco" example, the to­
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bacco industry-backed countermeasure and the ophthalmologist's 
measure both failed, though the tax on tobacco, a type 2 measure, 
passed easily despite a $4.8 million spending advantage by the "No 
on 44" side (see Woodward 1996). 
Data in table 4.1 and appendix 4 from all California general elec­
tion initiatives from 1986 to 1996 demonstrate that only one initia­
tive passed that pitted narrow groups against each other—a measure 
proposed by sportfishers to regulate commercial fishers, which 
might also have appealed to environmentalists. These type 1 initia­
tive contests include many that set campaign expenditure records 
in California (Propositions 100, 106, 207, and 211). Yet on average 
they received fewer votes than initiatives did overall (40.5% v. 
44.6%). They are also far less likely to pass. We found that only 14% 
passed, compared to 41.5% for all initiatives in this sample. (This 
41.5% passing rate compares to the 40% rate found by Magleby 
[1994, 229] for all statutory initiatives between 1898 and 1992.) 
Type 2. Entrepreneurial Contests: 
Broad Groups Challenge Narrow Interests 
Many other ballot initiative contests involve a loosely organized, 
broad-based type B player initiating a proposal that threatens a nar­
row type A actor. These contests are perhaps some of the most crit­
ically analyzed initiative campaigns in the modern era in terms of 
the effects of campaign spending. When critics of the professional­
ization of direct democracy cite examples where popular support for 
an initiative was "reversed" due to heavy opposition spending, they 
are often referring to contests in this category. This is the arena of 
entrepreneurial politics, where nonprofit organizations, volunteer 
groups, and policy entrepreneurs claiming to represent broad public 
interests promote initiatives that threaten wealthy, narrow, well-
organized interests. 
Examples of policies from this arena include environmental reg­
ulations applied to industry, provisions for public access to coastal 
areas, minimum wage, implementation of bottle recycling bills, for­
est preservation, taxes directed at specific industries, and taxes 
directed at the rich. In each case the benefits are fairly nondivisible 
and are directed to a large public, while costs are borne by a fairly 
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narrow group. The groups threatened by one of these proposals are 
likely to have full-time paid staff and experience with campaigns 
and legislative politics, and are able to mobilize financial resources 
to respond to the threat—perhaps even before the type B group's ini­
tiative actually qualifies. 
In some of these cases, the proponent can use a large base of vol­
unteer labor to lower the costs of circulating petitions (often using 
volunteers augmented by some paid help). Lacking the cash reserves 
of an established interest, advertising and direct-mail use might be 
limited for such groups. These groups often have access to numer­
ous small contributions, but this makes it difficult to raise funds 
rapidly.5 In contrast, groups threatened by their proposal are often 
quite small, homogeneous, well organized politically, and well 
funded. Opponents should thus be able to raise money quickly and 
make use of broadcast media. In terms of the examples above, a 
group qualifying an initiative that enacts environmental regulations 
might easily exhaust its financial resources paying the lawyers, con­
sultants, and petition firms needed to draft and qualify the measure, 
leaving the group scrambling for small contributions once the cam­
paign begins. In contrast, the threat of an initiative can mobilize af­
fected industry groups having substantial financial resources, and as 
noted in chapter 2, there are no limits on what they can contribute 
to an opposition campaign. 
This ability to raise money rapidly and without limits produces a 
double advantage for well-organized opponents, since, as we demon­
strate in chapter 5, opposition spending has a far greater impact on 
the vote than proponent spending. Risk-aversive voters might sim­
ply be more responsive to opposition information than proponent 
information (see Bowler and Donovan n.d. for a review). Type A op­
ponents in these situations can also use spending advantages to fur­
ther complicate the type B proponent's efforts by rapidly qualifying 
countermeasures designed to confuse voters or kill the intent of the 
original initiative—just as they would use similar methods to 
counter proposals by rival type A groups. 
Contests involving type A groups responding to type B proposals 
thus involve substantial advantages for opponents. In these con­
tests, the "initiative industry" weighs in heavily as a force hired by 
threatened (opposition) interests acting to maintain the status quo. 
If spending advantages in these contests often lead to defeat of pro­
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posals advanced by "popular" (or populist/grassroots) actors, then 
we might conclude that the "industry" has partly subverted the 
Progressive ideals of direct democracy (if only in these contests). We 
should stress, however, that in these entrepreneurial contests, the 
industry and media campaigns should typically play a more sub­
stantial role for opponents than proponents. As such, if the cam­
paign industry has any structural influence in affecting policy and 
public agendas, its influence is largely conservative and lies in its 
use as a tool for narrow interests to defeat proposals. 
But opposition advantages should not be overstated. Broad, dif­
fuse constituencies and interests, represented by policy entrepre­
neurs and other advocates who assume the organizational burdens 
of contesting a ballot measure, do have success passing initiatives. 
The evidence from California presented in table 4.1 illustrates that 
initiatives proposed by a group with a diffuse constituency and op­
posed by narrow interests are no more likely to pass or fail than ini­
tiatives overall. 
We identified fourteen initiatives on general election ballots 
from 1986 to 1996 that would benefit a broad constituency and 
threaten narrow interests. Of these, 35% passed, a rate lower than 
the overall approval rate of initiatives during this period (41.5%), 
and only slightly higher than the historic initiative passage rate of 
40% that Magleby (1994) calculated. We also found that these mea­
sures receive the same amount of voter support on average as all ini­
tiatives (44.4% for type 2 v. 44.5% overall). Campbell's (1997) study 
of Colorado initiatives from 1966 to 1994 found an even greater suc­
cess rate (48%) in entrepreneurial contests, a rate that exceeded Col-
orado's overall passage rate for the period of 37%. Thus, as the ini­
tiative process has been professionalized, it has not excluded policy 
entrepreneurs and organizations from passing measures that benefit 
broad, diffuse (or "public") interests by systematically giving nar­
row groups the ability to defeat such measures. 
Type 3. "Client Contests'": Narrow Group 
Challenges Broad, Diffuse (or Latent) Group 
On some occasions when narrow groups resort to the initiative, 
they propose measures that have consequences for a broad, diffuse 
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Table 4.1 Success of California General Election Initiatives by 
Nature of Intergroup Conflict, 1986-1996 
Type of Contest Mean Yes Vote (%) % Passed N 
Narrow Proponent, 
Narrow Opposition 40.5 14 7 
Diffuse Proponent, 
Narrow Opposition 44.4 35 14 
(2) 
Narrow Proponent, 
Diffuse Opposition 28.1 14 7 
(3) 
Diffuse Proponent, 
Diffuse Opposition 51.7 58 25 
(4) 
Total 44.5 41.5 53 
Note: See appendix for classification schema. 
public. These proposals differ from the interest group politics of 
type 1 contests in that the proposal advanced by a well-organized 
group involves costs that are to be borne by the general public, or 
some unorganized constituency. When these measures arise in a 
legislative context, Wilson (1980) labels them "client group" poli­
tics, since the beneficiary of the policy is often the client of the gov­
ernment (i.e., a subsidized industry, a firm seeking regulations re­
stricting competition, a firm receiving a tax break). Client politics 
are possible in the legislative arena, if not prominent, due to the low 
visibility of these policies. The mass public simply cannot know the 
policies that are being proposed in a legislature, and once policies 
are passed, the public is unlikely to detect costs that are widely dif­
fused. This gives legislators the ability to support these policies 
without fear of much electoral retribution. 
Given that direct democracy publicizes such policies by placing 
them on the ballot for voters to evaluate, it is unlikely that narrow 
interests would frequently go this route. Although they can use 
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their financial resources to hire consultants and to pay petition 
management firms to gain ballot access, they face a much "harder 
/sell ; to the general public than in a legislature, where logs can be 
rolled and deals can be cut. Still, there are occasional initiatives that 
fit into this cell. Unlike the type 1 "arms race" initiatives, in these 
contests proponents of client-like policies do have the resources to 
dominate the paid broadcast media with "yes"-side messages. Nar­
row interest groups might find this route necessary when their ef­
forts inside the state legislature are going nowhere. 
Some examples include attempts by the gaming industry to im­
plement gambling and state lotteries, attempts by landlords to re­
peal rent controls on their properties, tobacco industry attempts at 
repealing local smoking ordinances, a railroad company's effort to 
pass a tax to build railroads, insurers' efforts to write rules about in­
surance regulations, and possibly, professional groups seeking to 
alter regulatory structures that affect them (e.g., denturists in Wash­
ington, chiropractors in California).6 
California's Proposition 188 of 1994 is perhaps a defining example 
of this sort of contest where proponents have huge advantages in 
campaign resources. In this case, Philip Morris and associated parties 
interested in rolling back local smoking regulations wrote Proposi­
tion 188 and spent nearly $20 million in favor of it, much of it on di­
rect mail (Scott 1996, 24). Other initiative contests in this cell set 
spending records: the insurance industry spent over $40 million pro­
moting Proposition 104 of 1988, which would have protected the in-
dustry's profits from consumers (in tandem with an intra-interest-
group, type 1 initiative targeting lawyers, Proposition 106). 
In all of these cases, the potential opposition (renters, taxpayers, 
those morally opposed to gambling, people offended by secondhand 
smoke) is far less cohesive than the proponent, which can be as co­
hesive as a single firm. If there is an organized opposition, it could 
be advantaged by any "when in doubt, vote no" phenomena that 
might affect voting. However, the opposition can have a difficult 
time raising money needed to air advertising designed to raise 
doubts about the proposal, since these diffuse opponents can suffer 
from collective-action problems that limit the amount of money 
they will be able to raise in a short period (Olson 1965). 
Again, if the initiative industry provides advantages that some­
how corrupt the original ideal of the process, we might see that 
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narrow groups such as these would be able to spend heavily and pass 
their policies. These are the sort of contests that some of the origi­
nal critics of direct democracy feared most: relatively wealthy inter­
ests using the initiative to advance their goals, free from the orga­
nized opposition that might exist in partisan legislatures (Eaton 
1912). If the opposition to an initiative remains latent, or is poorly 
organized, there might be no opposition campaign at all beyond 
press releases issued by concerned groups. Unlike the type 1 and 
type 2 contests discussed above, opponent advantages are rather 
muted here. For poorly financed or poorly organized opponents, the 
initiative industry might simply not be an option. Their campaigns 
can be limited to the efforts of voluntary groups gathering elite and 
group endorsements and by attempts to influence free media. 
One problem that wealthy proponents like Philip Morris (or in­
surance companies, industrial firms, etc.) have in these contests is 
that by spending vast sums of money, they publicize their role in 
drafting initiatives, as well as publicizing the clientele politics of 
their effort. In other words, as they make themselves visible, they 
risk revealing themselves as the primary beneficiary of their self-
drafted policy. By doing this, they might aid any limited opposition 
that exists. Citizens, it turns out, often use information about who 
backs an initiative as a cue when deciding how to vote (Lupia 1994; 
Bowler and Donovan n.d.; see also chapter 7 in this book). High lev­
els of spending can eventually lead to media stories revealing, for 
example, that the group backing a measure advertised as promoting 
smoking regulations is a tobacco firm. Voters favoring regulations 
might, once they know who backs the measure, come to doubt that 
the measure would do anything to effectively regulate smoking. 
Campbell (1997) found a very low rate of passage (1 out of 12) in 
Colorado for these initiatives between 1966 and 1994. Our data re­
veal that these are indeed the hardest initiatives to market in Cali­
fornia, and that money spent by proponents in this arena is largely 
wasted. Of the seven client-politics initiatives we identify in Califor­
nia (see appendix) and include in table 4.1, only one (14%) passed—a 
measure that fits into this category fairly awkwardly (Proposition 
162, promoted by public employee unions to protect their Public 
Employees Retirement System (PERS) from augmenting the state's 
general fund). Even with this measure included, the average vote for 
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initiatives backed by narrow interests and affecting a diffuse opposi­
tion was only 28 % in favor. 
Type 4. Majoritarian Contests: Broad Group 
Challenges Broad (or Unorganized) Group(s) 
The final cell in our matrix includes majoritarian contests. The suc­
cess or failure of these initiatives affects such large constituencies 
that they are some of the most visible, and controversial, measures 
on the ballot. Since the groups affected by (or concerned about) the 
proposals are fairly large and diffuse, the " campaigns" promoting 
and opposing these initiatives often extend far beyond the actions of 
groups that might have initially proposed the measure. With majori­
tarian initiatives; we often see candidates and political parties dom­
inating the campaign discourse. 
Unlike entrepreneurial contests where representatives of a broad 
group challenge an established interest, these proposals primarily 
affect another diffuse group. The opponent might also be loosely or­
ganized, or likely to suffer collective-action problems that make it 
difficult to stage much of a campaign (the same type B opponent 
from client-politics contests). The proponent's initial efforts might 
be driven by a policy entrepreneur or volunteer group similar to 
those in type 2 contests. Poorly financed groups with a dedicated 
volunteer base—or more likely, with assistance from policy entre­
preneurs or candidates for office—frequently do qualify measures 
for the ballot. Following qualification, however, the formal activi­
ties of these "yes" campaigns might be completed. Furthermore, 
with some of these initiatives the interests affected by the proposal 
are so diffuse that no opposition campaign, or opposition discourse, 
will ever materialize. 
The absence of high-end spending or professional campaigns, 
however, does not mean that these ballot measures are always in­
visible. As the scope and diversity of interests affected by the pro­
posal widen, and as the political stakes get higher, so too does the 
chance that the measure will be discussed publicly and in the free 
media by candidates, parties, and pundits. 
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Indeed, one of the most celebrated initiatives in California his­
tory falls in this category, the anti-illegal immigrant Proposition 
187. Total campaign spending by proponents of 187 was only 
$800,000, and opponents spent only $1.6 million. Similarly, propo­
nents of California's famous "three-strikes" crime measure spent 
only $1.2 million total, and opponents spent less than $50,000, 
while opponents of California's medical marijuana initiative raised 
only $30,000 by the final week of the campaign. To put this spend­
ing in perspective, by the mid-1990s the average qualification costs 
in California were about $1 million (Scott 1994, 18). Despite low 
spending beyond the costs of qualification, each of these initiatives 
came to capture the attention of the national media and national 
political elites, including presidential candidates. 
In some of these contests, proponent groups that might begin as 
amateur, "grassroots" activists eventually welcome the adoption of 
their issue by other groups, political parties, or politicians. For ex­
ample, California's anti-affirmative action initiative (Proposition 
209) was drafted by two university professors having little previous 
involvement in state politics. Yet the issue quickly became impor­
tant to major political elites. Their campaign later benefited from 
fund-raising and appeals by Republicans Newt Gingrich and Pete 
Wilson, who saw Proposition 209 as a clear "wedge" issue to be 
used against the Democratic Party (King 1996; see also chapter 3 in 
this volume). There are other similar examples. Amateur activists 
promoting three-strikes criminal-sentencing proposals received fi­
nancial assistance for the petition drive from the National Rifle As­
sociation (NRA), while a liberal political outsider promoting Wash-
ington's term limits measure came to rely upon funds from a 
national conservative "congressional-reform" organization after 
early petition efforts stagnated (Olson 1992). Indeed, some of these 
initiatives are designed by parties or politicians seeking to expand 
their mass appeal (e.g., Pete Wilson and Proposition 165). 
Initiatives in this cell also include many political reform propos­
als7 that change the rules about how politics will be conducted 
(campaign finance reforms). We also include tax measures that, 
rather than affecting a narrow industry or narrow group (such as al­
eohol or tobacco), apply to large segments of the general public. 
Many social and moral questions (e.g., assisted suicide, medical 
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marijuana) and crime issues also fall in this cell, since beneficiaries 
or potential opponents of these policies, while perhaps small, are 
typically quite diffuse (e.g., the terminally ill, people fearing crime, 
people hostile to pot use, crime victims, criminals). In many of 
these cases, neither proponents nor opponents will have the re­
sources or organization to mount a big-budget campaign. 
With many majoritarian initiatives, then, much of the informa­
tion the public receives comes independent of the paid broadcasts 
and direct mail associated with professional "initiative industry" 
campaigns. With these measures, rival political elites and parties 
are often forced to take controversial positions on public policies. 
As groups and elites take positions and the free media grant atten­
tion to the measures, citizens are offered alternative sources of in­
formation and elite cues that can be used in making decisions. It is 
important to note that much of the criticism directed against direct 
democracy emphasizes the possible corrupting influence of cam­
paign professionals. Yet, by our classification, a plurality of Califor­
nia initiatives (47%) from 1986 to 1996 fall into this category. Thus, 
we suggest that many of the most prominent choices that voters 
make about initiatives are cast in an environment where the effects 
of campaign spending—by proponents or opponents—are fairly 
muted. Majoritarian contests thus possibly reflect some of the Pro­
gressive Era aspirations about how direct democracy would be con­
tested (as well as the sort of "reform77 issues to place before voters: 
term limits, open primaries, and constraints on government's tax 
and spending). 
Type 4 contests, conversely, can also provide the clearest exam­
ples of things feared by direct democracy's critics (anti-immigrant 
measures, antigay measures, civil rights issues, etc.). This can be 
the arena where contests might reflect the demagoguery that critics 
of direct democracy have long feared, as these initiatives often ask 
voters to cast judgments about racial and social groups, or about 
moral and social issues. Lacking resources to campaign through 
paid media, opponents and proponents can resort to targeting un­
popular minorities in attempts to gain public support and attention. 
Most (58%) of the majoritarian initiatives we identify in Califor­
nia from 1986 to 1996 were approved. Campbell (1997) also found a 
relatively high approval rate (50%) for majoritarian initiatives in 
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Colorado. This should not be entirely surprising, since by definition 
these are contests where the opposition is diffuse and possibly unor­
ganized. Thus, when diffuse groups propose measures that fail to 
threaten a well-organized interest, they have a good chance of vic­
tory. The 50-58% passage rates are impressive, considering that 
most initiatives fail. 
When all the data in table 4.1 are considered, we suggest they il­
lustrate that direct democracy primarily serves broad constituen­
cies, but that broad groups face an uphill fight if they challenge a 
well-organized interest. Half of all measures we identify as benefit­
ing or being promoted by someone representing a diffuse con­
stituency (type 2 and type 4 contests) were approved (19 of 38). Nar­
row constituencies do have success in blocking over 65% (14 of 21) 
of the proposals that threaten them (type 1 and type 2 contests), but 
only 14% of the policies they proposed have passed. 
The Advantages of Moving Second 
The role of political marketing, or possible "manipulative" initia­
tive campaigns, varies greatly across each type of contest. While 
professional campaigners do interact differently with "grassroots" 
groups as opposed to narrow groups, their services to a certain ex­
tent are available to all players. The campaign process in direct 
democracy as a whole is not so much a continuing game of gentle-
men-versus-the-players (or amateurs-versus-the-pros), but more of a 
mixed "pro-am" tournament. The sporting metaphors may be 
strained, but the simple distinctions of figure 4.1 allow more com­
plex sets of group competition. Campaign techniques, and the rela­
tive weight of the initiative industry v. the "grassroots" in each 
matchup, are to some extent determined by the context of inter­
group competition. 
In addition to intergroup competition and utilization of cam­
paign professionals, there is another structural factor associated 
with initiative campaigns that can affect who wins or loses. One of 
the biggest advantages for players in the process lies not so much in 
the resources available to a group, but in who moves second in the 
campaign. As we have seen so far, the existence of a professional 
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campaign industry does not always give an automatic edge to one 
group over another when it comes to passing initiatives. Indeed, as 
illustrated in the previous section, it is something of an oversimpli­
fication to see all ballot proposition campaigns as involving conflict 
between groups buying access to campaign professionals and groups 
who do not. To the extent that one set of players in this process is 
given an edge over another, it might lie with those who oppose and 
move second, rather than those who propose legislation. This ad­
vantage, we argue, offers a partial explanation of why most initia­
tives fail. Opponents have structural advantages in the process. 
Perhaps the major disadvantage faced by proponents is the asym­
metry of resource deployment before the election campaign. Peti­
tion costs can range between $500,000 and $1 million per ballot 
proposition. From 1978 to 1986, these petition costs accounted for 
an average of 72% of qualification expenditures for all California 
propositions (Berg and Holman 1989).8 Signature gathering has now 
become the single-largest expense for many proponents' campaigns— 
particularly if proponents use little broadcast media. Charles Price's 
data indicate that from 1980 through June 1988, for 65% of all ini­
tiatives qualifying in California, proponents spent more during the 
qualification phase than during the actual election period.9 In many 
instances, including efforts by grassroots groups that mobilize vol­
unteers to help gather signatures, proponents spend nearly all their 
resources during the qualification phase (Price 1988, 484). Evidence 
of the growing professional nature of the qualification stage is ap­
parent from the comments of one consultant: "I think [Proposition] 
187 is a great example. Ill note for you that almost all the money 
spent on the initiative in favor of it, was spent to qualify it for the 
ballot. Maybe $300,000 was finally spent to get it approved" (Inter­
view, 19 January 1995). 
Costs of petition efforts are further escalated if initiative propo­
nents must rely upon direct mail for soliciting signatures—although 
these costly efforts can also yield campaign contributions in return 
(Price 1988). When the market is crowded and many petitions are 
circulating simultaneously, proponents' costs can also escalate as 
crews concentrate on advancing petitions offering the highest per-
signature price. Lesser-paying efforts can thus be forced to pay 
more, or see their returns decline. 
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Despite its cost, however, paid signature gathering is a necessary 
expense for large- or small-membership groups. Most volunteer or 
grassroots organizations simply cannot mobilize sufficient volun­
teers to collect signatures within the time limits imposed. Very few 
if any initiatives reach the ballot in California, Oregon, or Washing­
ton without professional assistance with qualification (Scott 1996, 
17; Price 1988,- see also chapter 3). Generally, paid signature gather­
ers are used by trade associations and interest groups in California 
without fail. As another consultant working on initiatives noted: 
"You hire one of two or three major companies to circulate the peti­
tion. There are variants on that. . . . Some grassroots organizations 
take some percentage of the petitions and attempt to get signatures 
through volunteers. A couple of the anti-tax groups have perfected 
direct mail strategies for getting signatures. But everybody relies 
completely or to a substantial extent on paid signature gatherers 
throughout the state. You usually figure it costs $500,000, plus or 
minus $100,000, to get the measure qualified" (Interview, 18 Janu­
ary 1995). 
Clearly, proponents of the initiative process must devote sub­
stantial resources simply to getting a proposal on the ballot, and 
then they may not even succeed. Once the proposal is on the ballot, 
fund-raising, organizing, and campaigning must begin all over again 
to convince voters that they should support it. Once proponents do 
qualify, groups who object to the proposal have a number of ways in 
which they may exert their opposition. Opponents, moreover, do 
not have to spend any resources on petitioning.10 If two contesting 
groups or coalitions had the same amount of resources going into a 
contest, opponents would have more to spend on campaigning once 
the qualification period was over. 
One of the most direct ways of opposing an initiative is to broad­
cast advertisements that question the validity of some element of 
the proposal. The fact that the wording of the proposal is fixed 
means that opponents are able to End loopholes, rebuttals, and 
counterarguments that apply to even the most minor provisions in 
the text of the initiative. Drafting "errors" or strategic miscalcula­
tions in proposing a policy, exposed through advertising, can thus 
become a major source of embarrassment for any "yes" campaign. 
While candidates may change their positions or statements, subtly 
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or not so subtly, over the course of a campaign, the wording of 
propositions remains fixed through the qualification stage to the 
election. Opponents thus have the advantage of shooting at a target 
that cannot move or take cover. 
Opponents with ample resources can also take a more proactive 
stance by fostering rival propositions (see chapter 5), including mea­
sures containing "kill clauses/7 A kill clause means that the speci­
fied counterproposal will supersede the initial proposal if it receives 
more votes. The industry or group threatened by an initiative might 
divert attention from its own initiative containing the kill clause by 
including a softer version of the original initiative in their proposal; 
examples include industry responses to California's "Big Green" 
and "Forests Forever," Proposition 128 and 135, respectively. 
Opponents with legislative access have additional advantages. 
Some opposition countermeasures may come directly from the 
legislature—particularly at the local level—in the form of a referen­
dum that can include kill clauses and/or modified proposals. A 
state-level example of this is California's Proposition 126 (1990), the 
legislature's industry-sponsored alternative to an initiative tax pro­
posed on alcohol. Finally, opponents can resort to legal action to in­
validate some or all of a given proposition if it passes. Opponents of 
California's immigration, affirmative action, and term limits mea­
sures, for example, each waged campaigns only to lose on election 
day, later filing suit to delay implementation of the measures. 
Conclusion 
By "moving first" in direct democracy, type A or type B proponents 
are both in a difficult position: they must often spend more than op­
ponents, must overcome voter tendencies to "just vote no" when in 
doubt (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992), and must defend a pro­
posal that cannot be modified over the course of the campaign as it 
is publicly critiqued. Furthermore, campaign professionals provide 
services that might be most effective when applied to opposition 
campaigns. Many of these "initiative industry" tools and strategies 
are defensive, aimed at preserving the status quo in response to a 
threatening initiative. 
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If we think in terms of the discussion in the first section of this 
chapter, opponent advantages could be most pronounced for those 
narrow groups who make full use of the initiative industry. To be 
sure, proponents can try to protect themselves from some of the ad­
vantages that opponents possess. Care in drafting, for example, can 
reduce the scope for opposition exploitation of embarrassing loop­
holes and unpopular provisions. But the larger point is that oppo­
nents of a given proposal have a wider range of strategies open to 
them than do proponents. Little wonder, then, that approximately 
more than 60% of ballot propositions fail. 
Combining the findings from the first section with the discus­
sion above, we find that direct democracy is a rather conservative 
process: it is difficult to pass things, and even more difficult to pass 
something that threatens the well-established interests. By this 
measure, it might be said that the initiative process—at least out­
side of the arena of majoritarian policies—has not met the Progres­
sive reformers' expectations that public policy would better reflect 
the demands of broad, "public" interests. The contemporary process 
does not make it easy for advocates of large, diffuse, public benefits 
to take on "the interests." 
There are, nevertheless, successful campaigns in this area. In­
deed, there are far more examples from California of broad public 
groups (or entrepreneurs representing broad groups) using the initia­
tive to defeat narrow interests than there are examples of narrow in­
terests being advanced at the expense of a diffuse constituency. In 
the period covered by these data, voters approved rebates from the 
insurance industry, health advocates raised cigarette taxes, the min­
imum wage was increased, and worker safety regulations were rein­
vigorated, all through direct citizen legislation that threatened 
fairly wealthy, narrow interests. The public also came within a hair 
(1%) of voting to increase the income tax on the rich. "Clientele" 
politics, something that characterizes much of the politics of leg­
islative policy making, is largely absent here. Although state-level 
direct democracy does not resemble "grassroots" populism, those 
policies that do come out of the process typically serve a broad 
constituency. 
A P P E N D I  X 
Classification of All California General Election Initiative Contests, 
1986-1996 
Pwposition Proponent v. Type of Yes Vote 
Number Issue Opponent? Contest (%) 
61 Public employee Taxpayers v. public 2 34 
pay employee unions 
62 Taxes Taxpayers v. general 
fundb 
4 58 
63 English only Volunteers v. citizens 4 73 
64 AIDS Larouche 4 29 
65 Toxics Volunteers v. citizens 4 63 
regulations 
95 Homeless funds Volunteers v. business 2 45 
96 AIDS tests Law enforcement 4 62 
97 Calif. OSHA Labor v. business 2 54 
98 School funding Public education v. 4 51 
taxpayers 
99 Cigarette tax/ Education & health v. 2 58 
health industry 
education 
100 Auto insurance Lawyers v. insurers 1 41 
101 Auto insurance One firm v. consumers 3 13 
102 AIDS tests Dannemeyer 4 34 
103 Auto insurance Consumers v. insurers 2 51 
104 Auto insurance Insurers v. consumers 3 25 
105 Public Consumers v. business 2 54 
disclosure 
106 Auto insurance Insurers v. lawyers 1 46 
128 Environmental Greens v. industry 2 36 
regulations 
129 Crime prevention Candidate v. taxpayers . 4 28 
130 Forest regulations Greens v. industry 2 47 
131 Term limits Voters v. legislature 4 38 
132 Gill nets Sport v. commercial 1 56 
fishers 
133 Drug Candidate v. taxpayers 4 32 
enforcement 
134 Drink tax Public health v. liquor 2 31 
industry 
135 Pesticides Industry v. greens 3 30 
continued 
Classification of All California General Election Initiative Contests, 
1986-1996 (continued) 
Proposition Proponent v. Type of Yes Vote 
Number Issue Opponent" Contest (%) 
136 Tax increase 
reforms 
Taxpayers v. general 
fundb 
4 48 
137 Initiative Voters v. legislature 4 45 
reforms 
138 Forest Industry v. greens 3 29 
regulations 
139 Prison labor Government v. labor 4 54 
140 Term limits Voters v. legislature 4 52 
161 Suicide Hemlock v. CMA/ 4 46 
church 
162 PERS funds Unions v. general fund 3 51 
163 Repeal snack Industry/Taxpayers v. 4 or 3 66 
tax general fund 
164 Term limits Voters v. legislature 4 61 
165 Welfare Welfare v. general fund 4 46 
166 Health care Uninsured v. insurers 2 32 
167 Tax the rich Unions, etc. v. business 2 42 
184 Strikes/crime No opponent 4 72 
185 Gas tax SP RR v. taxpayers 3 19 
186 Health care Uninsured v. insurers 2 29 
187 Illegal Taxpayers v. immigrants 4 59 
immigrants 
188 Smoking Philip Morris v. 3 30 
regulations volunteer groups 
207 Lawsuits Lawyers v. corporations 1 34 
208 Campaign Public interest group v. 4 61 
reform parties 
209 Affirmative Party v. party 4 54 
action 
210 Minimum wage Labor v. business 2 62 
211 Securities One lawyer v. 1 26 
corporations 
212 Campaign reform Public interest group v. 4 49 
parties 
213 Limit drunk Quackenbush 4(?) 77 
driver rights 
214 HMO CA Chamber of 1 42 
regulations Commerce v. SEIU 
 103 Contending Players and Strategies
Classification of All California General Election Initiative Contests, 
1986-1996 (continued) 
Proposition 
Number Issue 
Proponent v. 
Opponent*1 
Type of 
Contest 
Yes Vote 
(%) 
215 Medical Volunteers v. 4 56 
marijuana government/law 
enforcement 
216 HMO CA Chamber of 1 39 
regulations Commerce v. nurses 
217 Top tax bracket Populists v. business 2 49 
218 Property tax Taxpayers v. general 4 56 
limits fund 
aThis classification is based primarily on the organized groups contesting the cam­
paign. It also relies on evaluations of the unorganized groups who will benefit or 
lose from the policy. The groups benefiting might not necessarily be actively asso­
ciated with the proposing groups. 
bIf a proposal affects public spending by allocating existing funds to new programs, 
or changes rules about revenue used in the general fund, the individuals affected 
include those benefiting from other programs supported by general funds. 
N O T E  S 
1. "Modest" relative to the wealthier industry and trade groups that con­
test initiatives. 
2. California moved its primary from June to March in 1996. This af­
fected the timing of qualification for the counterproposition. 
3. These include Proposition 100, Proposition 101, Proposition 104, and 
Proposition 106 of November 1988; Proposition 200, Proposition 201, and 
Proposition 202 of March 1996; and Proposition 207 and Proposition 211 of 
November 1996. 
4. We would categorize the proponents of Proposition 103 (Harvey 
Rosenfield and Ralph Nader) as reflecting a broad-based group traditionally 
suffering from collective-action problems that inhibit mobilization (con­
sumers groups). As noted by professional campaigners in the previous chap­
ter, Rosenfield's efforts, while representing a broad constituency, are not 
necessarily amateur politics. 
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5. However, the CCCF report (1992, 265) indicates that there are some 
wealthy individuals who now single-handedly bankroll the campaigns and 
qualification of a few consumer-oriented and environmental initiatives. 
6. Sometimes these type 3 initiative contests can trigger opposition 
from well-organized groups. Gambling initiatives often establish a state lot­
tery where none existed previously and generate little opposition from ex­
isting gaming interests. In some states, however, gambling initiatives will 
divide an existing industry over issues concerning what forms of betting 
(horses, video, slots, table games, etc.) may be located where (Arkansas, 
Washington). Likewise, if dentists viewed denturists as a grave economic 
threat, or if orthopedists perceived chiropractors this way, and each group 
mobilized substantial resources for media campaigns, some type 3 profes­
sional regulation initiatives could be classified as type 1 contests. 
7. It may seem odd to consider choices about institutional reform poli­
cies (e.g., term limits) in terms of a conflict between diffuse groups, rather 
than a battle between a group and the state or between diffused supporters 
and a narrow opposition. However, the "state" itself cannot directly engage 
in campaigns,- instead, the state's "interest" is furthered by a set of private 
actors. Parties, furthermore, are very broad coalitions of diffuse interests. 
8. One reason for high costs is that only the signatures of registered vot­
ers count, which requires signature gatherers to collect more than the bare 
minimum required by law. Other qualification costs can include legal ex­
penses, consulting fees, exploratory polling, and fund-raising. 
9. Propositions must qualify several months before the actual election. 
10. We should note that opposition groups occasionally become active in 
the qualification stage. Examples include the California Teachers Associa-
tion's (CTA) organized efforts to discourage people from signing petitions 
for a school choice initiative. CTA members tracked paid signature gather­
ers and asked people not to sign. They claimed to have succeeded in delay­
ing qualification until a higher-turnout general election. Other examples 
include "decline to sign" campaigns organized to counter antigay initiative 
petitions. 
Part I  I

Elections and Voters 

The rise of the initiative industry, the use of initiatives as vehicles 
for individual candidates, and the renewed use of initiatives by 
issue groups since the 1970s mean that more issues are reaching 
the ballot in many direct democracy states. In Oregon, California, 
Arizona, and North Dakota, a single ballot might have a dozen or 
more state propositions. With the diffusion of the California-based 
petition management industry and initiative consultants to other 
states, we might anticipate that even more state ballots will even­
tually resemble Oregon and California. In chapter 5, we examine 
when these initiatives are most likely to be used, and assess factors 
that explain why they pass or fail. 
As illustrated in part 1, a broad-based group might occasionally 
qualify an environmental-regulation initiative or a proconsumer ini­
tiative that threatens some narrow, well-organized interests (a type 
2 contest). Using the tools of paid signature gathering and the mod­
ern initiative industry, opponents can rapidly qualify a counterpro­
posal to be placed on the same ballot as the initiative that threatens 
some well-organized interest. Little is known about how voters re­
spond to the strategies employed by the modern initiative industry. 
As Susan Banducci illustrates in chapter 5, these counterinitiatives 
do appear to be associated with increased negative voting. 
Crowded ballots and competing initiatives can be expected to 
place substantial demands on the individual voter. To some, find­
ing that voters say "no" to competing initiatives might suggest 
that confused voters simply say "no/7 and are thus easily manipu­
lated by the initiative industry's tactics and campaigns. Yet other 
chapters in this section demonstrate that individual voter behavior 
and attitudes under direct democracy need not be viewed as con­
fused, capricious, or random. Rather, voters appear to respond pre­
dictably to information about initiatives and appear to show some 
consistency in attitude across numerous propositions. 
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In chapter 6, Banducci assesses how voters reason under the 
difficult decision context associated with competing initiatives. 
She studies voted ballots from Oregon to examine if voters are 
consistent in their attitudes across multiple initiatives, and she 
determines that choices on propositions do reflect some degree of 
ideological consistency. 
In chapter 7, Jeff Karp builds on work by Lupia (1994b) and 
Zaller (1992) and examines voter decision making on a term limit 
initiative. He illustrates that many voters take cues from party 
elites when deciding how to vote, and that they can obtain these 
cues from easily accessible media sources. This is an important 
finding, given the discussion of majoritarian initiative politics in 
the previous section. For many majoritarian policies like term 
limit initiatives, voters have ample opportunity to learn where 
politicians stand on ballot issues. Karp's chapter illustrates how 
voters get this information, and how they might use it to figure 
out if they are for or against an initiative. 
Direct Legislation: When Is It Used 
and When Does It Pass? 
SUSAN A. BANDUCCI 
After a decline in popularity in the 1950s, there was a resurgence of 
interest in direct legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a 
10-year period beginning with 1983, 291 initiatives appeared on 
statewide ballots, whereas only 97 initiatives appeared from 1962 to 
1972. The increase in initiative use has continued into the 1990s. In 
1994, the number of initiatives appearing on ballots increased to 
73.1 The latest growth of interest mirrors the decline of political 
parties, the rise of single-issue interest groups, an increase in the 
public's dissatisfaction with legislative effectiveness (California 
Commission on Campaign Financing [CCCF] 1992), and the growth 
of a direct legislation industry that makes qualifying initiatives for 
the ballot easier (Magleby 1984; see also chapters 3 and 4 in this 
book). During this latest growth in use, the initiative has had pro­
found effects on the institutions of representative democracy (Ma­
gleby 1990). In its report on the initiative industry in California, the 
CCCF (1992) argued that there had been a shift of power between 
the state legislature and the electorate and that increasingly, most 
important policy decisions are made in initiative elections. 
Accompanying this trend of increased initiative use by citizens 
and state legislators (Magleby 1988) is a trend of increasing use of 
counterproposals in direct legislation elections (Holman and Stodder 
1991; McKenna 1990; Stodder 1992) as well as in local ballot mea­
sure elections (Glickfeld, Graymer, and Morrison 1987). Competing 
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measures may appear on a ballot for three reasons. First, a legisla­
ture may place an alternative measure on the ballot either because 
it does not approve of an initiative proposed through the indirect 
initiative process or because it feels the initiative is too extreme. 
Likewise, interest groups or political activists may also qualify an 
initiative to counter another initiative that might threaten them. 
They might propose a countermeasure that is more moderate in the 
hope that the public can be persuaded to select the most moderate 
change in the status quo. 
More likely, however, interest groups can propose a competing 
measure in an effort to prevent any policy contrary to their interests 
from passing. In these cases, the more moderate alternative measure 
might simply be meant to confuse voters so that they vote "no" on 
both initiatives, maintaining the status quo. Most of the increase in 
initiative and counterinitiative use has occurred in western states, 
and tremendous variation exists in how frequently citizen-initiated 
legislation is used in direct legislation states. In this chapter, I ex­
amine several explanations for the cross-state variation in use of ini­
tiatives and counterinitiatives, and I assess the effectiveness of the 
countermeasure strategy at maintaining the status quo. 
Interstate Variation in Direct Legislation Use 
In chapter 2, table 2.1 shows the total number of initiatives qualify­
ing for ballots from the period of state adoption to 1994. Although 
the use of legislatively referred measures and referenda also vary 
across states, table 2.1 only examines propositions initiated by citi­
zen petition, since the increase in direct legislation is most pro­
nounced among initiatives (Magleby 1988). Direct and indirect ini­
tiatives2 have been included, while constitutional amendments and 
statutes are listed separately for the purpose of illustration. 
In order to count counterpropositions, I examined the content of 
ballot propositions occurring on statewide ballots in each initiative 
state. Initiatives were coded as "competing" if they contained con­
flicting provisions. Provisions are conflicting when one initiative is 
designed with language that addresses a subject differently than lan­
guage contained in a rival measure on the same subject. Initiatives 
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with similar subjects will often appear on ballots,- however, they do 
not always contain conflicting provisions. For example, two abor­
tion initiatives appeared on the Oregon ballot in the 1990 general 
election. One initiative banned all abortions except in cases of rape 
or incest or to preserve the life of the mother. The other initiative 
required parental consent for a minor wishing to obtain an abortion. 
In these cases, the initiatives were not coded as "counter," since 
provisions did not conflict. 
From table 2.1 it is readily apparent that there is a great disparity 
in the use of initiatives between states and between regions. The 
citizens of Oregon have placed the most initiatives on the ballot, 
while the citizens of Wyoming have placed the least. Wyoming 
adopted the statutory initiative in 1968, but 1992 was the first elec­
tion in which citizen-initiated measures appeared on the ballot. 
California and Oregon led in the total number of initiatives as well 
as in the total number of counterpropositions. Most of the high-use 
states, where the average use of initiatives is three or more per two-
year election cycle, are in the West (with the exception of North 
Dakota). Price (1975) explains that the initiative was adopted in 
these states when they were relatively new to the union and their 
political institutions were not yet firmly established; therefore, the 
citizen-initiated petition may have become a more routine process. 
Although Oregon has had more initiatives qualify for the ballot 
since the states began using initiatives in 1902, California has ex­
ceeded all others states in initiative use in recent years, leading the 
CCCF (1992) to call direct democracy California's "fourth branch" 
of government. 
The California Experience 
There have been several instances of counterpropositions in Califor­
nia on issues ranging from auto insurance to property taxes. Look­
ing at California ballot propositions from the 1968 until the 1990 
general elections, there have been 37 originating initiatives listed 
on the same ballot with a competing countermeasure. Figure 5.1 
shows the number of counterinitiatives since the general election of 
1968.1 have coded all similar-subject propositions with conflicting 
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Figure 5.1 California Ballot Propositions: November 1968-1990 
20 30 40 50 60 
Number of Propositions 
Counter Propositions 0 Total Propositions (General and Primary except 1968 - General Only) 
provisions as counterpropositions. Because ballots do not distin­
guish between originating initiatives and counterinitiatives, I refer 
to both the originating proposition and the counterproposal as 
"competing propositions/' Although 1988 and 1990 have many 
more competing propositions than do the other years, the figure 
demonstrates that it is not a new strategy. In fact, a counterproposi­
tion appeared on the 1922 ballot against a legislative proposal set­
ting new requirements for judges.3 
Explaining Variations in Use of Initiatives 
and Counterpropositions 
Except for Price's earlier work (1975), the causes of variation in ini­
tiative use have not been systematically examined. Price (1975) 
summarizes several explanations for variations in use of initiatives. 
States with strong interest groups and weak parties are expected to 
have a higher rate of initiatives. An ineffective legislature and voter 
frustration may also cause an increase in initiative use. Generally, 
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reasons for variations in use can be grouped into structural, politi­
cal, and cultural explanations. The structural explanations focus on 
the rules governing access to the initiative process and structural 
features of the state legislature that may affect legislative effective­
ness (the number of legislators, divided government, and legislative 
professionalization). The political explanations focus on actors such 
as interest groups and political parties. The cultural explanation 
considers the states' prevailing attitude toward the place of the indi­
vidual in political society (Elazar 1972). These factors should also 
contribute to explaining variation in the use of counterproposals. 
Structural factors have been divided into two categories: first, 
factors related to legislative structure or function, and second, fac­
tors related to ballot access. Indicators of legislative structure and 
function are proxy variables for legislative gridlock and inaction. 
The argument proposed here is that certain legislative structures 
and functions are ultimately related to legislative gridlock and inac­
tion, which in turn are related to frustration with the legislative 
process. Two examples of competing proposals from California, 
property tax and insurance initiatives (see chapters 3 and 4), were 
the result of the legislature's inability to resolve a conflict between 
powerful interests. Divided government is one possible source of 
this legislative inaction. Studies at the national level argue that the 
consequences of divided government are gridlock and stalemate 
(Brady 1993; Sundquist 1988). This view has been challenged by 
Mayhew (1991), who finds no effect on policy outputs or the policy 
process. However, divided government may heighten institutional 
conflict and, at the state level, force the governor to exercise veto 
power more often. In terms of initiative use, issue activists may be 
disappointed by the inability of the parties to reach a compromise, 
and may find it easier to seek the approval of voters than the leg­
islative supermajorities necessary to override a veto. The CCCF 
found that during periods of divided government in California, ini­
tiative use increased (1992, 61). Likewise, an increased use of coun­
terpropositions is expected as battles between competing interests, 
rather than being resolved by the legislature, are instead carried into 
the popular initiative arena. 
The level of professionalism in state legislatures may also affect 
variation in initiative use. Membership in professional state legisla­
tures is more attractive than in amateur legislatures. Therefore, 
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elections for these seats are more competitive and more costly. The 
CCCF (1992, 62) suggests that because candidates must raise large 
amounts of money from the interest groups, they will be reluctant 
to favor one interest over another. The resulting inaction on some 
key legislation may lead interest groups to turn to the initiative 
process—as the insurance industry and trial lawyers did in the case 
of auto insurance reform. The California legislature was unwilling 
to take sides, so both groups brought their cases directly to the vot­
ers through the initiative process (Reich 1988). 
Another link between professionalism and initiative use is 
through public opinion. Professionalization has a negative effect on 
evaluations of state legislatures. Jewell (1982) suggests that the 
more a legislature is in session, the more aware the public is of 
conflicts. Squire (1993) explains that professional legislatures may 
have larger agendas with more complex issues due to the economic 
and social diversity of the states. The larger the agenda, the more 
failures—and the more likely people are to be dissatisfied. The links 
between professionalism, legislative conflict or agenda complexity, 
and public support for the legislature are speculative, because the 
relationship has never been empirically tested. 
Ballot qualification procedures, the second structural explana­
tion, differ by states (see chapter 2). All states require that a certain 
percentage of signatures be gathered, but the percentage and the 
base used to calculate the number of signatures differ. For example, 
Alaska requires that the number of signatures gathered be at least 
10% of the turnout in the last general election, while California re­
quires only 5% of the turnout in the last gubernatorial election. It 
would appear as if California has much easier qualifying provisions. 
However, 5 % of the turnout in a California gubernatorial election 
{7,699,467 in 1990) is much greater than 10% of the turnout in 
Alaska (200,000 in 1990). Initiative studies note that states with 
lower thresholds of signatures do have more initiatives on the ballot 
(Magleby 1988; Price 1975). Other regulations, such as time limits 
and geographical distribution requirements, will also affect the ease 
of qualifying a measure for the ballot. 
Political factors such as party competition and strength and in­
terest group strength may also affect initiative use. Strong interest 
groups and weak parties are often associated with greater initiative 
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use (Price 1975; Dwyer et al. 1994). Because they have the resources 
to gather the signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot as well 
as the resources to run expensive campaigns, organized interests are 
frequent submitters of initiatives. Many observers of direct legisla­
tion suggest that interest groups have come to dominate the initia­
tive process (CCCF 1992; Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984, 1988). There­
fore, I hypothesize that states with strong interest group systems 
will more frequently use initiatives and counterpropositions. Inter­
est group strength is also associated with weak parties (Morehouse 
1982), a relationship suggesting that weak parties will be related to 
initiative use. Interest group strength may also reflect the number 
of "issue activists" that are organized to use the process. As Ma­
gleby (1994) notes, the rise of issue activists might also explain 
growth in initiative use. 
Arguments about interparty competition suggest that in states 
with competitive party systems, parties will adopt more-liberal wel­
fare policies in order to gain votes.4 If this logic is applied to initia­
tive use, states with competitive parties could have lower initiative 
use because the legislature will be more representative of the me­
dian voter.5 
Regardless of political and structural factors, some states may 
have a cultural predisposition toward citizen-initiated legislation. 
Elazar's (1972) conception of political culture within the United 
States as individualistic, moralistic, or traditionalist reflects migra­
tion patterns of religious and ethnic groups and relates to the way 
individuals view government activity. Most initiative states tend to 
fall along the moralistic-individualistic continuum (Price 1975). We 
might expect the most initiative activity in moralistic states, as 
they "embrace the notion that politics is ideally a matter of concern 
for every citizen" (Elazar 1972, 91). 
Results: Predicting Initiative Use in the States 
In order to empirically test the hypothesized relationship between 
structural and political variables and initiative use, cross-sectional 
data from the 23 states employing the initiative process have been 
collected from 1962 to 1990. Initiative use is measured using the 
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number of initiatives occurring on the ballot during a two-year pe­
riod. The data were collected at two-year intervals to reflect the 
electoral cycles and legislative sessions. Therefore, the unit of 
analysis is a two-year period in state time. Each state contributes 
equally to the total sample size of 327.6 There are two advantages 
to using a pooled cross-section: (1) this design allows for analysis 
over time as well as across cases, which is theoretically desirable; 
and (2) pooling cross-sections over time increases the number of ob­
servations and increases statistical power (Berk 1979; Sayrs 1989; 
Stimson 1986). Results of the analysis are displayed in table 5.1. 
Considering the structural explanation related to legislative ca­
pability, there is some support for the hypothesis that individuals 
or groups may try to circumvent an unresponsive or ineffective leg­
islature by turning to the initiative process. Of the hypothesized 
structural factors related to initiative use, divided government, con­
stituency size, and legislative professionalization are all signifi­
cantly related to the number of initiatives appearing on the ballot in 
23 states (see table 5.1, equation 1). When divided government ex­
ists between the governorship and the legislature, a state's initiative 
use is predicted to increase by approximately one-half of an initia­
tive (.54) per election cycle. Although the effect is significant, it is 
substantively small. However, the effects of legislative professional­
ization and qualification difficulty are much larger. The number of 
initiatives is predicted to increase by almost 3 (2.95) as the profes­
sionalization of the state legislature increases by 1 unit (see appen­
dix for codings). 
The other structural explanation, access to the ballot, is also sig­
nificantly related to initiative use. As the difficulty of qualifying an 
initiative for the ballot increases, the number of initiatives actually 
on the ballot is predicted to decrease. For every increase of 2,000 sig­
natures required per day, the number of initiatives on the ballot is 
predicted to decline by over 3. 
Of the political factors, only the indicator of interest group 
strength is related to initiative use. As with divided government, 
the effect of interest group strength, while significant, is small. A 
strong state interest-group system is expected to increase the num­
ber of initiatives by less than 1 initiative [.66] per two-year election 
cycle. Party competition and party strength appear to be unrelated 
to initiative use. 
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Table 5.1 Initiative Use in the American States, 1962-1990 (Pooled GLS 
Estimates with a Single AR(1) Model) 
No. of initiatives 
Divided government 
(governor) 
Divided government 
(legislature) 
Enacted/introduced 
Constituency size (1,000) 
Professionalization 
Qualification difficulty 
Party competition 
Party strength 
Interest group strength 
Moralistic state politics 
Population (xl00,000) 
Constant 
AdjR2 
N = 327 
Counter- Counter-
Initiatives initiatives initiatives 
(1) (2) (3) 
0.12* 
(.02) 
.54** 0.15* .11 
(-25) (.09) (-08) 
-.31 .10 .15 
(.31) (.11) (.10) 
.01 -.01 -.01 
(.21) (•07) (•07) 
.06** 0.03** 0.02* 
(.01) (.005) (.004) 
2.95* -2.24** -2.51** 
(1.72) (.66) (.62) 
-1.59** -0.53** -.25 
(.56) (.27) (.24) 
-1.64 -.10 .32 
(1.38) (-59) (.54) 
.21 .06 .06 
(-31) (.16) (.14) 
.05 -.04 
(.31) (.15) (.14) 
.85** -.07 -.16 
(.32) U7) (.14) 
-0.03** -0.01** -0.01** 
(o.i) (.005) (.005) 
.03 -.15 -.16 
(.43) (.20) (-18) 
.25 .21 .30 
Note: For the dependent variable, one case equals the number of initiatives in a 
state, per two-year election cycle. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p < .05 (one-tailed), **p <.O25. 
A moralistic state political culture seems to contribute to initia­
tive use. Moralistic states tend to be in the western region, where 
high-use initiative states also tend to be. The effects of region and 
culture, however, are difficult to distinguish, as migratory patterns 
(westward) are part of Elazar's (1972) measure of political culture. 
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Turning to counterinitiative use, the results demonstrate that 
the same conditions that lead to initiative use are most likely also 
the causes of counterproposal use, except for qualification difficulty 
and interest group strength (see table 5.1, equations 2 and 3). Re­
sults shown in equation 3 in table 5.1 control for total initiative use, 
and thus provide the most conservative test of hypotheses about 
counterinitiative use. While qualification difficulty is negatively re­
lated overall to initiative use, it appears to have no effect on coun­
terproposal use (see equation 3). Likewise, interest group strength 
has no effect on counterinitiatives but significant effect on initia­
tive use. Both of these results suggest that counterproposals are no 
more or less likely to occur in states with weak or strong interest 
group systems or with easy or difficult qualification requirements. 
This null finding is surprising, as interest groups are the primary 
initiators of counterproposals (CCCF 1992). 
States that are more likely to use the initiative process are also 
more likely to use counterproposals. The coefficient for total initia­
tives (table 5.1, column 3) illustrates that an increase of 10 initiatives 
is likely to increase counterproposal use by over 1 (.12 x 10 = 1.2). 
When controlling for the total number of initiatives, the effects of di­
vided government (governor and legislature controlled by different 
parties) on counterproposal use are shown by equation 2. Divided 
government does not increase the use of counterproposals. Once the 
effects of initiative use are held constant (equation 3), divided gov­
ernment no longer has any impact on counterinitiative use. The 
lack of a relationship between divided government and counterpro­
posals when controlling for the number of overall initiatives indi­
cates that interest groups or even legislators may turn to the initia­
tive process to address issues when the state government cannot 
reach a compromise. 
In high-initiative-use states there appears to be greater use of 
counterpropositions regardless of whether or not there is divided 
government. Therefore, divided government has an indirect effect 
on counterinitiative use. If interest groups are likely to turn to the 
initiative process because the state government is unresponsive due 
to divided government, this leads to a greater likelihood of their 
fighting proposed ballot initiatives by proposing countermeasures. 
Another structural factor, qualification difficulty, also has an indi­
rect effect on counterinitiative use,- as qualification difficulty in­
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creases, both initiative and counterinitiative use decreases. As with 
divided government, the effect on counterinitiative use disappears 
when controlling for overall initiative use. 
Professional state legislatures tend to have higher numbers of ini­
tiatives and counterproposals qualifying for the ballot. The direc­
tion of the relationship, though, differs between the two dependent 
variables. As expected, as the professionalism of the state legisla­
ture increases, the number of total initiatives also increases. Unex­
pectedly, as professionalism decreases, counterproposals increase. 
There are at least two reasons that states with professional legisla­
tures would have higher initiative use. First, expensive campaigns 
mean that legislators rely more on interest groups for contributions; 
therefore, legislators are unwilling to favor one in the legislative 
process, leading interest groups to turn to the initiative process. 
Second, professional state legislatures have larger agendas, raising 
public expectations but also making it more difficult to achieve ob­
jectives, and ultimately leading to a dissatisfied public that might 
then turn to the direct legislation process. This positive link be­
tween professional legislatures and initiative use is supported in the 
first equation. However, there is a negative, and statistically signifi­
cant, relationship between professionalism and counterinitiative 
use. California, a state with a highly professionalized state legisla­
ture since the 1960s, had the highest use of counterproposals. How­
ever, Oregon, with the second highest number of counterproposals, 
has a relatively amateur state legislature with small staffs and only 
biennial sessions. 
Overall, the structural, political, and cultural factors account for 
only 25% of the variation in initiative use over time and between 
states and for 21% of the variation in counterinitiative use. When 
the number of initiatives is added to the equation predicting coun­
terinitiative use, the model explains 30% of the variation in coun­
terinitiative use. 
Maintaining the Status Quo: Initiatives, Campaign 
Spending, and Direct Legislation Outcomes 
In the previous section, I examined the factors contributing to ini­
tiative and counterinitiative use, finding that structural factors 
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were the most successful in explaining variation in use across the 
states. In this section, I develop a model for direct democracy out­
comes in order to test the effectiveness of the counterinitiative 
strategy. Have political elites hit upon a successful strategy for de­
feating ballot measures? I propose to answer this question by testing 
whether or not competing initiatives are more likely to fail. At first 
glance the counterinitiative strategy appears successful. For exam­
ple, in 1990 there were 13 measures on the ballot in California re­
lated to the environment, alcohol taxes, and term limits that com­
peted with other measures on the same topic. All of the alcohol tax 
and environment measures failed. The only counterinitiative to 
pass was the more extreme term limit initiative, sponsored by a re­
tiring Los Angeles County supervisor, Pete Schabarum. The failure 
of the environmental propositions was especially disconcerting to 
environmentalists because opinion polls showed concern about the 
environment to be higher than in any previous year. 
One reason that the counterproposition strategy might facilitate 
defeat is that these contests typically involve heavy negative spend­
ing. Yet observers offer several explanations for the failure of com­
peting initiatives. Some have argued that, although polls showed 
growing concern about the environment, the public was not willing 
to pay the price during a recession. Bowler and Donovan (1993) show 
that adverse economic conditions increase the likelihood of negative 
voting on ballot measures,* and California was suffering the effects of 
a recession in 1990. Others explained that the sheer number of 
propositions on the November ballot turned voters off, leading them 
to stay home or vote "no." Another explanation was that the com­
plexity of the initiatives led voters to reject rather than adopt. The 
latter two explanations fit the conventional wisdom about initiative 
voting that says confused voters will vote "no." In fact, 22 out of the 
28 initiatives on the November 1990 California ballot failed. 
This negative voting on counterinitiatives is illustrated in table 
5.2. The average percentage of individuals voting "no" on ballot 
propositions and average expenditures on each type of proposition for 
California and Oregon are also listed.7 Looking at the totals for com­
peting and noncompeting propositions, the average percentage of "no" 
votes is significantly higher for the competing than the noncompeting 
propositions (p < .01). In California, counterpropositions received an 
average "no" vote of 52.3%, whereas noncompeting propositions re­
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ceived an average "no" vote of only 44.3%. The difference between 
the average percentage voting "no" on competing and noncompeting 
propositions in Oregon is slightly less than in California (10%). 
Overall, these competing propositions are less likely to receive a 
majority vote when compared to other measures. The one exception 
is legislatively proposed measures in California, where there is no 
significant difference between competing legislative ballot amend­
ments (average "no" vote = 42.5%) and legislative amendments that 
do not compete with similar propositions (average "no" vote = 
42.3%). Indeed, the average "no" vote on legislative amendments is 
lower than on all other types of ballot measures. This result is con­
sistent with other findings. Propositions put on the ballot by the 
legislature for citizen approval (bond acts and constitutional and 
statutory amendments) are less likely to fail than propositions put 
on the ballot by citizen petition (Magleby 1984; Bowler, Donovan, 
and Happ 1992). 
Counterinitiatives also involve far more money than other mea­
sures. In California, significantly more money is spent by the pro 
side on measures that end up in competition with another initiative 
on the same topic (avg. = $5,127,754) than is spent by the pro side 
when an initiative is not competing with another measure on the 
same subject (avg. = $1,446,217). These differences in spending are 
not surprising if we consider that the "yes" side promoting a coun­
terinitiative is typically well organized and well financed, and in a 
position where they must pay top-dollar to get signatures. What is 
surprising is that the most expensive "yes" campaigns in California 
coincide with the largest "no" vote. If initiatives are separated from 
legislative amendments, the gap still exists. Legislative amend­
ments that are competing proposals have, on average, $886,081 
spent by the "yes" side, while "yes" spending on noncompeting leg­
islative amendments averages only $134,607. 
Differences in spending also exist in Oregon,- however, overall 
spending there is much lower than in California. In both states, 
more is spent on initiatives than on legislative amendments. The 
obvious conclusion about spending in both states is that the most 
expensive measures, for both pro and negative spending, are com­
peting initiative campaigns. At first glance, the counterproposal 
strategy appears to be effective at maintaining the status quo,- coun­
terinitiative campaigns are more expensive and counterinitiatives 
Table 5.2 Spending and Outcomes on Ballot Propositions 
Competing Non:Competing 
Legislative Legislative 
Total Initiative Amendment Total Initiative Amendment All 
California 
Average % 52.3 57.2 42.5 44.3 49.6 42.3 45.1 
voting no. 
Average expend. 
per prop. 
(1988 $) 
For $3,831,687 5,127,754 886,081 444,013 1,446,217 134,607 969,973 
Against 2,607,387 3,754,637 0 611,101 2,514,042 23,615 925,599 
N 36 25 11 195 46 149 
Oregon 
Average % 57.3 58.5 51.2 47.4 48.4 47.0 48.0 
voting no. 
Average expend. 
per prop. 
(1988$) 
For 134,034 160,840 0 56,116 141,451 18,103 61,585 
Against 598,465 718,158 0 131,516 422,702 1,806 164,284 
N 12 10 2 159 49 110 
Sources: California Fair Political Practices Committee (1988); California Secretary of State (1988, 1990); Oregon Office of the Sec­
retary of State (1970-1990). 
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are more likely to fail. But these data also suggest that "yes" spend­
ing might be associated with "no" voting. 
To better understand the relationship between initiatives, coun­
terinitiatives, spending, and election outcomes, table 5.3 presents 
the results from a model that examines the impact of each spending 
variable while controlling for others factors. The multivariate 
model is based on other models that predict aggregate direct legisla­
tion outcomes (see Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992; Hadwiger 
1992; and Magleby 1984, 1994b). The estimated equations for Cali­
fornia and Oregon are in table 5.3. 
The nature of the relationship between spending and election 
outcomes is not well defined and raises questions about the specifi­
cation of spending effects. Campaign spending is expected to be a 
powerful indicator of who wins in direct democracy elections 
(Cronin 1989). However, the relationship between spending and 
outcomes is not just a matter of one side outspending the other, 
with each having equal impact. Negative spending can be expected 
to have a large effect on initiative voting behavior if voters are 
somehow more responsive to "vote no" appeals in general. Magleby 
(1984, 1994b) shows that, at certain levels, negative spending has 
more of an impact on election outcomes than proponent spending. 
Others have cited a similar relationship between spending and di­
rect legislation outcomes (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992; Cronin 
1989; Lee 1979; Shockley 1980; Zisk 1987). By focusing on any triv­
ial implications of the targeted measure, high-end negative spend­
ing can shape voters' perceptions by confusing or frightening them 
(Lowenstein 1982). However, Thomas (1991) found a relationship 
between spending and outcomes regardless of whether the spending 
was one-sided. In one analysis of the relationship between spending 
and direct legislation outcomes, Magleby (1994b) finds that oppo­
nent spending will increase the "no" vote, and that proponent 
spending, at high levels, also increases the "no" vote. 
To account for this counterintuitive finding, Magleby (1994b) 
points to Gary Jacobson's work and draws an analogy between spend­
ing in congressional elections and spending in direct legislation elec­
tions. Jacobson (1980, 1990) suggests that when an incumbent antic­
ipates a close race due to a strong challenge, he or she will spend 
more money. Because the incumbent spends a lot of money promot­
ing herself in the anticipation of a close race, incumbent spending 
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Table 5.3 Campaign Spending, Counter Proposals, and Direct 
Democracy Outcomes: Explaining "No" Votes in Direct Legisla­
tion Elections (Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates) 
California (1976-90) Oregon (1970-90) 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
First Stage (Proponent Spending') 
Counter proposal 1.69 .95 -1.29 1.33 
Initiative 3.81 1.16 2.85** .88 
Business regulation 1.99 1.18 .23 .94 
Opponent spending 0.42 .08 .50** .08 
Constant 3.59 .40 2.2** .41 
AdjR2 .46 .42 
Second Stage (% "No" Vote) 
Counter proposal 6.25 2.54 7.78 5.32 
Proponent spending' -.43 .16 -.47a .30 
dog) 
Opponent spending .97 .18 1.09** .32 
dog] 
Presidential election -6.35 2.25 -.16 3.01 
year 
Primary -5.24 2.09 4.36 2.98 
Constitutional .20 1.70 -2.64 3.26 
amendment 
Ballot placement .53 .15 -.18 .47 
Turnout (in 100,000s) -0.13 .04 -.08 .10 
Constant 67.40 8.25 55.04** 11.17 
Adj R2 .29 .13 
N 231 170 
ap = .12, *p < .05 (one-tailed), **p== .025 (one-tailed) 
appears to negatively affect vote share in some analyses of congres­
sional spending; but proponent spending does not directly cause the 
vote share to be lower. 
If this analysis is applied to direct legislation campaigns, ballot 
measure proponents sensing a hard sell or a close race will spend 
more while getting only limited returns per dollar. Because it is a re­
sponse to the appearance of a strong challenge, the level of propo­
nent spending, like incumbent spending in congressional elections, 
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is not a variable that is completely external to any model that pre­
dicts initiative voting. Strong opposition is likely to occur on more 
controversial measures. As with congressional elections, proponent 
and opponent spending are wrapped up in each other—in other 
words, they are endogenous variables. Furthermore, if there is some 
decline in returns per dollar for very high amounts of spending, 
the relationship between spending and outcomes is not necessarily 
linear. 
If spending is endogenous, it is necessary to use a two-stage 
model and some indicator of the controversy or competitiveness of 
each proposition to correctly specify how spending affects out­
comes. This allows us to account first for the effect of opponent 
spending on proponent spending, and then to see its effect on votes. 
The first stage of the model predicts the proposition proponent's 
spending while controlling for opponent spending. I use three indi­
cators that tap how competitive or controversial each measure is: 
whether or not there is a competing proposition,- whether or not 
the proposition is an initiative (v. a legislative amendment); and 
whether or not it contains provisions regulating or taxing an indus-
try.8 Because most industries already have organizations or lobby­
ists to represent their interests (in the language of the previous 
chapter, these are type A narrow interests), any attempt to regulate 
or tax an industry can be met with quickly organized and well-
funded opposition. 
These four variables are regressed on proponent spending to pre­
dict how much proponent spending is driven by the threat of oppo­
sition. Proponent spending predicted from this first stage is used in 
the second stage, along with opponent spending, to predict vote out­
comes. This allows us to see the independent effects of each type of 
spending, while isolating and eliminating the effects of proponent 
spending that is driven by the anticipated closeness or competitive­
ness of the contest. Since spending might have diminishing returns 
at very high levels, I use the natural log of proponent and opponent 
expenditures in the models (Magleby 1994b). This helps model the 
potential nonlinear effects of spending on outcomes. 
Besides spending, the model controls for other variables in the 
second-stage equation that may affect direct legislation outcomes. 
The success or failure of an initiative depends on several factors: 
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whether the proposal is a constitutional amendment; placement on 
the ballot; and the type of election (general or primary) and turnout 
(see Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992; Hadwiger 1992; Magleby 
1984). Because constitutional amendments tend to be more "remote 
and obscure" than statutory initiatives, a higher "no" vote is ex­
pected (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992). Primary elections can 
produce different outcomes from general elections, since the compo­
sition of the electorate may affect voting. Primary voters tend to be 
more interested and thus better informed than general election vot­
ers. Because confusion and lack of information can lead voters to re­
ject proposals, propositions on the ballot in primaries might be more 
likely to pass or have a lower percentage of "no" votes than those on 
the ballot in the general election. Furthermore, presidential election 
years may bring out a larger share of the population; research on 
turnout and outcomes at the local level suggest that higher turnout 
increases the likelihood that the measure will not pass (Coleman 
1957; Knox, Landry, and Payne 1984). To control for the effects of 
primaries and election years I have created two dummy variables: 
(1) ballot measures appearing on the ballot during primary elections 
have been coded "1" ; all others have been coded "0"; (2) ballot mea­
sures appearing on the ballot during presidential election years have 
been coded "1" ; all others have been coded "0." Turnout during the 
election is also included in the multivariate model. 
Results: The Disproportionate Effects 
of Negative Spending 
Table 5.3 reports the results of this analysis with data from Califor­
nia (left columns) and Oregon (right columns). Examining the re­
sults from the first stage predicting proponent spending (logged) 
shows that for both Oregon and California, if a measure had been 
placed on the ballot by citizen petition, proponent spending is sig­
nificantly increased. Counterproposals and business regulations also 
significantly increase proponent spending in California. As ex­
pected, there is a significant relationship between opponent and pro­
ponent spending, suggesting that proponent spending is a function 
of opponent spending. Overall, both equations explain over 40% of 
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the variation in proponent spending on all of these propositions, 
largely due to the inclusion of opponent spending in the model. 
The second stage estimates the percentage of "no" votes on each 
measure with values of proponent spending (the predicted value of 
logged proponent spending from the first stage). It shows that, once 
proponent spending has been "purged" of effects shared with oppo­
nent spending, proponent spending does have a significant, inverse 
effect on the proportion of people voting "no" on a ballot measure 
in both states. In other words, as proponents spend more, "yes" vot­
ing increases. Remember that this analysis accounts for the declin­
ing marginal returns on high levels of spending (by logging the data) 
and for the fact that proponent and opponent spending are often 
"wrapped up" in each other (or, in the jargon of statistics, multicol­
inear). By using a two-stage estimation, this analysis may have ac­
counted for Magleby's counterintuitive findings that high "yes" 
spending was associated with more "no" voting. At least with these 
data, "yes" spending appears to buy more "yes" votes. 
However, the effect of opponent spending on "no" votes is still 
much larger than the effect of proponent spending. This finding sup­
ports the conclusions of previous research that negative campaigns 
are much more effective at decreasing support than proponent cam­
paigns are at increasing support. Using the natural log of proponent 
and opponent spending also appears to produce a model that fits the 
data fairly well. This suggests that modest levels of spending have 
larger returns (per dollar) than spending at the higher end. Both pro­
ponents and opponents appear to get a diminishing marginal return 
on their spending. 
The data in table 5.3 also tell us something else about opponent 
advantages, confirming something discussed in the previous chap­
ter. In California, the countermeasure strategy seems to be effective 
in reducing support for a measure, and the effect is above and be­
yond the impact of negative spending. The first stage of the estima­
tion shows that counterproposals (in California) are significantly 
more costly—as the existence of a counterproposal already indicates 
a well-formed opposition. In the second stage, the coefficient indi­
cates that counterproposals, holding spending constant, are still 
more likely to fail. Whether an originating or subsequent conflict­
ing measure, counterpropositions receive 6% more "no" votes, 
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other things being equal. Therefore, not only are counterproposal 
campaigns more expensive, but counterproposals are also more 
likely to fail when proponent and opponent spending are equivalent. 
This finding provides some evidence that targeting an unwanted 
proposition with a counterproposition is an effective strategy for de­
feating measures. Competing measures may add confusion (if not 
negative advertising information) to direct legislation elections,-
voters may be confused about which alternative to support or fa­
tigued from more choices on the ballot and may vote "no" on both 
the originating and countermeasure. The estimates in table 5.3 sug­
gest that this does have an effect on direct legislation outcomes in 
the aggregate. 
As for the other variables in the equations, contrary to expecta­
tions, the different composition of the electorate in presidential 
elections decreases the negative vote in both Oregon and California. 
Also, the negative vote is significantly higher in Oregon primary 
elections. These findings differ somewhat from those of Bowler, 
Donovan, and Happ (1992). They also find a negative relationship 
between presidential elections and negative voting, but it was not 
significant. They also found a positive and significant relationship 
between primary elections and the proportion of negative votes 
when they hypothesized a negative relationship. Perhaps the hy­
pothesis that a more informed primary electorate is more likely to 
support initiatives is flawed. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined two questions about initiative and 
counterinitiative use. First, I examined the factors that explain vari­
ation in use of initiatives and counterinitiatives across time and be­
tween states. The analysis demonstrated that initiative use is more 
frequent where interest groups are strong, where states have divided 
government, in states with professional legislatures, and where 
qualification burdens are low. The same conditions largely deter­
mine use of counterinitiatives, although these are less constrained 
by qualification requirements and divided government. 
 129 Direct Legislation
Next, the chapter examined the effects of spending and coun­
terinitiatives on direct legislation outcomes. Counterproposals lead 
to more "no" voting. Results further demonstrate that proponent 
spending increases support and opponent spending decreases sup­
port. More interestingly, opponent spending, dollar for dollar, has a 
much greater impact on votes than proponent spending. Given the 
discussion in chapter 4, this furthers our understanding of why nar­
row interests have a difficult time using money to advance their in­
terests, but are well positioned to defend themselves when threat­
ened. Well-financed opponents have two major defensive advantages 
in the process: using countermeasures to defeat an original proposal, 
and receiving higher returns on each dollar of campaign spending. 
Stodder (1992) suggests that industry groups created the coun­
terinitiative strategy as a response to the weakening effect of nega­
tive spending. The second part of my analysis on elections outcomes 
suggests that although this may have been the perception, negative 
spending is still a significant factor affecting vote margins. The re­
sults show that negative spending is much more effective in defeat­
ing a measure than affirmative spending is at promoting a measure. 
Although the success of counterproposals at maintaining the status 
quo relies partly on the large amounts of money spent on the cam­
paigns, my findings in this chapter suggest that counterproposals 
also have an independent effect on direct legislation outcomes. 
APPENDIX 
INITIATIVE USE 
Initiatives Number of initiatives appearing on the ballot in a two-
year election cycle. 
Countehnitiatives Number of counterinitiatives appearing on the 
ballot in a two-year election cycle. 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
Legislative Capability 
Divided Government 1 Governor of different party than legislature 
(1); otherwise (0). 
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Divided Government 2 Chambers of legislature controlled by differ­
ent parties (1); otherwise (0). 
Legislative Functionality Proportion of bills enacted of bills that 
have been introduced in state legislature. 
Professionalization Compares legislative compensation, session 
length, and staff size to that of the U.S. Congress. The closer the 
state legislature is to the Congress, the more professional it is. 
The three proportions are averaged for each state (Squire 1992). 
Information on compensation and session length is from the 
Council on State Government's The Book of the States. Staff 
size is from Weberg (1988). 
Constituency Size Population per district of lower chamber 
member. 
Ballot Access 
Qualification Difficulty Number of signatures required per day of 
circulation = number of signatures required/number of days al­
lowed to circulate petitions. 
POLITICAL VARIABLES 
Party Competition: Party competition is the moving average over three 
gubernatorial elections: l%Dem - %Repl, where %Dem and 
%Rep are the Democratic and Republican votes for governor 
(Morehouse 1982, 66). 
Party and Interest Group Strength: I use Morehouse's (1982) categoriza­
tion of states into weak, medium, and strong for the appropriate 
year. For the analysis, the weak and moderate rankings of inter­
est group and party strength have been collapsed into one 
category. Although collapsing these indicators gives up some 
variability in the measures, using the full scales did not yield 
different results, and the dichotomous measures performed 
better. 
NOTES 
1. Personal correspondence with the Public Affairs Research Institute, 
22 May 1995. 
2. See chapter 1 for a discussion of direct versus indirect initiatives. 
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3. Since this chapter was written, a new phenomenon has emerged, in 
which allied groups, after failing to agree on a plan for a policy, place com­
peting measures on the same ballot. 
4. The literature testing V. O. Key's (1949) suggestion that more-compet-
itive state party systems will result in more-liberal welfare policies is too 
vast to review here. For reviews of the literature see Lewis-Beck (1977) or 
Carmines (1974). The arguments rest on the assumption that both parties 
will appeal to the larger disadvantaged group in order to gain an electoral ad­
vantage when there are competitive elections. This interpretation is closely 
related to Downs;s (1957) argument in Economic Theory of Democracy. 
5. If the legislature is more responsive to opinion, there would be fewer 
initiatives in response to "sins of omission/7 although Weingast (1988) and 
Matsusaka (1996) show that logrolling within legislatures could cause pol­
icy to depart from median voter preferences if logrolling is common. 
6. The starting sample size was 345 cases. Four cases are missing from 
Nebraska because data were not available on eligible voters from 1962 to 
1968. Four cases are missing from Illinois, 8 from Florida, and 3 from 
Wyoming because the initiative was not adopted until after 1962. There­
fore, the sample size is reduced to 326. 
7. I focus on California and Oregon here because these states have the 
highest occurrences of counterpropositions. 
8. These are not the best indicators of the controversial nature of a 
proposition. Certainly, propositions occur on the ballot that are neither 
counterpropositions nor regulatory measures that are nonetheless very con­
troversial. For example, 1988's Proposition 102 in California was a highly 
controversial antigay initiative that called for reporting anyone believed to 
have been exposed to the AIDS virus. Good indicators of whether or not a 
measure is controversial would be spending and the margin of victory or de­
feat. However, these variables do not predict controversy; they are after-
the-fact indicators of controversy. 
Searching for Ideological Consistency 
in Direct Legislation Voting 
SUSAN A. BANDUCCI 
Central to the debate over direct legislation is the question of voter 
competence—whether voters can make meaningful choices that re­
flect underlying preferences. While some argue that voter choice in 
direct legislation elections is capricious (Mueller 1969), other evi­
dence suggests that ideological self-placement is a strong predictor 
of choice. Using measures developed to test attitude consistency, I 
examine the structure of electoral choices for ballot measures. Al­
though there is not one underlying attitude dimension, choices are 
structured within particular issue areas. 
The individual voter faces an information vacuum in direct legis­
lation elections. If a proposed ballot measure is noncontroversial, a 
voter is not likely to be exposed to any information about the mea­
sure before entering the voting booth. Even the usual decision-
making shortcuts that make up for the lack of information in candi­
date elections—party cues, candidate evaluations, and retrospective 
judgments—are absent in direct legislation elections. Even if the 
measure is controversial and information is available, the complex­
ity of the measure may-make it difficult for voters to translate pref­
erences into electoral choice. Given this lack of information, some 
researchers claim that there is little to structure electoral choices in 
direct legislation elections, and therefore choices appear to be noth­
ing more than "snap judgments" made in the voting place (Magleby 
1984, 179). However, the one factor that does seem to be consis­
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tently related to choice is self-identified ideology (Magleby 1984; 
Bowler and Donovan n.d.). In this chapter, I examine the extent to 
which voting decisions in direct legislation elections are structured 
by some underlying predispositions or whether they are random 
marks on a ballot. 
The Structure of Electoral Choice 
in Direct Legislation Elections 
Voting-behavior studies of direct legislation elections often focus on 
a single issue such as auto insurance reform (Lupia 1994b), nuclear 
power (Kuklinksi, Metlay, and Kay 1982), property taxes (Lowery 
and Sigelman 1981), open housing (Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968), 
and term limits (Karp 1995). These studies model outcomes as a bi­
nary choice between the status quo and the proposed alternative, 
with votes ("yes" or "no") regressed on a series of predictor vari­
ables. On economic issues, social class is a strong explanatory fac­
tor; parental status is a strong predictor of support for school bond 
measures,- and religion affects support for a casino-gambling mea­
sure (Magleby 1984). Because of the focus on a single issue at a time, 
the results are not applicable to initiatives generally. However, po­
litical ideology is one factor that is consistently related to voting on 
many individual ballot measures (Gerber and Lupia 1992; Magleby 
1984). Yet with a focus often directed at a single issue or types of is­
sues, the underlying coherence of multiple electoral choices from a 
single given ballot is rarely assessed. 
It is important that we understand how voters behave when cast­
ing decisions across several policy measures in any particular elec­
tion. Given our democratic ideals, we expect a coherent outcome to 
an election after the votes have been counted. Outcomes should 
"make sense" to observers who are interested in gauging how votes 
on specific policies might express mass preferences in general. Con­
sider two abortion measures on Oregon's 1990 ballot. Measure 8 
proposed prohibiting all abortions except in cases of rape or incest 
or to save the mother's life, while Measure 10 would have required 
parental notification for a minor to obtain an abortion. Had neither 
passed, representatives might infer that the public was decidedly 
134 SUSAN A. BANDUCCI 
pro-abortion rights. Had both passed, they might infer that the pub­
lic was decidedly anti-abortion rights. If only parental notification 
passed (the more moderate departure from the status quo), they 
might infer the public was somewhere in the middle. However, 
given that the near prohibition was an extreme departure from the 
status quo, it would be much more difficult to infer voter intent if 
near prohibition passed while parental notification failed.1 
Studying the relationship between policy choices in a single elec­
tion is important, since it can illustrate how election outcomes 
might come to be structured by some underlying policy preferences 
that constrain how voters think. If there is evidence of structure, 
choices across multiple issues should be more logically constrained, 
and election results should be more likely to "make sense." 
For the past 35 years the subject of attitude structure has been 
central to public opinion research. The more politically sophisti­
cated voters are expected to have attitudes on issues that are consis­
tent with one another and that reflect some underlying ideological 
predisposition. Testing for attitude consistency, or testing the ex­
tent to which attitudes on a wide variety of issues are structured 
along a single dimension, is one way to approach studying the rela­
tionship among choices on ballot measures. Can voters organize 
their preferences on a list of ballot measures in a coherent way that 
reflects some underlying principle to the organization such as ideol­
ogy? Because attitude consistency is related to behavior in candi­
date elections (Levitin and Miller 1979; Stimson 1975), we might 
also expect a relationship in direct legislation elections. 
Research on political belief systems, although not without signif­
icant debate, has generally concluded that very few people attain a 
high level of abstract ideological thinking, and that many individu­
als hold inconsistent attitudes. The authors of The American Voter 
concluded that only about 10 % of the electorate came close to ap­
proximating the ideal of a sophisticated or ideologically thinking 
voter; they suggest that "the concepts important to ideological 
analysis are useful only for that small segment of the population 
that is equipped to approach political decisions at a rarefied level" 
(Campbell et al. 1960, 250). From this perspective, few voters have 
attitudes across several policy issues that are constrained by ideol­
ogy in a manner producing logical consistency. While the debate 
over the distribution of sophistication may have been settled (Kinder 
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1983; Luskin 1987), questions still remain about measurement (E. 
Smith 1989; Luskin 1987) and about how the use of abstract ideolog­
ical reasoning varies by cognitive ability (Sniderman et al. 1991). 
Ideological Consistency on Ballot Propositions— 
Should We Expect It? 
In terms of issue attitudes we might expect consistency in re­
sponses for at least two reasons—one psychological, the other soci­
ological. If one understands the connections among different poli­
cies, their implications, and consequences, then opinions will be 
logically tailored on these policies so that they do not conflict. This 
notion of constraint is drawn from the psychological theory of cog­
nitive consistency, or balance theory. If you are aware that two be­
liefs are inconsistent, this produces tension, and you are likely to 
change beliefs to be consistent. On the other hand, if you do not as­
sociate the two beliefs or connect them in any way, there is no need 
to change them, because there is no tension (Osgood and Tannen­
baum 1955). We would expect, therefore, greater constraint among 
those more aware of politics, because they are more likely to recog­
nize when positions conflict. The other reason for attitude con­
straint is social. People might learn from elites how beliefs about 
policies "fit together" into nice little packages. For example, liberal 
elites typically favor spending more on social services and less on 
defense; some voters can pick up on these ideological packages.2 Ev­
idence does suggest that elites have more constrained belief systems 
than do non-elites (see Jennings 1992). 
There can also be many dimensions along which people organ­
ize their political beliefs. Converse (1964) argues that, since politi­
cal elites in the U.S. structure their beliefs along the left-right 
ideological dimension, the same dimension should be used as the 
yardstick for mass belief systems as well. Hence, the politically "in­
volved" should exhibit belief systems constrained by some under­
lying dimension of liberal-conservative ideals. Controversy about 
the dimensionality of sophisticated belief systems has raised some 
questions, however. What, for example, really suggests greater 
complexity: having fewer or more numerous dimensions structur­
ing attitudes? 
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Stimson (1975) presents evidence suggesting that more-educated 
voters have fewer dimensions underlying attitudes, while Marcus, 
Tabb, and Sullivan (1974) support the opposite position. Many 
scholars have pointed out that beliefs can be structured along sev­
eral "ideological" domains—domestic policy, foreign policy, eco­
nomic matters, racial affairs, and social policy. Conover and Feld­
man (1984) argue that each domain should be considered in political 
belief systems, yet they still interpret results in terms of a single un­
derlying left-right ideology (Luskin 1987). Using exploratory factor 
analysis, Stimson (1975) finds two distinct dimensions among pol­
icy positions for the more highly educated individuals (elite), while 
four dimensions emerged for the least educated. The difference in 
the number of factors between the least- and most-educated could 
indicate that the more highly educated have more constrained belief 
systems, since variation in attitudes about many policies could be 
explained (or constrained) by only two underlying dimensions. Im­
portantly, there was not a single underlying dimension for the best-
educated; rather, there were two. Stimson interpreted these as a di­
mension of reasoning involving social issues, and another involving 
traditional left-right issues. The social dimension structured atti­
tudes about issues such as women's rights and legalization of mari­
juana, while the traditional left-right dimension structured atti­
tudes about guaranteed jobs and inflation. 
In addition, self-placement on a left-right ideological spectrum 
has been shown to be highly correlate! with issue positions and 
electoral choices, and the left-right placement continuum fits a 
broad range of attitudes (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Be­
cause ideology is one factor consistently related to preferences on 
ballot measures for many voters, we might expect choices on ballot 
propositions to be structured along ideological lines, even for fairly 
complex issues. Kuklinski, Metlay, and Kay (1982), for example, 
find that "core values"—defined as political ideology and attitudes 
about technological advances—played a significant role in voters' 
decisions on a nuclear energy initiative (619). The most knowledge­
able voters were found to be more likely to rely on political ideology 
in decision making, while the least knowledgeable relied on general 
feelings about, technology. Furthermore, out of the three models of 
decision making tested (cost-benefit, core values, and reference 
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group cues), core values had the most pervasive influence on the 
policy choices of individuals: "Core values .. . are the key to under­
standing how citizens decide" (Kuklinski, Metlay, and Kay 1982, 
633). This conclusion is particularly notable given that nuclear en­
ergy was a relatively new and highly technical issue not easily de­
fined in terms of a left-right continuum. Lowery and Sigelman 
(1981) also claim that ideology played a much larger role than eco­
nomic self-interest in explaining support for California's Proposi­
tion 13. 
Even beyond these two examples, ideological self-placement is 
consistently related to voting preferences regardless of ballot mea­
sure content. Magleby (1984) regressed vote choice for ten Califor­
nia ballot measures on a series of six predictor variables, including 
party and ideology; ideology was statistically significant in seven of 
the equations (176). No other predictor variables worked as well. In 
an analysis of voting in direct legislation elections, Gerber and 
Lupia (1992) regressed vote preference for 42 California initiatives 
on party identification, age, education, union membership, gender, 
race, home ownership, and awareness. Party identification was sig­
nificant in over two-thirds of the equations. Because ideological 
self-identification was not used in these models, party identifica­
tion was most likely picking up some of its effects. 
All of this demonstrates that there is a solid basis for assuming 
that preferences on ballot measures are structured by ideological 
predispositions. If this is true, and ideology constrains and struc­
tures attitudes across numerous policy issues, we can also expect 
decisions across multiple propositions on one ballot to be some­
what consistent. 
Searching for Consistency 
Using surveys to test attitude consistency in a single election is 
problematic, because most preelection surveys only include ques­
tions on controversial ballot measures. Preelection samples also 
include many individuals who have not made up their minds on 
ballot measures. Using exit polls would solve this latter problem, 
but the number of questions about ballot measures is still limited 
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by the financial considerations of polling organizations. Instead of 
relying on survey data, I use the actual voted ballots from the 1990 
general election in Oregon's Marion County,3 thus avoiding some 
problems associated with surveys. First, because the voted ballot 
records actual votes rather than reported votes, I avoid some of the 
unreliability of survey questions. Second, during the campaign, vot­
ers are more likely to have been exposed to some information about 
the ballot measures and are therefore more likely to have opinions, 
which also reduces unreliability. However, this does not mean vot­
ers may not be confused by the description of the measures on the 
ballot. Another advantage to using voted ballots is that we are mea­
suring actual behavior rather than reported behavior or reported at­
titudes. Of course, the drawbacks of using voted ballots is that we 
do not have access to questions that directly measure factors related 
to consistency, such as education, political knowledge, awareness, 
and interest in politics. 
On the 1990 Oregon ballot, there were 11 measures addressing 
several issues. Because the dynamics of choice for legislative refer­
rals and referenda are different from those for initiatives (Magleby 
1984; Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992), I limit my analysis to the 
8 citizen-initiated measures on the ballot, thereby eliminating a ref­
erendum and two legislatively referred constitutional amendments. 
These policies are listed in table 6.1. Briefly, the policies voters eval­
uated included Measure 4, which proposed closing a nuclear power 
plant until safety measures had been met; Measure 5, which pro­
posed cutting property taxes; Measure 6, which called for all prod­
uct packaging to be recyclable,- Measure 7, which proposed that wel­
fare recipients be required to work for benefits,- Measure 8, which 
proposed prohibiting abortions except in a few cases; Measure 9, a 
proposal to require the use of safety belts; Measure 10, which pro­
posed that parental notification be required for a minor seeking an 
abortion; and Measure 11, a school voucher measure. 
Measuring Consistency 
I use two methods of assessing consistency here. First, I use princi­
pal components analysis to test the number of underlying factors 
that structure voting on the eight initiatives, with the expectation 
that votes can be reduced to a smaller number of common dimen­
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Table 6.1 Ballot Measure Titles, Oregon 1990 
Measure No. Summary 
 Prohibits Trojan operation until nuclear waste, 
cost, earthquake standards met 
5 State constitutional limit on property taxes for 
schools government operations 
6 Product packaging must meet recycling standards 
or receive hardship waiver 
7 Six-country work in lieu of welfare benefits pilot 
program 
8 Amends Oregon constitution to prohibit abortion 
with three exceptions 
9 Requires use of safety belts 
10 Doctor must give parent notice before minor's 
abortion 
11 School choice system, tax credit for education out­
side public schools 
sions if there is some underlying ideology or principle that guides 
voters making choices across many issues. I have also constructed a 
measure of consistent partisan voting in order to test whether parti­
san voters have more constrained attitudes. Partisan consistency 
serves as a rough indicator of one form of ideological reasoning. The 
scale identifies those who are consistent in partisan voting in candi­
date races. High scores are given to individuals who vote consis­
tently with one party on five candidate races (U.S. Senate, U.S. 
House, governor, state senator, and state representative). These 
scores are used to divide the sample into subgroups so I can test if 
there is more structure to ballot proposition voting among highly 
consistent partisan voters. 
Second, I measure consistency on ballot measures using Gutt­
man scales. If votes on the ballot propositions have some underly­
ing structure, approval of the propositions should scale like a 
Guttman scale. The special feature of a Guttman scale is that items 
will be related in such a way that an individual with a particular at­
titude will agree with less extreme items on one side of that posi­
tion and disagree with the other items. Each value is a function of 
the underlying continuum and from the respondent's score on a 
Guttman scale we should be able to predict the responses to all the 
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individual items on the scale (Mclver and Carmines 1981). Errors in 
the scale occur when an individual gives a negative response to an 
item lower than the individual's scale score. The test of whether to 
reject or accept the unidimensionality of the scale is based on the 
number of errors. 
Factor Analysis 
Principal components analysis illustrates how a large number of 
variables might share a smaller number of underlying traits. It al­
lows us to find the underlying structure—or factors—among a large 
number of things, like votes on several initiatives. With this 
method, the number of factors found is nearly always a function of 
the number and type of issues chosen. In my analysis the issues are 
limited to the initiatives that appeared on the 1990 Oregon ballot. 
The analysis resulted in three unique factors (each with eigenvalues4 
greater than 1) that explain variance in votes across the 8 initiatives. 
At the top of table 6.2,1 present the factor structure derived from the 
analysis of all voters in the sample, as well as the factors for highly 
consistent party voters and for the least-consistent party voters. 
Although the factor analysis does not support the existence of a 
single underlying dimension, the measures load onto three factors 
in coherent fashion. The three underlying dimensions seem to re­
flect established social, economic, and regulatory domains of a 
left-right ideology (Asher 1980; Weisberg and Rusk 1970). Votes on 
the two abortion-restriction measures (Measures 8 and 10) are ex­
plained by one factor (social), the school voucher and workfare ini­
tiatives (Measures 7 and 11) by another single factor (economic), 
while voting on two regulatory questions (Measures 6 and 9) is ex­
plained by a third factor (regulatory). We can thus say that support 
for both of the abortion initiatives is structured by some common 
source (which we assume is underlying social attitudes), and that 
support for initiatives dealing with workfare policies and school 
choice (or tax credits for private schools) is structured by another, 
distinct dimension of attitudes about economic issues. Similarly, 
voting on requirements for product packaging and safety belts is 
structured by a separate dimension of attitudes about regulation. 
When all voters are considered, these three factors explain over 58% 
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Table 6.2 Principal Components Analysis of Voted Ballots by Level 
of Partisan Consistency 
Explained Interpretation Ballot 
Group Factor Variance (%) of Factor Measures 
All 1 25.5 Social 8, 10 
2 17.5 Economic 7,11 
3 15.1 Regulatory 6,9 
Total variance 58.1 
Low partisan 
constituency 
in candidate 
voting 1 23.8 Social 10 
2 17.1 Economic 5 
3 13.8 Mixed 9 
4 13.0 Regulatory 6 
Total variance 67.7 
High partisan 
constituency 
in candidate 
voting 1 28.4 Social 8, 10 
2 17.6 Economic 7,11 
3 14.4 Regulatory 
Total variance 60.3 
of the variance in votes across all 8 initiatives, with the two largest 
explaining 43% of the variance. 
Support for the final two ballot measures (closing a nuclear 
power plant and a tax limitation initiative) fails to load on any of 
these factors, illustrating that these three underlying dimensions do 
not structure votes on all measures, including two that might have 
been expected to be affected by whatever underlying attitudes the 
economic and regulatory factors represent. For example, if attitudes 
were perfectly structured or constrained by a small number of under­
lying factors, we might expect that voting on the tax limitation ini­
tiative (Measure 5) would be affected by the same attitudes that struc­
ture voting on the school choice and workfare initiatives (the 
economic factor). Similarly, we might except support or opposition to 
the nuclear power question to be explained by the same underlying 
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dimension that structures voting on product packaging and safety 
belt requirements (the regulatory factor). But as table 6.2 illustrates, 
these measures fail to load on these factors. 
Table 6.2 also shows the factor structure for each level of partisan 
consistency. For individuals with a low level of partisan constraint, 
the 8 ballot measures loaded onto four rather than three factors, 
with each failing to structure opinions on multiple initiatives. The 
two largest factors for the least partisan explain 40.9% of the vari­
ance in voting on all initiatives. However, for those with high parti­
san constraint, the 8 ballot measures reduced to three factors, with 
each structuring opinions on multiple initiatives. The first two fac­
tors from highly partisan voters explain 46% of variance in votes, 
while all three explain over 60% of variance in votes on all 8 initia­
tives. The increase in the number of factors for the least partisan, 
and the failure of any of these factors to constrain votes across mul­
tiple initiatives, suggest that those who vote without partisan con­
sistency in candidate races also have a less coherent structure to 
their votes on ballot measures. Thus, whatever it is that causes vot­
ers to behave in terms of a straight partisan lens in candidate races 
(i.e., ideological reasoning, cognitive ability, education) might also 
cause them to structure their decisions on the basis of underlying 
principles when evaluating numerous ballot measures. 
Guttman Scales 
Guttman scaling assumes the underlying pattern to responses 
are "triangular/7 such that people who answer "yes" to the first 
item in an ordered scale should consistently answer "yes" to other 
items. If a person answers "no" to items early in the scale, once 
they answer "yes" to any item they should agree with the remain­
ing items.5 I use this method to test how voted ballots might be 
structured by left-right scales of policy choices. The people's re­
sponses are ordered as a scale, so there should be few errors in pre­
dicting actual votes with the scale. 
Creating and interpreting a Guttman scale using all 8 ballot mea­
sures can prove difficult, especially when we have no a priori rea­
sons for placing the ballot measures on a left-right scale. It is diffi­
cult, for example, to know whether support for closing the Trojan 
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nuclear power plant (Measure 4) is further to the left than rejecting 
the measure to prohibit abortions. Therefore, I have used the princi­
pal components solution from table 6.2 to separate the measures 
and build Guttman scales for each of the three issue dimensions. 
The two propositions that failed to load on any factor (Measures 4 
and 5) are placed on what are assumed to be the most appropriate 
issue dimensions. Measure 5, the property tax limit, is placed on the 
economic dimension and the nuclear initiative on the regulatory di­
mension. Within one of these dimensions, the placement of the 
measures on the left-right continuum is based on newspaper en­
dorsements. In using elite (newspaper) endorsements to construct a 
Guttman scale, I am assuming that editorial staffs reflect highly 
constrained reasoning about ballot measures. These elite endorse­
ments from newspaper editorial boards are given in table 6.3. 
A clear Guttman scale for the regulatory dimension can be illus­
trated by newspaper endorsements. Assume the conservative, status-
quo position would be to oppose all measures. All papers endorsed 
the more moderate regulation (safety belts). One paper [The Wil­
lamette Weekly) has taken the position farthest to the left of the sta­
tus quo by endorsing each measure. Two papers endorsed the safety 
belt measure and also endorsed the product packaging measure, 
while one paper endorsed the safety belt measure only [The Oiegon­
ian). The Oiegoniaris position is thus closest to the status quo, and 
the Willamette Weekly's the farthest from it. The endorsements 
Table 6.3 Newspaper Endorsements on Oregon Measures 
Ballot Willamette Statesman-
Scale Measure Weekly Journal Oregonian 
Social 8 No No No 
10 No No No 
Regulatory 9 Yes Yes Yes 
6 Yes Yes No 
6 Yes No No 
Economic 5 Yes No No 
7 No No No 
11 No No No 
Source: Oregonian, 6 November 1994; Salem Statesman-Journal, Novem­
ber 1994; Willamette Weekly, 1 November 1994. 
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illustrate that elites (editorial boards) who favor the more extreme 
regulatory intervention (of nuclear plants) should also favor safety 
belt regulations. If voters have a similar structure to their reasoning, 
we might expect that voters who support Measure 4 (nuclear plants) 
would also support Measures 6 (packaging) and 9 (safety belts). Like­
wise, a voter who supports Measure 6 and not Measure 4 would also 
support Measure 9. 
A Guttman pattern is as clearly evident for the economic issues. 
One endorsement for Measure 5, the property tax measure, places it 
closest to the status quo and places the other two measures (7 and 
11) to the right of Measure 5. However, because none of the papers 
supported Measure 7 or 11, it is difficult to distinguish whether 
Measure 7 or Measure 11 is closer to Measure 5. I tested the scale 
with both Measure 7, the welfare benefits measure, as the most ex­
treme and then Measure 11, school vouchers, as the most extreme. 
The placement of these measures did not make any difference to the 
number of errors. Figure 6.1 shows the placement of the measures 
on a left-right dimension according to the newspaper endorsements. 
For the other two issue dimensions (social and economic, respec­
tively), creation of the underlying scales was more subjective. No 
paper endorsed either of the abortion restrictions measures. Mea­
sure 8, which prohibits abortion, has been placed to the right of 
Measure 10, the parental notification requirement. Therefore, we 
would expect that voters who supported Measure 8 would also sup­
port Measure 10, whereas voters who favored some restrictions but 
not a ban would also support parental notification only. 
The distribution of actual votes is presented in table 6.4. Individ­
uals whose responses did not fit the anticipated Guttman scale 
pattern are listed in the last row as errors. The standard used for 
identifying if the response pattern is logically consistent (or unidi­
mensional) is to have fewer than 10% errors. Thus, for the social di­
mension, high constraint is evident. On these abortion measures, 
fewer than 2% of the voters can be classified as casting a set of 
choices that depart from the scale (i.e., voting for a ban, but not for 
parental notification). This finding complements the factor analy­
sis, which found that the dimension of underlying social attitudes 
explained the largest proportion of variance in initiative votes. 
The distribution of votes on the economic and regulatory dimen­
sions does not appear to be as consistently ordered as votes on the 
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Figure 6.1 Placement of 1990 Oregon Ballot Measures on Left-Right 
Continuum 
Social/Abortion i 
SQ Measure 10 Measure 8 
Regulatory 
Measure 4 Measures Measure 9 
Economic 
SQ Measure 5 Measure 7 Measure 11 
Left Ideology Right Ideology 
social issues. On the regulatory scale, approximately 30% of voters 
cast a set of choices that did not fit the left-right patterns derived 
from the newspaper endorsements. A similar rate of errors is found 
for the economic scale. While the number of errors exceeds the ac­
ceptable standard for a unidimensional Guttman scale, that an over­
whelming majority of voters fit the pattern is exceptional given the 
number and complexity of the issues. 
Conclusion 
Electoral choice on ballot propositions does appear to be con­
strained by some underlying attitudinal dimensions. For the ballot 
measures I have analyzed, the structure of choices appears to be 
fairly consistent with common ideological dimensions. While the 
principal components analysis does not reveal a single underlying 
dimension, the factor loadings coincide with clear social, economic, 
and regulatory ideological dimensions that have been proposed as 
alternatives to the single left-right ideological dimension. Further­
more, the Guttman scale analysis suggests ideological consistency 
in decisions within the three specific issue areas. 
There is also some evidence that the underlying structure of elec­
toral choices varies in the population. Admittedly, my measure of 
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Table 6.4 Guttman Scale: Patterns of Responses 
on Ballot Measures 
Ballot Measure Response Errors 
Social Issues 
Vote on 
Measure 10 no yes yes no 
Vote on 
Measure 8 no no yes yes 
% with 
response 
pattern 43.0 16.7 38.7 1.6 
Economic Issues 
Vote on 
Measure 5 no yes yes yes 
Vote on 
Measure 7 no no yes yes 
Vote on 
Measure 11 no no no yes 
% with 
response 
pattern 24.7 18.8 8.9 13.4 30.1 
Environmental 
Issues 
Vote on 
Measure 9
Vote on 
 no yes yes yes 
Measure 6 no no yes yes 
Vote on 
Measure 4 no no no yes 
% with 
response 
pattern 18.7 11.4 21.5 19,7 28.7 
partisan consistency is a poor substitute for cognitive ability, politi­
cal involvement, or ideological reasoning, factors that have been ac­
knowledged as causing variation in the structuring of attitudes. My 
analysis is limited by the lack of explanatory variables. However, I 
do find higher attitudinal consistency on ballot measure voting for 
the groups that also vote consistently with the same party in candi­
date races. My evidence does not establish that the structure of atti­
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tudes is markedly different when highly partisan and less partisan 
voters are compared, but rather that there is less structure to ballot 
measure voting among those whose candidate voting is not struc­
tured by party. 
The factor analysis and the Guttman scale analysis reveal pat­
terns that should not exist if numerous choices on ballot measures 
were merely random marks on a ballot. Thus, when voters make 
choices on a large number of initiatives, it is reasonable to expect 
that outcomes "make sense" after all the votes are counted. That is, 
it might be relatively unlikely that a majority of voters would ap­
prove two policies that are logically incompatible with each other, 
given the sort of structure demonstrated here. This is not to say that 
inconsistent outcomes could not happen on occasion, but we 
should not expect it to be common. 
Finally, I should note that I have not directly tested what leads to 
consistency or to ideological structuring of choices, but have only 
found some evidence of consistency and structure. Comparisons 
with newspaper endorsements suggest that some structure may be 
learned from elites. However, it is difficult to establish a causal link 
between the endorsements and choices with these data from Ore­
gon. The next chapter examines how knowledge of another form of 
elite endorsements (elected officials' positions) structures choices 
on a term limit initiative in Washington. 
NOTES 
1. Or, for another (hypothetical) example, consider how one would inter­
pret the results of a single election where voters approved tougher criminal-
sentencing for drug crimes in one initiative, while approving decriminaliza­
tion of marijuana use in another. 
2. For a summary of the research on ideological consistency, see Smith 
1989. 
3. The sample of approximately 1,200 voted ballots was systematically 
drawn from all voted ballots in Marion County, Oregon. An examination of 
the representatives of the sample is presented below [N = 1,198). 
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Sample (%) Actual Outcome (%) 
Governor—vote for Roberts 39.51 39.59 
Measure 10—yes 55.68 54.94 
Measure 11—yes 34.79 34.74 
Measure 5—yes vote 59.11 55.47 
4. An eigenvalue of 1 is the most common criterion used for determin­
ing the number of components in a principal components analysis (Kaiser 
1958). Any component that a number of variables have in common with an 
eigenvalue, greater than 1 indicates that the component explains more vari­
ance in the responses than a single variable. Therefore, if a component is 
explaining more variance than a single variable, it is explaining a meaning­
ful amount of variance. 
5. The scale is said to be triangular, since it assumes an underlying pat­
tern of ordered responses such as the following: 
Choice Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
Initiative A yes no no 
Initiative B yes yes no 
Initiative C yes yes yes 
The Influence of Elite Endorsements 
in Initiative Campaigns 
JEFFREY A. KARP 
In November of 1991, voters in Washington State rejected an initia­
tive that would have placed limits on the number of terms elected 
officials could serve. The term limits initiative would have forced 
the state's entire congressional delegation, including Speaker of the 
House Tom Foley, to leave office after serving just one more term in 
office. The 1991 term limits defeat in Washington State was unique 
and unexpected. Just one year before, the term limits movement ap­
peared to have strong momentum when voters approved term lim­
its initiatives in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma. Initially the 
Washington measure enjoyed widespread support; however, after an 
expensive and hotly contested campaign, the measure failed with 
46% of the vote. A year after the defeat, voters in Washington and 
13 other states passed similar term limits measures. Most of these 
measures passed easily, with little or no opposition. By the end of 
1995, voters in more than 20 states approved ballot measures limit­
ing the number of terms of either or both state legislators and mem­
bers of Congress. 
Washington was one of the few states to experience organized op­
position to term limits. Moreover, the nature of opposition was 
unique in that well-known elites, like Speaker Tom Foley, actively 
campaigned against the initiative. Foley and the other members of 
the congressional delegation warned that passage of the term limits 
initiative would result in Washington State unilaterally disarming 
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its clout in Congress. Pundits as well as the campaign strategists 
themselves attributed the defeat of the initiative to the crafting of 
this message (see Robinson and Dixon 1992). 
This chapter focuses on the term limits campaign in Washington 
State in 1991, examining how citizens use cues and other informa­
tion from political elites to help them decide whether or not to vote 
for a ballot measure. While the chapter provides insight into the na­
ture of public support for legislative term limits, its broader objective 
is to explain the influence of elites in direct democracy elections. 
Opinion Formation 
Studies of mass opinion change contend that the attitudes of the 
electorate are shaped by the political rhetoric of elites/ that "[t]he 
voice of the people is but an echo" (Key 1966, 2). V. O. Key believed 
that public opinion is part of a dynamic system in which activists, 
organized groups, and elected officials influence mass opinion: 
"Mass opinion is not self-generating; in the main, it is a response to 
cues, the proposals, and the visions propagated by the political ac­
tivists" (1966, 557). Similarly, Converse (1964) believed that indi­
viduals rely on information or messages from political elites to help 
organize political issues and ideas. For an individual's political rea­
soning about an issue to be influenced by elite opinion, he or she 
must have knowledge of these issues and opinions. Exposure to 
messages from political elites depends in part on the individual's 
level of political involvement as well as the intensity of the mes­
sage. Individuals who pay attention to current political events and 
understand them are more likely to develop stable attitudes on 
major political issues (Feldman 1989) and to think in ideological 
terms (Converse 1964; Stimson 1975). Because high political aware­
ness is associated with stable attitudes and probability of exposure, 
those individuals who are more likely to be exposed to cues from 
political elites are also likely to have knowledge about the sources 
of the cues and whether or not they are consistent with prior atti­
tudes. The least-informed individuals, while in theory being more 
susceptible to campaign messages, are likely not to respond to cues 
from elites because they are less likely to be exposed to the persua­
sive messages, especially when the flow of information is low (Con­
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verse 1962). Those who are moderately informed are most suscepti­
ble to campaign messages because they have a higher probability of 
being exposed to the message than the least aware and are more 
likely to be persuaded by the message than the highly aware. 
Following on Converse's work, Zaller (1992) outlines scenarios 
for mass opinion change in two cases: first, when there is consensus 
among elites,- and second, when there is elite polarization. Zaller de­
fines these elites as persons who devote themselves full-time to 
some aspect of politics or public affairs (1992, 6). These would in­
clude politicians, journalists, and policy experts, as well as some ac­
tivists. The model treats opinion formation as a two-step process 
wherein individuals must first be exposed to new political informa­
tion, and then decide whether to accept or reject the information 
based on their own political predispositions. If there are no ideologi­
cal or partisan cues in the messages—meaning there is a consensus 
in elite opinion—then support for the elite position should increase 
among the politically aware. However, if there are partisan or ideo­
logical cues in the messages, the politically aware liberal will resist 
the conservative message and accept the more consistent liberal 
messages. Likewise, politically aware conservatives will be exposed 
to persuasive messages but reject the inconsistent liberal ones. 
While Zaller is not necessarily referring to direct legislation cam­
paigns (for an exception, see Zaller 1987, 826, on gay rights), the 
model is applicable, as these campaigns present information to vot­
ers in attempts to persuade them with messages from political elites. 
Elite endorsements may be a source of information about the ide­
ological or partisan nature of ballot propositions. In candidate elec­
tions, party labels serve as a critical reference point for voters by 
helping to reduce the costs of information (Downs 1957). Without 
partisan cues, information costs are substantially higher, and as a 
result, few voters will be informed about propositions. As a substi­
tute for party, elite endorsements may serve as a cost-cutting deci-
sion-making strategy in direct legislation elections. Research on the 
effects of elite endorsements in direct democracy elections indi­
cates that they do play an important role in voters7 decision making 
(Bowler and Donovan 1993; Lupia 1994; Magleby 1984) and that 
these effects may be greater when there are high levels of consensus 
among elites (Magleby 1984, 152-53). The influence of elite en­
dorsements may also depend on who the endorser is. The positions 
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of elected officials who are better known to voters than part-time 
activists may receive a disproportionate amount of coverage during 
a campaign. As a result, persons who are equally attentive might be 
more aware of the politician's position than that of the activist. 
To summarize, elite endorsements are a source of information 
for voters in ballot proposition campaigns. How voters respond to 
this information will depend on the extent of elite involvement, the 
individual's level of political awareness, and the nature of elite mes­
sages in the campaigns, whether it is contentious or unanimous. 
The next section examines the nature of elite messages in the 
Washington term limits campaign. 
The 1991 Washington Term Limits Campaign 
The term limits initiative that qualified for the ballot in 1991 in 
Washington followed three successful term limits initiatives in Ok­
lahoma, Colorado, and California. Unlike its predecessors in Okla­
homa and California, Washington's term limits initiative proposed 
limiting the terms of both state and federal lawmakers and was 
more severe. The limits varied from 6 to 12 years, depending on the 
office. The measure would also limit the terms of the governor and 
lieutenant governor to 8 years. Unlike the term limits measures in 
other states, the limits were retroactive; all incumbents who had 
reached their limit, with the exception of the governor, would be al­
lowed one more election for office. Officials could run again for of­
fice after a 6-year break. Passage of the measure would have pre­
vented incumbent Governor Booth Gardner from running for a third 
term in 1992. Additionally, House Speaker Tom Foley and all seven 
of his House colleagues, and 109 of the 147 state legislators, could 
seek and serve just one additional term before leaving office in 1994 
if the measure passed (Olson 1992, 69). 
Proponents for the initiative came from both sides of the politi­
cal spectrum. The term limits initiative was authored by a group of 
liberal activists calling themselves LIMIT (Legislative Mandating 
Incumbent Terms) but funded primarily by antitax conservatives 
and Libertarians. Sherry Bockwinkel, who led the campaign for 
LIMIT, had worked in the previous year as a staff member for a con­
gressional candidate who attempted to unseat a veteran incumbent 
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in the Democratic primary, and later for a Democratic candidate 
running for the state assembly. The failure of these candidates to 
win election convinced Bockwinkel and several other LIMIT orga­
nizers that incumbent advantages in fund-raising, franking privi­
leges, and media access made them invulnerable. Passage of term 
limits measures in Oklahoma, California, and Colorado led them to 
believe that term limits would provide a solution to the problem. 
The primary source of funding for the signature drive and the cam­
paign came from a national term limits group controlled by conser­
vative Republicans and Libertarians. The coalition between left-
wing Democrats and right-wing conservatives was rather tenuous. 
Bockwinkel accepted the money, saying, "Wring 'em dry. Let 'em 
spend it on this one instead of spending it on taking people's civil 
liberties away. Then we'll save the left's money to fight the war ma­
chine" (Olson 1992, 75). 
The opposition campaign was spearheaded by the state employ­
ees union and joined by good-government and environmental 
groups. Initially, members of the state's congressional delegation, 
including Speaker Tom Foley, stayed out of the term limits battle. 
Foley and the other members of the congressional delegation were 
reluctant to voice an opinion against an issue that appeared to be 
popular with voters. Moreover, they believed that the measure was 
unconstitutional at least as it applied to members of Congress 
(Olson 1992, 76). In an effort to forestall passage of the initiative, 
Washington's top elected officials, including Governor Gardner and 
Speaker Foley, joined other good government groups, such as Com­
mon Cause and the League of Women Voters, in a lawsuit to declare 
the initiative unconstitutional before it was placed on the ballot. 
The Washington Supreme Court, however, refused to hear the case 
before the election. 
With seven weeks to go before the election, opponents of the 
measure were running out of money. Proponents enjoyed a 7.5 to 
1 advantage in fund-raising. Almost all of the money that LIMIT had 
received came from Citizens for Congressional Reform (CCR), a na­
tional, Washington, D.C.-based term limits group funded primarily 
by the Koch brothers, two billionaires from Kansas who were active 
in the Libertarian Party. Given the funding advantage, it appeared as 
if the measure would easily pass. Six weeks before the election, Foley 
and all of the other members of the state's congressional delegation, 
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which included three Republicans, began to raise money to defeat 
the initiative and began to speak out against the measure. A month 
later, the opposition campaign had received $300,000 in campaign 
contributions. These contributions came from the nation's most 
well-financed lobbying interests: tobacco giants Philip Morris and 
RJR Nabisco, defense contractors Northrop and General Electric, 
and the National Rifle Association (Young 1993). 
In the final month of the campaign, the dialogue shifted from 
term limits and government's unresponsiveness to one that focused 
on the loss of clout. The opposition argued that losing the Washing­
ton congressional delegation could cost voters their jobs, threaten 
their low electric rates, and jeopardize their environment (Robinson 
and Dixon 1992, 18). In the final three and a half weeks, the opposi­
tion aired radio and television commercials, focusing on Washing-
ton's losing its powerful delegation and unilaterally disarming itself 
while other states retained their entrenched representatives. Propo­
nents relied primarily on radio advertisements, emphasizing anti-
incumbent and abuse-of-office themes. The vast majority of news­
paper editorials were against the initiative and focused on the costs 
to the state of losing Foley. In the last two weeks of the campaign, 
Governor Gardner announced that he would not run for a third 
term in 1992, and U.S. Representative Al Swift, a seven-term De­
mocrat, made a pledge to seek just one additional term. Foley, who 
had tried to remain on the sidelines, entered the fray in the last 
week of the campaign and crisscrossed the state in a major media 
blitz from Seattle to Spokane (Olson 1992, 81). He emphasized how 
the loss of clout would affect the state. 
In the end, proponents outspent the opponents by a 2 to 1 mar­
gin, spending $705,403 compared to $316,250. However, about one-
third of the money spent by proponents was just to obtain access to 
the ballot. On November 5, 1991, voters in Washington rejected the 
measure by a 54% to 46% margin. 
Explaining Opinion Change on Initiative 553 
Before the onset of the campaign, public opinion polls in Washing­
ton, like surveys elsewhere, indicated strong support for legislative 
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term limits. Support for term limits appears to be the result of wide­
spread dissatisfaction with the political process, manifested in an 
increasingly cynical electorate (Karp 1995). In an exit poll taken dur­
ing the 1990 midterm election, 72% of Washington voters favored 
unspecified limits on members of Congress.1 National surveys con­
ducted at that time revealed similar levels of support.2 When re­
spondents are presented with a hypothetical term limit of twelve 
years, a majority still expresses support for the idea.3 In August, 
three months before the election, about two-thirds of likely voters 
expressed support for the term limits initiative, compared to 28% 
opposed and 4% undecided.4 Comparing these data with surveys 
conducted later in the campaign and after the election reveals a dra­
matic change in opinion, though care must be used in interpreting 
these results, as the surveys were based on different samples.5 As fig­
ure 7.1 reveals, initial support for term limits was high, but declined 
rapidly for both Democrats and Republicans as election day neared. 
After a strong and visible campaign, aggregate support fell off by al­
most 30 points, leading to an opinion reversal. Preelection polls of 
registered voters taken the Sunday and Monday before the election 
showed 39% in favor and 49% opposed, with 13% undecided.6 Split­
ting the undecided voters almost evenly results in the eventual 46% 
to 54% margin of defeat. Republicans were more supportive than 
Democrats or independents, though these differences are not statis­
tically significant. Nor are there significant partisan differences in 
the exit poll as support drops off equally over the course of the cam­
paign for Republicans, Democrats, and independents. 
Changes in public opinion over the course of a campaign are not 
unusual. Most ballot measures appear to have a great deal of sup­
port, only to have that support erode by election day (see Magleby 
1984). But changes in support for term limits measures are unex­
pected if one considers the nature of the issue. Unlike the typical 
ballot question, which is technically worded, the ballot language of 
most term limits initiatives is rather straightforward. Moreover, 
most surveys indicate that only a small minority of voters remain 
undecided, indicating that the issue is not one of great complexity 
for voters. For these reasons, voters may be more sure of their opin­
ions. Data from other states where term limits initiatives later ap­
peared on the ballot indicate very little change in aggregate opinions 
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Figure 7.1 Changes in Partisan Support for Initiative 553 
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Sources: Greenburg-Lake: The Analysis Group (Aug. 20, n = 648; Nov. 14, n = 489); 
Fairbank, Maullin, Associates (Oct. 8-9, n = 400). 
before the election, despite differences in both population and ques­
tion wording. An Arizona poll, for example, taken over six months 
before the election, showed 73% in favor of term limits. The initia­
tive received 74% of the vote. In Florida, surveys in the fall of 1991 
and July 1992 showed roughly three-fourths of the respondents sup­
porting such measures.7 The initiative passed with 77% of the vote. 
In Montana and Wyoming, polls taken a month before the election 
were virtually identical to the final results.8 In Missouri, polls in 
June 1992 showed that 80% of the respondents supported term lim­
itations for both state legislators and members of Congress. By No­
vember, support had eroded by only 5%. Similar polls in Ohio and 
Nebraska reveal that support eroded only by 5 to 7 percentage 
points.9 
Why the erosion of support in Washington and not in most other 
states? We cannot be certain, given the nature of the data, which 
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factors account for changes in individual voting intentions over the 
course of the campaign. Nevertheless, we can draw some general 
conclusions based on the pattern of aggregate support. The Wash­
ington case was relatively rare in that well-known elites actively 
campaigned against the measure. In other states where term limit 
measures appeared on the ballot, many elites chose not to oppose an 
idea that was extremely popular with the voters, because they were 
convinced that the initiatives, at least as they applied to members 
of Congress, would never go into effect. They believed, correctly as 
it turned out, that term limits for members of Congress were un-
constitutional.10 These initiatives also did not impose the immedi­
ate threat that they had in Washington State. Many initiatives con­
tained a "trigger clause" that delayed the implementation of term 
limits until a given number of states enacted similar provisions. 
In some cases, as in Missouri, term limits for members of Con­
gress would begin only after similar limits were adopted by one-half 
of the states. This requires at least one state without the initiative 
process to pass term limits, which is a hard trigger to pull. Other 
elites chose not to risk the political capital by opposing a popular 
issue. In Ohio, for example, the Democratic political leadership was 
convinced that the term limit initiative would pass if it got on the 
ballot, and they could do nothing much to stop it (Jewell 1993, 13). 
And in Missouri, the opposition spent all of its money, $7,380, on 
legal fees to have the initiative removed from the ballot. None of 
the members of the Missouri congressional delegation publicly op­
posed the measure, most likely because it would never apply to 
them. Thus, Washington was one of the few states where there was 
organized opposition and elites were outspoken.11 While propo­
nents spent a great deal of money responding to the criticism, the 
campaign was led by previously unknown activists and funded by 
individuals who would have preferred to remain anonymous. 
If we assume most voters were paying attention to the campaign 
and were aware of elite discourse, it appears from the aggregate data 
displayed in figure 7.1 that some voters accepted the information car­
ried by Foley and other elected officials. The preelection poll taken 
just before the election shows that Democratic support for the initia­
tive plummeted by nearly 39 points after August. Aggregate Republi­
can support also dropped by 23 points, indicating that some Republi­
cans were also likely to accept the messages conveyed by elites. 
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Estimating the Influence of Elite Endorsements 
Since aggregate data can only be suggestive, we must turn to indi-
vidual-level data to examine the influence of elite endorsements. 
Given that Speaker Tom Foley was a central figure in the campaign 
to defeat the term limits initiative, the analysis that follows focuses 
on his involvement. Foley was a well-known figure in Washington 
politics who symbolized the political establishment and whose 
tenure in Congress demonstrated the value of seniority. He was 
thus in an excellent position to define the issue. 
To examine Foley's influence, a model is specified that takes into 
account both the voters7 awareness and the extent to which voters 
found Foley credible. Based on the theory of opinion formation dis­
cussed earlier, it is hypothesized that persons supportive of Foley 
are likely to accept his message and vote "no" on the initiative, 
whereas those persons who are not supportive of Foley are likely to 
reject his appeals and vote "yes/7 The effect of these attitudes to­
ward Foley will depend on whether a voter is aware that Foley op­
posed the measure. Thus, the model presupposes a two-stage 
process wherein voters must first be exposed to the cue and then 
must decide whether or not to accept or reject. The first stage in the 
model estimates the likelihood that individuals are aware of Foley7s 
position. The second stage estimates the impact of awareness on the 
likelihood of voting for the initiative, using an indicator of aware­
ness predicted from an equation estimating awareness as a function 
of media exposure.12 
Those most likely to know Foley7s position are those who were 
exposed to information about the campaign through radio and tele­
vision advertisements as well as editorials in various newspapers. 
According to Magleby (1984, 130-39) these are the primary sources 
of information about ballot propositions, although information 
about politics comes from other sources, such as friends and family, 
work associates, fellow members of groups or organizations, and the 
voter7s pamphlet. The variables used here are based on questions 
asking respondents if they remembered reading or hearing the ad-
vertisements.13 To measure awareness, the dependent variable in 
the first stage of the model, the following question is used: "Do you 
remember seeing or hearing during the campaign that Speaker of the 
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House Tom Foley was against Initiative 553 ?" A sizable majority of 
those who voted on the initiative, 64%, were aware of Foley's posi­
tion, compared to only 30% who knew that their own member of 
Congress was against the term limits measure. Former California 
Governor Jerry Brown also came to Washington to campaign in sup­
port of the initiative, but only 27% of the voters knew about that. 
Thus, the influence of elites depends not only on their prominence 
but also on the extent of their involvement. 
The final stage in the model estimates the likelihood of voting 
for the initiative. To estimate Foley's influence, an interaction is 
specified between those who are aware of Foley's position and their 
feelings toward Foley. A "feeling thermometer" is used to measure 
feelings toward the Speaker, ranging from cold (0) to very warm 
(100). Partisanship is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 
strong Democrat (1) to strong Republican (7), with independents 
coded in the middle (4). Another included variable measures respon-
dent's feelings toward LIMIT, the organization that placed the ini­
tiative on the ballot. Finally, a measure of responsiveness is in­
cluded in the model, based on the hypothesis that individuals who 
think government is out of touch are more likely to support term 
limits. The measure is based on the question, "Do you agree or dis­
agree that Congress is out of touch and elected officials do not care 
about the people they represent?"14 
Results 
The results in table 7.1 demonstrate how mass opinion is shaped in 
part by elites when their positions are known. The first-stage results 
illustrate that persons who were exposed to radio and television ad­
vertisements, both for and against the initiative, were more likely 
to know Foley's position. The second-stage results demonstrate that 
knowing Foley's position (predicted as a function of media exposure) 
in turn influenced their vote. Newspaper editorials against the ini­
tiative were also an important determinant of knowing Foley's posi­
tion. These results coincide with those of Magleby, who found that 
a popular source of information on Proposition 13 in California was 
the newspaper (1984, 131). Those who knew that Foley opposed the 
Table 7.1 Vote on the 1991 Washington Term Limits Initiative 
(Two-Stage Logit Estimates) 
First Stage Second Stage 
Know 
Foley's Vote on 
Variables Against Effect Initiative Effect 
Radio/TV .615** .141 .127 .031 
ads (pro) (.284) (.324) 
Radio/TV .589** .136 .094 .023 
ads (con) (.282) (.319) 
Editorials (con) .814*** .187 .413 .100 
(.213) (.219) 
Female -.334 -.077 
(.208) 
Age .067 .015 
(.050) 
Education .028 .006 
(.075) 
Income -.013 -.003 
(.062) 
Union member -.025 -.006 
(.244) 
Party ID — .025 .006 
(.051) 
Know Foley against — 1.606*** .389 
1553 (.441) 
Foley (x) temperature — -.038*** -.009 
(.006) 
LIMIT temperature — .039*** .009 
(.005) 
Responsiveness — .458*** .111 
(.186) 
Constant -.762 -2.178*** 
(.471) (.443) 
N 489 489 
-2 Log Likelihood 570.771 535.127 
% correctly 70.50 70.66 
classified 
Sources: Stan Greenberg and Celinda Lake, "1991 Survey of Washington 
Initiative 553." Survey commissioned by the Washington State Federation 
of Employees and conducted by Greenburg-Lake: The Analysis Group. 
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initiative were more likely to vote for the measure, but their feel­
ings toward him also conditioned this relationship. The significance 
of the interaction term in the second-stage results indicates that 
those with favorable feelings toward Foley were least likely to sup­
port the initiative, while those with unfavorable feelings toward 
Foley were most likely to vote for the initiative. These effects are il­
lustrated in figure 7.2, which reveals that Foley's position has a dra­
matic effect on the probability of supporting the initiative, depend­
ing on feelings toward Foley. Those with negative feelings toward 
Foley are almost twice as likely to vote for the initiative as those 
who are unaware of Foley's position.15 Support for the initiative 
drops off sharply among those who are aware of Foley's position, as 
feelings toward Foley become more positive. On average, feelings 
toward Foley are generally favorable, which translates into a net ad­
vantage in persuading persons to vote "no" on the initiative. The 
differences at the extremes are rather large. Individuals who are the 
most positive toward Foley are three times as likely to vote against 
the measure as those at the other extreme. 
Empirically, there is little evidence to suggest that simply hear­
ing or seeing advertisements or reading editorials is enough to di­
rectly persuade voters. On average, about two-thirds of those who 
voted on the measure had heard radio commercials or seen televi­
sion advertisements for and against the initiative. Less than 10% 
had heard only one side of the debate. These advertisements appear 
not to have influenced voters one way or another. Just under half of 
the voters (46%) had read newspaper editorials against the initia­
tive. These too did not appear to directly influence voters to vote 
"no" on the initiative. These findings do not, however, disregard ad-
Thanks to the Washington State Federation of Employees for providing me 
access to their data. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Dependent variables: Eq1, 1 = Aware of Foley's Position; O = other­
wise,- Eq2, 1 = voted for 1553; O = voted against. 
Effect: Net effect on probability of a one-unit change in the indepen­
dent variable evaluated at the mean. Eq1 = .64; Eq2 - 4 1  . 
**p<.05, ***p<.01. 
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Figure 7.1 Estimated Support for Initiative 553 by Feelings toward Foley 
and Awareness 
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vertisements as an important source of information. The informa­
tion carried in these ads was probably more effective in providing 
cues to voters about elite positions than they were in directly per­
suading voters. Foley's role in the debate was effective as a means of 
providing cues to voters who, in turn, chose to accept or reject argu­
ments depending on feelings toward him. 
Conclusion 
Most commentary after the election concluded that the fear of los­
ing clout was the principal factor for the defeat of Initiative 553. In 
an article in Campaign Magazine, the campaign strategists against 
Initiative 553 claimed that the crafting of a persuasive message was 
critical to their success (Robinson and Dixon 1992). Proponents also 
believed that the message was the major factor for the loss (Struble 
1993, 6). Indeed, in their second attempt at passing term limitations 
 163 Influence of Elite Endorsements
in Washington, LIMIT tried to diffuse the clout issue by making 
term limits nonretroactive. The findings in this paper suggest that 
the message was probably not quite as important as the messenger. 
While 20% of those who voted for term limits mentioned the loss of 
clout as a reason for voting against the measure, the analysis pre­
sented here suggests that without Foley, the message would proba­
bly not have had the impact it did. These findings are consistent 
with a large body of research that suggests that citizens who are 
well informed react to political ideas on the basis of cues provided 
by elites. 
This model may also explain why term limits eventually passed 
in Washington in 1992 as well as in other states across the country. 
Unlike the Washington campaign in 1991, elites in the vast major­
ity of states where term limits initiatives appeared on the ballot 
chose not to become involved in the debate. California was one ex­
ception, where prominent Democratic elites such as California As­
sembly Speaker Willie Brown led a campaign to defeat two term 
limits measures for state legislators that appeared simultaneously 
on the ballot in 1990 (see Donovan and Snipp 1994; Price 1994). One 
of these measures had the backing of the state's Republican leader­
ship, while the other measure—which did not have as severe limits 
and also included campaign finance reform—was sponsored by a 
group of liberal reformers. Brown, who was joined by gubernatorial 
nominee Dianne Feinstein and other prominent Democrats, was 
successful in defeating one of these measures, largely because both 
Democratic and Republican elites, such as Republican gubernator­
ial candidate Pete Wilson, also opposed the measure (see Banducci 
and Karp 1994). On the other measure, however, elites were divided 
along partisan lines, and the measure passed with 52% of the vote. 
A year later in Washington, term limits supporters qualified an­
other measure for the ballot. A coalition of interest groups, similar 
to the one in the previous year, opposed the measure. Foley, how­
ever, was preoccupied with his own reelection bid, and as a result 
was less active in fighting term limits. The other members of the 
congressional delegation were also much less active in opposing 
term limitations in 1992 than in 1991. Not only were they all run­
ning for reelection, but the term limits restrictions were not 
retroactive and were less severe, giving them less of an incentive to 
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oppose the measure. Although the opposing campaign relied on the 
same rhetoric, elites were not as active, and the initiative passed 
with 52% of the vote. 
NOTE S 
1. Voter Research and Surveys General Election Exit Poll, 1990, Na­
tional File, Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR) 9604. 
2. CBS/New York Times Poll, October 1990. 
3. CBS I New York Times Poll, October 1990. 
4. Greenburg-Lake, 20 August 1991. Based on a sample of 648 likely 
voters. 
5. The August poll sampled likely voters, whereas the two polls taken 
in October and November sampled registered voters. 
6. Fairbank, Maullin &. Associates. Based on a sample of 400 registered 
voters. 
7. Hill Research, July 1992. Based on a sample of 485 likely voters. 
8. University of Montana, October 1992; based on a sample of 389 
likely voters. University of Wyoming, October 1992; based on a sample of 
521 residents. 
9. University of Akron, October 1992; based on a sample of 577 resi­
dents. University of Nebraska, 1992; based on a sample of 491 residents. 
10. In a 5-4 decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 
(1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state-imposed term limits were 
unconstitutional, thereby overturning term limits laws in 23 states. Ac­
cording to the majority opinion, the qualifications for congressional service 
listed in the Constitution—age, citizenship, and state residency—are exclu­
sive, and neither the states nor Congress could add additional qualifications. 
11. Utah and California are other examples where partisan elite opposi­
tion could have driven an opinion reversal. For Utah, see Magleby and Pat­
terson (1996); for California, Banducci and Karp (1994) and Donovan and 
Snipp (1994). None of these studies were able to directly account for the ef­
fects of media exposure and knowledge of elite positions in their analyses. 
12. This two-stage estimation process thus tests if exposure to media 
has a direct impact on voting, or if the effects of media on vote operate in­
directly, by structuring voter awareness of elite positions. 
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13. "Do you remember reading any newspaper editorials against Initia­
tive 553?" "Did you hear any radio commercials or see any television ads 
for Initiative 553 ?" "Did you hear any radio commercials or see any televi­
sion ads for Initiative 553?" Coded " 1  " for Yes; "0" otherwise. 
14. Coded "I " for Agree, "0" for Don't Know, "-1  " for Disagree. 
15. Figure 7.2 plots the probability of supporting 1553 predicted by feel­
ings toward Foley when all other variables in the second-stage model are set 
at their mean values. 

Part I I  I

State Public Policies 
and Direct Democracy 

After examining how initiatives originate (part 1) and how voters 
respond to some initiative campaigns (part 2), in part 3 we examine 
the policy outcomes associated with direct legislation. The chap­
ters in this section emphasize how politics in direct democracy 
states are, to a certain extent, fundamentally different from politics 
in states with traditional representative legislative institutions. 
These chapters explore three dimensions that distinguish direct 
democracy states from other states, one being popular "gover­
nance" reform policies adopted in direct democracy states. These 
policies differ from some of our standard classifications of public 
policies (i.e., distributive, redistributive, regulatory,- see Lowi 1969) 
in that the agent being acted upon by policy is the government 
rather than the public. Chapter 8 demonstrates how governmental 
procedures and legislative operations in initiative states are sys­
tematically different from those in other states, since citizens are 
prone to pass governance policies that legislatures would not. Of 
immediate concern are reformist policies initiated by "citizens" 
(or groups outside the legislature) to constrain the operation of leg­
islatures: term limits, tax and expenditure limits, and supermajor­
ity requirements. These governance policies change the way that 
legislatures can function in direct democracy states. 
A second distinction of politics and policy outcomes in initia­
tive states relates to the threat that the initiative (or potential ini­
tiative) places on legislatures. Proponents of direct democracy ar­
gued that the initiative would provide direct effects on policy by 
allowing citizens to propose and pass policies that legislators might 
not consider (as illustrated in chapter 8). The proponents also ar­
gued that the initiative would provide indirect influence by affect­
ing the behavior of officials once they are sent to the legislature 
(see Cronin 1989). Chapter 9 demonstrates how the threat of direct 
legislation can affect legislative policies in direct democracy states. 
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The initiative can force legislators to consider voter preferences 
when drafting new laws. Legislators in these states might antici­
pate initiatives and thus produce policy more in line with public 
opinion than legislative policy produced in noninitiative states. 
A third way that initiatives might alter policies in direct democ­
racy states is by facilitating an arena for what Meier (1994) and 
Haider-Markel and Meier (1996; see also Gusfield 1963) call morality 
politics. In the arena of morality politics (as opposed to interest group 
politics), issues are highly salient and are framed as moral issues that 
challenge the acceptability of a group or of some behavior. Those op­
posed to a group or a behavior (i.e., drinking, homosexuality, abor­
tion, etc.) seek to expand the scope of conflict beyond legislatures, 
where interest group politics might structure policy, to the mass pub­
lic, where morality-based arguments can have greater effect. For pol­
icy entrepreneurs or issue activists critical of homosexuality, moral-
ity-based appeals in the context of the mass politics of direct 
democracy can be effective for overturning civil rights protections 
that gays and lesbians might win in legislatures (Haider-Markel and 
Meier 1996; see Cain 1992b for a similar argument about legislative 
gains, direct democracy losses, and racial minorities). 
By allowing for an expanded scope of public conflict based on 
morality, or feelings toward a minority group, direct democracy 
might thus provide an environment where minority groups can be 
targeted by critics in a manner distinctly different from a legislative 
setting's. The classic criticism of direct democracy—that it might en­
gender a tyranny of the majority—is addressed, at least in part, in 
chapters 10 and 11. Minorities who might find civil rights protec­
tions or sympathetic policies (or ambivalence) from legislatures can 
become the targets of hostile statewide campaigns in direct democ­
racy states. Chapter 10 examines the racial and ethnic context that 
spawned two policies that might be seen as targeting minorities: Cal-
ifornia's anti-immigration Proposition 187 and its "Official English" 
measure. The consequences of these policies are noteworthy when 
these measures pass (e.g., Proposition 187 and Colorado's antigay ini­
tiative); yet as chapter 11 illustrates, there are also consequences, 
though less obvious ones, in placing these initiatives on the ballot, 
even when they fail. Chapter 11 demonstrates that mass opinion 
about groups targeted by initiatives is more likely to shift toward in­
tolerant attitudes in areas holding initiatives that target the groups. 
8 
Changing Rules for State 
Legislatures: Direct Democracy 
and Governance Policies 
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT 
This chapter examines the adoption of state governance policies, 
such as legislative term limits and tax and expenditure limitations. 
Governance policies are procedural reforms that constrain the au­
tonomy of state legislatures, change the "rules" that state and 
elected officials must follow, and restructure political institutions. 
A reemergence of populism is developed as critical in the adoption 
and linkage between governance policies. Constitutional provisions 
for the initiative and a history of using the process are developed as 
indicators of state populism. Analysis indicates that states with a 
history of direct democracy usage are more likely to adopt gover­
nance policies than nonpopulist states; states with high usage of the 
initiative process are the first to adopt governance policies. Re­
search also suggests that the current political climate (1980-90s) 
can be compared to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
an era that produced a range of political reforms. Both periods have 
strikingly similar characteristics, as each era is marked by a rise in 
the use of direct democracy, the adoption of a significant number of 
reforms, preference for procedural over substantive policies, and the 
pervasive distrust of representative government's institutions. 
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Growing Public Disenchantment 
with Government 
A distinguishing feature of politics in the 1990s is a pervasive sense of 
public distrust of, frustration with, and alienation from government— 
from Washington to the state capitols. Public dissatisfaction with gov­
ernment and elected officials is documented in the print media and 
public opinion polls. A recent Gallup Poll showed that only 20% of re­
spondents said they can trust the federal government all or some of 
the time—half the percentage during the Watergate scandal of 1974 
(Shogan 1994). Rather than following circular swings, public discon­
tent with government has intensified over the past 20 years. 
In 1976, for example, 60% of the public said that the government 
was run for "a few big interests" rather than for the "benefit of all the 
people"; in 1992, 75% felt this way. Over the same period, the propor­
tion of the public believing that the government in Washington could 
be trusted "to do what is right" only some of the time rose from 63% 
to 73% (Citrin 1996, 269). Before the Vietnam War and Watergate, 8 
out of 10 people said they could trust the government in Washington 
to do what was right all or most of the time. In 1994, only 3 out of 10 
people share that confidence in government (Broder 1994). 
The factors driving the public's discontent are complex and may 
reflect a deep-rooted dissatisfaction with representative institutions 
of government (Dodd 1995). Phillips argues that public discontent is 
rooted in growing public awareness that representative government 
has failed to address voters' most pressing concerns—violent crime, 
national health care, K-12 education, a clean environment, and eco­
nomic security (1993). Revelations of governmental corruption and 
scandal fuel the public's negative assessment of their elected offi­
cials. For example, after the 1994 indictment of Congressman Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) for misuse of public funds, a Gallup Poll 
found that 49% of the public believed that Congress was more cor­
rupt than it had been 20 years before,- only 7% felt Congress was less 
corrupt. Also, 51 % said that most House members were corrupt, 
and 29% expressed this view about their own representative (Citrin 
1996, 270). It is often through revelations of governmental corrup­
tion and scandal that the public understands the actions of their 
elected officials (Merida 1994). 
This chapter defines governance policies, a set of political reforms 
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that arise from a context of popular distrust of government. I argue 
that the 1990s can be characterized by a reemergence of populism. Use 
of the initiative process is conceptualized as an indicator of state pop­
ulism. I model the impact of this explanatory/independent variable on 
the adoption of three state governance policies: term limits, tax and 
expenditure limits, and supermajority tax rules—dependent variables. 
Public Support for Political Reform 
Public discontent with lawmakers coincides with increased sup­
port for political reforms, such as legislative term limits, tax cuts, 
and restrictions on governmental spending. Support for these re­
forms may lie in the fact that the average citizen feels left out of the 
political process and distrustful of political elites. In the media, it is 
increasingly argued that a sense of powerlessness in the face of a 
growing "governmental bureaucracy" is what drives the anger and 
frustration so common in discussions of politics in the 1990s. For 
these individuals, the institutions of representative government 
have failed in their fundamental goal to represent the public. Politi­
cal reforms are promoted as giving the public more control over 
their elected officials and the operation of government. 
Public support for political reforms that give the public a more 
direct role in government decision making is widespread. An April 
1994 poll of 900 individuals found broad support for "direct democ­
racy" measures that would allow the public to make policy deci­
sions without intermediaries. Sixty-four percent of those inter­
viewed favored conducting national referenda on major issues and 
giving votes on national referenda equal weight with legislation 
passed by Congress. Also, 66% favored submitting all tax increases 
approved by Congress to a vote in the next national election.1 Even 
when respondents were presented with arguments that term limita­
tions would lead to a loss of expertise, penalize lawmakers who are 
doing a good job, and increase the power of career staff members and 
savvy lobbyists, 74% of those surveyed still favored term limita­
tions for Congress and state lawmakers (Merida 1994).2 
Governance Policy 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of U.S. states enacted 
reform policies concerned with governance, several through ballot 
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initiative. Although the passage of political reforms was common­
place in the 1990s, academic research and the media often character­
ize the passage of individual reforms as isolated phenomena. A grow­
ing body of literature has addressed legislative term limits (Banducci 
and Karp 1994; Benjamin and Malbin 1992; Cain 1992a; Capell 1993; 
Clucas 1993; Copeland 1992, 1993; Copeland and Rausch 1991; 
Dodd 1995; Donovan and Snipp 1994; Jewell 1993; Lunch 1993; 
Thompson and Moncrief 1993; Moncrief et al. 1992; Mondak 
1995; Noah 1995, 1996; Petracca 1992-1994; Polsby 1993; Pound 
1993; Reed and Schansberg 1995a, 1995b; Rausch 1994; Sussman et 
aL 1994; Struble 1993). But little effort has been made to understand 
how diverse political reforms are related—whether they are re­
sponses to a similar force, or combine to make a similar impact on 
politics and policy. I suggest that the adoption of legislative term 
limits and tax and expenditure limitations are not isolated, unique 
phenomena, but are part of a body of linked reforms that are sweep­
ing local, state, and even national government. These political re­
forms are part of a growing category of new policies that are restruc­
turing state political institutions in the 1990s. I argue they can be 
construed as "governance policies/7 
Governance policy is an aspect of public policy that has received 
less attention than traditional substantive policies, such as health, 
welfare, education, or other expenditure policies. The definition of 
governance policy includes policies (1) that constrain the autonomy 
(or discretion) of the legislature in governing, and (2) have a promi­
nent procedural component. Examples of governance policies include 
tax and expenditure limitations, supermajority rules for tax in­
creases, and legislative term limits. Governance policies reform the 
institutions of representative government at the local, state, and na­
tional level. Governance policies modify not only the actions of 
elected officials but also the very fabric of representative government. 
Governance policies reform state governments by constraining 
their autonomy in areas including taxation, social policy, and leg­
islative procedures (cf. Rausch 1994) by amending state constitu­
tions and statutory law. Legislative term limits, for example, re­
strict the tenure of elected officials in the state legislature and often 
reduce the size of the legislative staff. Tax and expenditure limita­
tions regulate the tax take and expenditures available to the state 
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legislature, and decrease its autonomy over fiscal policy. Superma­
jority rules for tax increases require a two-thirds vote of the legisla­
ture to raise taxes or enact a new tax. In each case, a defining feature 
of governance policy is a prominent procedural component. 
Other examples that might qualify as governance policies in­
clude affirmative action, campaign finance reform, and criminal 
sentencing. Anti-affirmative action initiatives have qualified for the 
1996 ballot in over ten states, including California. These measures 
would prohibit state governments and universities from considering 
race, ethnicity, or gender in awarding employment, contracts, or 
college admissions. Public regulation of the courts and judiciary via 
direct democracy is also evident in the adoption of "three-strikes-
you're-out" measures that require the legal system to sentence re­
peat convicted felons to life in prison. These measures have been 
adopted in over 30 states nationwide. Other policies that attempt to 
govern the actions of the state and/or elected officials include cam­
paign spending limits and disclosure laws. Although these diverse 
policies reform fiscal policy, legislative procedures, and even the 
court system, each attempts to regulate how the state should pro­
ceed to govern. Each policy is a procedural reform that changed the 
rules under which public officials can operate. 
"Governance Policy" and "Public Policy" 
Governance policies can be distinguished from traditional public 
policies—policies that aim to distribute, redistribute, or regulate for 
the commonwealth—by the agent of action. The term "public pol­
icy" implies that the public is the subject being acted on by "gov­
ernmental trustees" or elected officials. Public policies are justified 
as necessary for the public good and betterment of society. "Gover­
nance policies" aim to increase accountability, and imply that the 
government is the object being acted on by the public. Governance 
policies are justified by advocates as necessary for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of democratic rule. Traditional research on regulatory 
policy outcomes assumed that it is the behavior of the private sec­
tor that is modified by a governmental agency or congressional 
mandate. That is, the private sector is being told by government 
what it can and cannot do. In contrast, governance policies—term 
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limitations, tax limitations, supermajority tax rules—modify the 
behavior of the public sector, or government officials. 
Governance policy can be thought of as "procedural" policy. By 
definition, governance policies constitute "internal reforms" of state 
government, particularly state legislatures. Rather than constraining 
the actions of the private sector, governance policies constrain the 
way the public sector—state governments, legislatures, and bureau­
cratic agencies—can proceed to operate. Because governance policies 
place internal constraints on state governments, they may be as im­
portant as external constraints (partisan identification, economic 
conditions, etc.) for understanding state policy outcomes.3 
Most empirical research on policy outcomes assumes a stable 
governing environment and primarily addresses external factors in­
fluencing policy outputs. This literature focuses on traditional in­
stitutional processes and assumes the primacy of a legislative or gu­
bernatorial decision process. By assuming the centrality of the 
legislative process, this literature emphasizes a top-down process of 
policy formulation dominated by policy specialists, state govern­
ment officials, and professional organizations. For example, Berk-
man (1993) focuses on networks of state elected officials in shaping 
the tax agenda in state legislatures and Congress. Dye focuses on 
economic determinants of state policies (1966), while Elazar (1984) 
emphasizes cultural and historical features shaping policy out­
comes. In each case, political elites determine policy content, level 
of service provided, and which sector of society bears the costs and 
benefits. This literature, however, does not adequately explain gov­
ernance policies, which are often adopted through alternative insti­
tutional contexts, such as direct democracy. 
Governance policies are not unique in the history of U.S. poli­
tics, but rather are part of a series of policies that seek to change the 
institutional rules and operation of government. In recent decades, 
as in the late nineteenth century, there is an increasing interest in 
changing the rules of the political game. By institutionalizing rule 
changes for taxation, budgeting, and elections, governance policies 
potentially have a dramatic impact on substantive policy.4 Chang­
ing the rules of the game can effectively determine who wins and 
who loses the game. And by changing the rules, governance policies 
can ultimately change the operation of representative governments. 
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Governance Policy: State Incumbency 
and Fiscal Controls as Dependent Variables 
This analysis examines the adoption of three governance policies: 
legislative term limits, state tax and expenditure limits, and legisla­
tive supermajority requirements for tax increases—all dependent 
variables in this analysis.5 Each is a procedural policy that changes 
the internal "rules" elected officials must follow in campaigning for 
election, levying taxes, or allocating governmental resources.6 This 
analysis includes state governance policies adopted as of November 
1994. These policies were adopted in the states over nearly a 20-year 
period between 1978 and 1994. 
Legislative Term Limits 
Since 1990, when legislative limits were first adopted in Califor­
nia, Colorado, and Oklahoma, term limits have been adopted in 22 
states.7 Each state measure varies in the length of terms in office, 
number of offices under limit, and method of restricting the terms of 
state and congressional lawmakers. Most measures apply to both 
state legislatures and congressional delegations, while some include 
limitations on other statewide officials, including the governor and 
secretary of state. Although there is some variation in the length of 
terms for state office-holders, strict limits allow only 6 years of ser­
vice, while more lenient limits of 12 years offer more moderate in­
cumbency controls. Of the governance policies examinedhere, none 
have had as direct an effect on legislative institutions as term limits.8 
State Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) 
State tax and expenditure limits create a fiscal control on state 
legislators that limits their taxing and spending authority, Beginning 
with the late 1970s tax revolt, state tax and expenditure limitations 
have been enacted in 21 states (ACIR 1994).9 Eleven of these mea­
sures were adopted since 1980. Colorado voters approved a state tax 
and expenditure measure in 1992 that limits increases in state 
spending and taxes to population growth and the rate of inflation,- no 
changes in taxes or tax policy are allowed without voter approval. 
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The Colorado legislature can no longer enact tax increases—tax 
hikes can only become law if approved by the voters in a referen­
dum election. The general assembly can declare an emergency by a 
two-thirds vote and raise emergency taxes subject to voter approval. 
Measures like these institutionally weaken the ability of legisla­
tures to collect revenue and provide services, a fundamental respon­
sibility of government. 
Legislative Supeimajority foi Tax Increases 
Eleven states have constitutional provisions requiring a "super­
majority" or a two-thirds vote in the legislature to pass some or all 
tax increases. In the 1992 election, four states (Arizona, Colorado, 
Oklahoma, Washington) enacted constitutional amendments re­
quiring tax increases to be approved by a margin larger than a sim­
ple majority of both houses. Arkansas was the first to adopt super-
majority rules for tax increases in 1934. Arkansas voters approved a 
constitutional amendment that requires a two-thirds vote to in­
crease "the rate for property, excise privilege, or personal taxes now 
levied" (Stansel 1994; Mackey 1993). Supermajority tax rules in 
seven states—Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and Washington—can be characterized as tax-revolt 
measures (Mackey 1993). 
Supermajority rule changes are increasingly popular reforms for 
making policy changes immune from legislative modification. Super-
majority rules, along with voter approval requirements to enact all 
tax increases, are examples of "second generation" state TELs (Tol­
bert 1994a, 1994b). In contrast to the 1970s tax revolt, which specifi­
cally targeted the property tax with tax rate limits, revenue limits, 
and caps on the increase in assessment ratios, the 1990s tax reforms 
limited the long-term growth in government and all tax types 
through procedural reforms of legislatures. Second-generation tax 
limitations consist of tax rule changes (supermajority rules or voter 
approval for all tax increases) that restrict the taxing and spending au­
thority of elected officials and the long-term growth in government. 
Linkages between Adoption of Governance Policies 
There is some overlap between the passage of state tax and ex­
penditure controls, supermajority tax rules, and legislative term 
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limits (see table 8.1). Thirteen states (Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ok­
lahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington) have laws limiting legisla­
tive tenure in office and state taxation or spending. Eight states (Ari­
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Washington) place restrictions on both legislative 
terms and voting margins (a two-thirds vote required) for tax in­
creases. Six states have both types of fiscal controls: state TELs and 
legislative supermajorities for tax increases. Stated another way, 
73% of the states with term limits also have state taxation and 
spending limits. Only six states have term limits without also plac­
ing limits on the legislature's spending and taxation powers. 
The lack of correlation between adoption of the three different 
governance policies suggests a distinct adoption pattern for each 
policy. The Pearson (r) correlation between legislative term limits 
and state tax limits (TELs) is .31. The correlation between term lim­
its and supermajority tax rules is .31, and .14 between supermajor­
ity tax rules and state TELs. None of these correlations are statisti­
cally significant. 
Fourteen of the 16 states with term limits and either state tax 
limits (TELs) or supermajority rules for tax increases have a tradi­
tion of moderate to high use of the initiative process. The ex­
ceptions are the states of Utah and Idaho, which have adopted 
governance policies but have low initiative use. The passage of gov­
ernance policies is largely a western phenomenon, with 11 of the 13 
most-reformist states located west of the Mississippi River. Some 
southern states, such as Arkansas, Florida, and Missouri, also ap­
pear more likely to adopt governance policies than their northeast­
ern neighbors. 
State Populism/Initiative Use as a Determinant 
of Governance Policy Use 
While public support for term limits and tax cuts appears to be 
fairly constant across individual states, there are significant varia­
tions in state institutional structures that might cause a state to 
adopt these polices—such as the initiative process. The argument 
developed here is that a New Populism is critical in the adoption of 
Table 8.1 State Governance Policies and Historical Use 
of the Initiative 
Annual Use Term State 
State of Initiative Limits TELs Supermajority 
Alabama 
Alaska Moderate X* X 
Arizona High X X X 
Arkansas High X X 
California High X X X 
Colorado High X* X X 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X 
Florida Moderate X X 
Georgia 
Hawaii X 
Idaho Low X* X * * 
Illinois Low 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana X X 
Maine Low X* 
Maryland 
Mass. Moderate X* X 
Michigan Moderate X X 
Minnesota 
Mississippi Low X 
Missouri Moderate X X 
Montana Moderate X X 
Nebraska Moderate X 
Nevada Low X* 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico 
New York 
N. Carolina X 
• *N. Dakota High X 
Ohio Moderate X 
Oklahoma High X* X X 
Oregon High X X 
Pennsylvania 
continued 
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Table 8.1 State Governance Policies and Historical Use 
of the Initiative (continued) 
Annual Use Term State 
State of Initiative Limits TELs Supezmajority 
Rhode Island 
S. Carolina X 
S. Dakota Moderate X X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah Low X* X 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington High X X X 
W. Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming Low X 
Total 24 22 21 11 
state governance policies. One indicator of a populist climate is citi­
zen usage of the initiative process. I argue that historical use of this 
process over the past century is a central component in understand­
ing the adoption (and linkage between) governance policies.10 Fre­
quent use of the initiative is also associated with institutional pro­
visions that regulate use of the initiative in each state (i.e., signature 
requirements,- see chapter 5 in this volume). 
State constitutional provisions for the initiative are an institu­
tional mechanism that shapes state politics, public opinion, and 
policy. The importance of institutions is emphasized in the work of 
new institutionalist scholars who recognize that state political 
structures shape the strategic context in which political actors 
make policy choices (March and Olsen 1984, 1989; Steinmo 1989, 
1992). These scholars argue that institutional contexts shape actors7 
strategic choices and thereby shape policy outcomes. 
Demands for Popular Rule: Initiative Use 
One indicator of a populist climate is citizen demand and usage 
of popular-rule mechanisms, such as the initiative process. Over the 
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past 100 years, certain states have tended to rely heavily on the ini­
tiative to formulate state law and policy. Usage of the initiative is 
measured by the average number of statewide initiatives appearing 
on state ballots per year from 1898 to 1992 (Neal 1993).11 As the 
number of initiatives on the ballot increases, I predict the likelihood 
a state will adopt all three governance policies increases. 
Over the past 100 years, citizen usage of the initiative process 
has varied substantially across the states. Table 2.1 (see chapter 2) 
ranks the states by the total number of initiatives on the ballot 
since adoption of the process. Oregon, California, North Dakota, 
Colorado, and Arizona have had over 100 initiatives on the ballot in 
the past century. Oregon tops the list, with 274 initiatives on the 
ballot since adoption of the process in 1902 (Neal 1993). In 1994 
there were over 56 different petitions in circulation for the Novem­
ber 1994 ballot in Oregon, including one that legalized medically as­
sisted suicides. Mississippi, on the other hand, the latest state to 
enact the initiative in 1992, had not qualified any measures for the 
ballot as of 1992. 
While the majority of state initiative provisions were adopted be­
tween 1898 and 1919, in 1959 Alaska's electorate adopted the initia­
tive, and in the 1960s and 1970s initiative provisions were approved 
in Florida, Illinois, and Wyoming. To control for the number of 
years that the initiative has been in place, I divide the total number 
of initiatives on the ballot by the number of years the initiative has 
been in place.12 Based on this, the states are ranked low, medium, 
and high in Table 8.1, along with the governance policies adopted in 
each state. This standardized measure of historical use of the initia­
tive can be used as a proxy for "state populism/7 States with a his­
torical political tradition of lawmaking through the initiative have 
developed a distinct populist climate and are expected to be more 
likely to adopt governance policies.13 
Alternative Explanations for Governance Policies 
The most common appeal for legislative term limits is the need 
to increase legislative rotation in office (Petracca 1992; Benjamin 
and Malbin 1992). States with highly professionalized legislatures 
and low member turnover are considered to be more susceptible to 
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the adoption of term limits.14 A distinguishing feature of the U.S. 
Congress and more professional legislatures is low membership 
turnover (Squire 1992; Fiorina 1994). Incumbents in professional 
legislatures have high electoral success rates. If internal features of 
state legislatures are important, states with low membership 
turnover should be the first to adopt term limits. State legislative 
turnover is measured by the average 10-year rate of turnover 
(1979-1989) in state legislatures (Benjamin and Malbin 1992). 
If internal features of state legislatures are important, support for 
term limits should be strongest in states with the most-professional 
legislatures (Mondak 1995; Copeland and Rausch 1991; Jewell 1993). 
State legislative professionalism is measured by an index created by 
Squire (1992) that uses the U.S. Congress as a baseline against which 
to measure the salary, staff, and time-in-session of all 50 state legis­
latures. In states with less-professional legislatures composed of 
" amateurs/7 there may be less perceived need for term limits. 
State TELs aim to reduce growth in levels of taxation and spend­
ing. If state fiscal features are important, states with high state and 
local taxes should be more susceptible to the adoption of tax and ex­
penditure limits and supermajority rules for tax increases (Stansel 
1994; Tolbert 1992a, 1992b). TELs and legislative supermajority 
rules are fiscal reforms to control high taxes and cap the growth in 
state and local spending. State and local tax burdens are measured 
by average total taxes (per $100 of income) over a 20-year period 
(National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] 1989). 
Empirical Model 
This analysis utilizes a series of logistic regressions to analyze the 
adoption of governance policies. I present one bivariate model 
(series A) and one multivariate model (series B) for each of the three 
reforms. The bivariate models measure the strength of the simple 
relationship between annual use of the initiative and adoption of 
each procedural reform. The multivariate models analyze the 
strength of this relationship controlling for alternative explanations 
for adoption of governance policies. 
In each equation, the dependent variable is a binary variable 
measuring whether the state has adopted the political reform: term 
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limits, state TELs (ACIR 1994), and legislative supermajority for tax 
increases (Mackey 1993). If the state has adopted the procedural re­
form, it is coded 1; 0 if otherwise. Positive coefficients for the inde­
pendent or explanatory variables indicate a greater likelihood the 
state will adopt that particular reform. The three models are esti­
mated as follows. 
As discussed above, use of the initiative (first explanatory vari­
able in each equation) is measured by the average number of 
statewide initiatives appearing on the ballot per year from 1898 to 
1992 (Neal 1993). As the number of initiatives on the ballot in­
creases, I predict an increased likelihood that a state will adopt all 
three political reforms. The multivariate models control for alterna­
tive explanations for the passage of each governance policy. 
Discussion of Results 
Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates are shown in tables 
8.2 and 8.3. Table 8.2 displays three bivariate logistic regression 
models for the adoption of the three governance policies. In each 
case, citizen usage of the initiative is a powerful explanation for the 
adoption of legislative term limits and constraints on governmental 
taxation and spending. States with high initiative use are more 
likely to adopt all three governance policies. 
Model 1A provides maximum likelihood estimates of initiative 
use on state adoption of legislative limits. Usage of the citizen ini­
tiative is positively associated with the adoption of term limits at 
the state level; the bivariate model predicts 96% of the cases cor­
rectly, and only two states are mispredicted (model 1A). Model IB 
(from table 8.3) estimates state adoption of term limits controlling 
for legislative professionalism and the average turnover in state leg­
islatures during the 1980s. Knowing the level of legislative profes­
sionalism or membership turnover in a state does not significantly 
improve our ability to predict the adoption of legislative limits. 
Rather than a response to legislative professionalism or low 
turnover, the adoption of term limits is associated with features of a 
populist climate (as reflected in the use of direct democracy). 
Model 2A in table 8.2 estimates the impact of annual use of the 
initiative on the passage of state TELs. Again, citizen usage of the 
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Table 8.2 Usage of the Initiative and Adoption of Governance 
Policies (State-Level Data) (Bivariate Models with Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates) 
Supermajohty 
Term Limits TELS Tax Rules 
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A 
Use of initiative 35.77** .62** .94** 
(15.12) (-27) (.31) 
Constant 4.96*** -.94** -2.34*** 
(2.16) (.27) (.61) 
N 50 50 50 
Model x2 
(Improvement) 62.34** 5.93** 10.38*** 
Predicted correctly 96% 68% 84% 
Note: The dependent variable for each model is binary - 1 if the state has 
the political reform, 0 if otherwise. Coefficients are unstandardized, val­
ues in parentheses are standard errors of the MLE. The coefficients and 
standard errors were derived using logistic regression in the SPSS program. 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. 
initiative is a statistically significant predictor of the adoption of 
TELs; states with high initiative use are more likely to adopt TELs. 
The model using initiative use only explains 68% of the variance in 
TELs adoption. Since twenty-one of the fifty states have state TELs 
(42% of the states), a model that predicts 58% of the states correctly 
would occur by chance. Thus, knowing whether a state has the ini­
tiative and how heavily the process is used improves our prediction 
by 10%. Model 2B in table 8.3 adds controls to this basic model and 
estimates the likelihood of a state's adopting TELs, controlling for 
total state and local tax burdens. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, 
state and local tax burdens appear to have little impact on the 
passage of TELs. Once again, only the coefficient for initiative use is 
statistically significant. Rather than a direct response to high taxes, 
the passage of state TELs is largely a function of a populist climate 
as expressed by initiative use. 
Model 3A (table 8.2) estimates the impact of indicators of initia­
tive use on the adoption of supermajority rules for tax increases. 
Like the previous policies, usage of the initiative process is posi­
tively associated with the adoption of supermajority rules and 
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Table 8.3 The New Populism and Adoption of Legislative Term 
Limits (State Level Data) (Multivariate Models with Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates) 
Superm a jority 
Term Limits TELS Tax Rules 
Model IB Model 2B Model 3B 
Use of initiative 5.30** .61** 1.30*** 
historical (2.00) (.27) (.41) 
Legislative -16.08* 
professionalism (7.95) 
Legislative turn- -.12 
over 1980s (•09) 
Total state taxes .23 -.22 
(.22) (-36) 
Total local taxes .08 -.75 
(•27) (-45) 
Constant 6.34 -2.91 1.51 
(7.16) (2.30) (3.50) 
N 50 50 50 
Model x1 50.53*** 6.62 16.14*** 
(improvement) 
Predicted correctly 96% 70% 84% 
*p<.05; **p<Dl, ***p<.001. 
Note: The dependent variable for each model is binary = 1 if the state has 
the political reform; 0 if otherwise. The coefficients presented are unstan­
dardized, values in parentheses are standard errors of the MLE. The coeffi­
cients and standard errors were derived using logistic regression in the 
SPSS program. 
allows us to predict 86% of the cases correctly; states with higher 
usage of the initiative process are more likely to adopt supermajor­
ity tax rules. The controls for total state and local tax burdens in 
table 8.3 (model 3B) are not a significant predictor of the adoption of 
supermajority rules. 
In sum, states with a higher number of initiatives on the ballot 
per year are more likely to adopt governance policies: legislative 
term limits, state TELs, and supermajority tax rules. Constitutional 
rules creating the initiative are not a sufficient condition for enact­
ing governance policies. Nor are states experiencing high tax bur­
dens, legislative professionalism, or lower turnover more likely to 
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adopt governance policies. A state history of active citizen partici­
pation using the process is necessary to explain the adoption of gov­
ernance policies. States that lack the initiative, and those with the 
initiative that make little use of it, are less likely to adopt political 
reforms. 
Conclusion 
This analysis suggests that states vary in their reform climate. 
States with a populist climate and frequent initiative use are more 
likely to adopt three governance policies: legislative term limits, 
state TELs, and supermajority tax rules. 
As with the direct election of U.S. senators and other early-twen-
tieth-century reforms first adopted through the initiative, term lim­
its, tax limitations, and supermajority rules for tax increases were 
first adopted in states that rely heavily on the initiative. In the past 
twenty years the initiative has been used to adopt a wide range of 
policies, from black bear-hunting regulations, euthanasia, legaliza­
tion of gambling, open-space/environmental policy, to antigay laws. 
But its most important application is perhaps in the area of gover­
nance policy that changes the very operation of representative gov­
ernment. The resurgence in use of the initiative process for proce­
dural reforms (often sponsored by conservative organizations) can 
have long-term impacts on state and local governments. Since these 
reforms have not been around very long, there is limited research as 
to their consequences. However, two studies on the effects of TELs 
suggest that states adopting these policies might incur greater long-
term indebtedness as they attempt to maintain spending in the face 
of constrained tax revenue (Clingermayer and Wood 1995; Bowler 
and Donovan 1994d). Early studies of the effects of state term limits 
suggest that limits, while doing little to alter the social composition 
of legislatures, might lead to more frequent election of women. 
Term limits do appear to alter the behavior of state legislators by 
constraining members7 district-oriented activities. Early research on 
the effects of limits also suggests a weakening of state legislatures' 
positions relative to executives and staff (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 
1996). 
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Governance policies are an ever-growing component of political 
agendas. I discuss only three governance policies here, but there are 
a myriad of other salient procedural political reforms that might 
constrain the discretion of state legislators. These political reforms 
are sweeping state election ballots, dominating legislative sessions, 
and structuring candidate-centered campaigns. They include limita­
tions on campaign spending, anti-affirmative action laws, ethics 
legislation, and restrictions on repeat criminal offenders. Such gov­
ernance policies are often first adopted through the citizen's initia­
tive, then later adopted through state legislatures as interest in the 
reforms diffuses through a process of cross-state policy contagion. 
This research suggests that the reformist political climate of the 
1980s-1990s can be compared to the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century, which spawned a range of political reforms. Each 
era is distinguished by a rise in the use of direct democracy, the 
adoption of a significant number of institutional reforms, preference 
for procedural over substantive policies, and the pervasive distrust 
of representative government's institutions. Both eras may also be 
characterized by a backlash by upper-middle-class whites against 
the gains and political power of ethnic groups. Cain suggests this 
"New Populism" represents a voter backlash to reverse the gains of 
minority groups in the 1970s and to inhibit their access and influ­
ence in government (1992b). 
Many Populist/Progressive Era political reforms (direct election 
of senators, direct primary, Australian ballot, home rule, nonparti­
san local and state elections, women's suffrage) can also be charac­
terized as governance policies, since they (1) are driven either di­
rectly or indirectly by citizen pressure,- (2) change the internal rules 
that state and elected officials must follow,- and (3) constitute proce­
dural rather than substantive policy. Ironically, almost 100 years 
later, the success of 1980s-1990s reform politics is achieved by 
building on a procedural reform adopted during the Progressive Era 
(1900-1920): provisions for direct democracy. 
The legacy of Progressive Era political reforms on U.S. politics 
sheds light on the long-term impact of current procedural reforms 
aimed at state and local governments. It also raises several ques­
tions. How will the procedural reforms we are enacting today fun­
damentally shape the structure of politics and policy in the next 100 
years? What kind of 21st-century procedural reforms will produce 
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the fundamental changes in American politics that women's suf­
frage, the civil service, and direct democracy brought about in the 
Progressive Era? 
N O T E  S 
1. Similar reforms requiring voter approval of all tax increases have been 
enacted through the initiative in Colorado (1992) and Washington (1993). 
2. Survey conducted by Americans Talk Issues: Improving Democracy 
in America (Washington, D.C: Americans Talk Issues Foundation, 1994). 
3. Governance policies can be distinguished from Lowi's constituent 
policy—essentially, administrative reorganization of national bureaucratic 
agencies—in that governance policy is a restructuring of the institutions of 
the state, rather than administrative reorganization (Lowi 1972). Gover­
nance policies are the building blocks for state-building (Skowronek 1982). 
4. The impact of TELs on public policy is discussed briefly in chapter 12. 
5. Both legislative term limits and TELs are commonly adopted by the 
citizen initiative. These reforms are also adopted through legislative 
statute. Since the late 1970s, the most common subject matter for initia­
tives has been taxes and government spending; three-fifths of all initiatives 
have concerned government spending, public morality, or political reform 
(Magleby 1994, 237). In the 1990s this trend is magnified, with nearly 30% 
of all initiatives focusing on governmental and political reform (Magleby 
1994, 238). 
6. The governance policies examined here were adopted both by ballot 
initiative and legislative statute. Governance policy is also not synonymous 
with "constitutional" initiatives. Governance policies can be adopted either 
by constitutional amendment or legislative statute. 
7. As of July 1994 18 states had adopted legislative term limits. In the 
1994 November general election, 4 more states adopted term limits. 
8. From interviews with legislative party leaders in 4 states (Colorado, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington) during the 1993-94 legislative 
sessions. 
9. Nevada and Rhode Island have nonbinding state expenditure limita­
tions and are excluded from this analysis. 
10. The measure of historical usage of the initiative (over roughly the 
past 100 years) is highly correlated with measures of citizen usage of the 
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initiative process over the past 20 years. The same states with high initia­
tive use over the past century are also high users of the initiative over the 
past 20 years. The variable with the broader time frame, historical use of 
the initiative, is used in this chapter to measure a populist climate, history, 
and "political culture" (Elazar 1984). 
11. This measure is based on the total number of initiatives qualifying 
for state election ballots each year, not only those that were adopted (Neal 
1993). The latter data are not readily available. Given that only half of all 
initiatives that qualify for the ballot are adopted, limiting this measure to 
only successful initiatives would unnecessarily reduce the sample size. Pre­
vious research in this area (cf. Magleby 1995) has included all initiatives 
qualifying for state election ballots. 
12. The standardized number of initiatives on the ballot per year was 
calculated by dividing the total number of initiatives by the number of 
years the state has had the process. With regular elections every two years, 
this number can be multiplied by 2 for the average number of initiatives ap­
pearing on the ballot per election cycle. Eight states were coded high use of 
the initiative (above .9 initiatives per year), nine states were coded moder­
ate (.43 [mean] to .90 per year), and six states were coded low (below .43 ini­
tiatives per year). 
13. There are important variations in historical use of direct democracy. 
Some states use the process quite frequently, while other use the process 
rarely. What accounts for this variation? Variation in use of the initiative is 
a function of institutional rules for: (a) petition requirements, (b) geograph­
ical distribution requirements, and (c) the availability of other direct 
democracy options. Of the three, the signature threshold (petition require­
ments) for qualifying an initiative for the statewide ballot may be the most 
critical. Some states, such as Oregon and Colorado, require signatures from 
only 5 % of the electorate voting for governor in the last election, compared 
with Wyoming, which requires signatures from 15% of the electorate. 
States such as Colorado and Oregon may provide a testing ground for new 
policy ideas because of low entrance costs for using the initiative process. 
Analysis (not shown) indicates that over 50% of the variation in historical 
usage of the initiative process is a function of the stringency of signature 
thresholds (petition requirements), geographic requirements for circulating 
petitions, and the number of available direct democracy options. 
14. Both legislative professionalism and turnover in state legislatures are 
included as alternative explanations in the term limits models. The Pear­
son (r) correlation between these two independent variables is -46, indicat­
ing they measure distinct features of state legislatures. 
Pressuring Legislatures 
through the Use of Initiatives: 
Two Forms of Indirect Influence 
ELISABETH R. GERBER 
One of the noteworthy facts of the modern initiative process is that 
most ballot initiatives fail. In the twenty-three American states 
that use initiatives, only 42% of the 271 statewide initiatives con­
sidered by voters between 1981 and 1990 passed.1 In prior decades, 
the initiative passage rate in many states was considerably lower. In 
California, for example, the passage rate was less than 30% for the 
nearly seven decades between adoption of the initiative in 1911 
through the late 1970s.2 At the same time, the cost of qualifying 
and campaigning for initiatives is rapidly increasing. Proponents of 
five major California ballot initiatives spent an average of over $7 
million per measure in 1994.3 
Yet despite the low initiative passage rate and high cost, interest 
groups continue to use the process.4 The number of initiatives ap­
pearing on statewide ballots increased from 67 initiatives in 1992, 
to 68 initiatives in 1994, to 92 initiatives in 1996.5 One explanation 
for the use of initiatives in the face of high costs and low passage 
rates is that passing a new law is neither the only nor even perhaps 
the most important purpose for proposing an initiative.6 Groups 
may propose initiatives without ever intending to pass the laws 
they propose. Instead, their motivation for proposing initiatives is 
often to exert pressure on other political actors. Groups that use 
initiatives to exert pressure hope that other actors will then pass or 
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block legislation in response to the interest group's proposal. To the 
extent that interest groups can pressure other actors through their 
initiative proposals, their activities may provide enough indirect 
influence to justify the costs of using the initiative process. 
In this chapter, I focus on the use of initiatives to achieve indi­
rect influence. I argue that groups pursue indirect influence for one 
of two different reasons. Some groups lack the resources to pass 
laws directly as initiatives (i.e., to achieve direct influence). For 
these groups, indirect influence is the only way that they can use 
initiatives to achieve their policy goals. Other groups have the re­
sources to achieve direct influence. For these groups, indirect influ­
ence may represent a less costly way of achieving the same policy 
outcomes. In both cases, groups propose initiatives to pressure 
other actors, particularly the state legislature. To the extent that 
groups use initiatives to pursue indirect influence, the low passage 
rate, and the continued use of initiatives in the face of this low pas­
sage rate, are much less surprising. 
Beyond addressing the immediate question of why groups use a 
process that seems to provide them with so little influence, my ap­
proach to studying indirect influence provides insight into the 
broader question of the overall extent of interest group influence in 
the initiative process. Acknowledging that groups may pursue ei­
ther direct or indirect influence helps us to understand the motiva­
tions behind the choices interest groups make. Studies that focus 
solely on direct influence are likely to seriously underestimate the 
influence of groups that use initiatives to achieve indirect influ­
ence. My analysis also shows, however, that the ability of groups to 
achieve indirect influence is also severely limited. For most groups, 
achieving indirect influence is no more feasible than achieving di­
rect influence. By identifying the conditions under which groups 
can and cannot achieve indirect influence, this analysis thus con­
tributes to our understanding of interest group behavior and influ­
ence in the initiative process. 
Forms of Influence 
Groups can promote their political interests by pursuing several 
forms of influence. Influence can be "status quo modifying" or "sta­
tus quo preserving"; it can also be "direct" or "indirect." "Modify­
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ing" influence involves changing policy by passing a new law. "Pre­
serving" influence involves protecting the status quo by preventing 
the passage of new laws. "Direct" influence involves immediately 
influencing policy, either modifying or preserving the status quo, 
through a given policy-making mechanism (i.e., the initiative 
process). "Indirect" influence involves using one policy-making 
mechanism (i.e., the initiative process) to bring about an effect on 
policy, again either modifying or preserving the status quo, in an­
other policy-making arena (i.e., the legislative process). Thus, status 
quo-modifying influence can be either direct or indirect, as can sta­
tus quo-preserving influence. 
An example of direct modifying influence involves passing a law 
by initiative. Such influence is modifying in the sense that the policy 
consequence is to change the law from the status quo to the new ini­
tiative law. It is direct in the sense that the change comes about as a 
direct consequence of the initiative rather than as an indirect conse­
quence (as when legislators respond to election outcomes). An exam­
ple of direct preserving influence involves blocking the passage of an 
initiative. Such influence is status quo preserving in the sense that 
its consequence is to prevent passage of a new law; it is direct in the 
sense that the effect is made through the initiative process. 
Indirect influence comes about when one actor pressures another 
actor to change or protect policy. An example of indirect modifying 
influence involves using initiatives to pressure state legislators to 
pass a new law. An example of indirect preserving influence in­
volves using initiatives to pressure state legislators to block passage 
of new legislation. There are at least two ways an interest group can 
use initiatives to pressure the state legislature either to modify or 
preserve the status quo.7 The first is to threaten to pass an initiative 
that legislators oppose. The second is to use initiatives to signal the 
group's support for (or opposition towards) an issue. Each of these 
approaches involves pursuing different activities, and each entails 
different relationships between interest groups, voters, and legisla­
tors. I describe each form of indirect influence below. 
Threatening to Pass an Adverse Initiative 
An interest group may attempt to generate legislative action by 
threatening to pass an initiative that legislators oppose. The interest 
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group may exert pressure either to modify current policy or to pre­
vent the passage of new legislation. In response to such threats, leg­
islators may or may not act. Whether legislators in fact respond to 
an interest group's threat, and hence whether the group can achieve 
indirect influence, depends upon the credibility of the group's 
threat. As I illustrate in the examples below, the credibility of a 
group's threat depends upon whether there exist majority-preferred 
initiatives that the group can propose and whether the group has 
sufficient resources to pay the costs of proposing, qualifying, cam­
paigning for, and defending the initiative.8 In other words, to pose a 
credible threat to the legislature, an interest group must have the 
electoral support and resources to pass their initiative directly,- oth­
erwise, legislators can ignore their threat. Interest groups pursue 
this form of indirect influence, then, when they have the choice of 
pursuing either direct or indirect influence and believe they can 
achieve their policy goals more cheaply by pressuring legislators to 
act on their behalf. 
The following examples illustrate when groups will be able to 
use the initiative process to pressure the state legislature. The ex­
amples are based on a simple spatial model that is intended to cap­
ture the essential elements of the interaction between interest 
groups and legislatures.9 Like all models, this spatial model repre­
sents a simplification of the actual policy process in many ways.10 
The purpose of the model is not to mirror all aspects of the policy 
process,- rather, it is to isolate those fundamental features of the 
process that determine when groups can use initiatives to achieve 
this form of indirect influence. 
In the model, there are three players: a Legislature, an Interest 
Group, and the median Voter.111 represent each player's policy pref­
erences by an ideal point, which I refer to as L, I7 and V, respectively, 
and a utility function relating each policy to the utility the player 
receives.12 To facilitate illustration, I assume that players prefer 
policies that are " closer" to their ideal points to those that are fur­
ther away.13 
To understand the sequence of events, first consider the game 
tree represented in figure 9.1. The object of the game is to select a 
single policy. The Legislature moves first and decides whether or 
not to pass a new law (L*). If the Legislature decides to act, it passes 
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Figure 9.1 Game Tree 
L* through normal legislative channels. If the Legislature does not 
act, the status quo (SQ) effectively becomes the "Legislature's law." 
The Legislature recognizes that some of its choices may provoke a 
challenging initiative. The Interest Group recognizes that it may be 
able to influence what the Legislature does and the content of the 
legislation it produces. 
The Interest Group moves next and decides whether or not to 
propose an initiative (I*). If no initiative is proposed, the game ends 
and the Legislature's law remains. If an initiative is proposed, the 
Voter chooses between the initiative (I*) and the Legislature's law 
(JL* or SQ) in a subsequent election. The policy (the law or the ini­
tiative) preferred by the median Voter prevails. 
Whether the Interest Group can pressure the Legislature to pass a 
law other than its ideal policy (L* » L), and hence whether the group 
can achieve indirect influence by threatening to pass an initiative, 
depends upon the configuration of player preferences. Suppose the 
players' preferences are as depicted in figure 9.2.14 In this example, 
the Interest Group's ideal point is moderate relative to the Legisla-
ture's and the Voter's, such that L < I < V.15 If the Legislature and the 
Interest Group were to each propose their ideal policies, the initia­
tive (I*) would win because the Voter would prefer the Interest 
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Figure 9.2 Player Preferences with Moderate Interest Group 
Group's moderate policy (I* = I) to the Legislature's extreme policy 
(L* = L). Whether this translates into a credible threat by the Inter­
est Group depends on the level of the Interest Group's costs.16 In 
general, when the increase in utility the Interest Group expects to 
receive from proposing an initiative—compared with the utility re­
ceived from the law—is greater than its costs, the Interest Group is 
tempted to make a proposal.17 When the utility differential is less 
than the Interest Group's costs, the Interest Group cannot justify 
the costs and does not make a proposal. 
In figure 9.2, when interest group costs C = 0, the Interest Group 
is willing and able to offer an initiative at its ideal point (I).ls This 
initiative will beat any law that the Legislature prefers to /*, that is, 
any point to the left of I*, since any such point is further from V 
than is I*. Anticipating this, the Legislature knows the best it can 
do is pass its law at the Interest Group's ideal point (I). When C > 0, 
if the Legislature passes a law close enough to I, the Interest Group 
will not find it cost-effective to counter. In fact, the Legislature 
passes its law between L and I, just close enough to I to make the 
Interest Group indifferent between paying C and proposing an ini­
tiative, and keeping C and accepting L*.19 Note that L* in this.case 
is closer to the Legislature's ideal point than when C=0? as a func­
tion of the Interest Group's costs. However, it is further from the 
Voter's ideal point, implying that the Legislature need not be as re­
sponsive to the Interest Group and the Voters when the cost of 
using the initiative process is high. When C is sufficiently large (i.e., 
when L and I are less than C units apart), the Legislature can pass a 
law at L* - L and the Interest Group will not act. A similar dynamic 
holds for the case where the Voter's preferences are relatively mod-
erate.20 In both cases, the important point is that both I and V are 
located on the same side of L. 
By contrast, in figure 9.3, the Legislature's preferences are mod­
erate relative to the Interest Group's and the Voter's such that 
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Figure 9.3 Player Preferences with Moderate Legislature 
I < L <V.21 When the players hold these preferences, there exists no 
initiative that the Interest Group and the Voter both prefer to the 
Legislature's ideal policy. For example, suppose the Legislature 
passes its law and the Interest Group proposes an initiative each at 
their ideal points. Clearly, the Voter prefers L*, since it is closer to 
V. Indeed, if the Interest Group proposes any initiative that is to the 
left of L*, the voter prefers L* and I* loses. Therefore,. there exists 
no policy that the Interest Group prefers to the Legislature's policy 
that the Voter also prefers, and so no initiative is proposed. Know­
ing this, the Legislature passes its law at its ideal point (L) and ig­
nores the Interest Group's potential threat. 
To summarize, the legislature responds to an interest group's 
threat when there exists a majority-preferred initiative that the in­
terest group can propose, and when the group can mobilize the nec­
essary resources at sufficiently low cost to result in a positive net 
benefit. In other words, groups can successfully threaten to pass ad­
versarial initiatives only when they know they can convince legis­
lators both that their threat is credible and that they could, if they 
so chose, pass the initiative directly. 
Whether or not a group can actually convince legislators that it 
has sufficient resources to obtain direct influence depends upon the 
amount of uncertainty regarding actors' preferences and resources. 
If all players have complete information about the other players7 
preferences and resources and the content of the policy alternatives, 
the interest group does not need to take any action at all. Under 
complete information, the legislature anticipates whether the group 
will propose an initiative, the content of its initiative proposal, and 
the median voter's preference. Furthermore, the legislature also 
knows that, as long as the other players have complete information 
as well, the voter will always vote for the policy that is closer to its 
ideal point, and the interest group will always propose the utility-
maximizing initiative. Thus, the legislature can perfectly anticipate 
the interest group's activities and the median voter's response and 
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moves to preempt them when the expected outcome is contrary to 
the legislature's preferences. 
In the real world of politics, however, we know that political ac­
tors rarely have complete information. Uncertainty abounds. Legis­
latures can rarely predict the content of initiative proposals, let 
alone which groups might do the proposing. Interest groups have 
limited information about voter preferences, and voters themselves 
are often uncertain about the likely consequences of policy alterna­
tives. All of these sources of uncertainty mean that interest groups 
may need to take steps to signal their intentions to the legislature. 
In particular, groups may need to reveal the content of their pro­
posal by actually drafting and beginning to qualify their initiative. 
They may also need to signal public support for their initiative by 
organizing and mobilizing voters and by running and publishing 
polls. Finally, groups may need to signal their ability to mobilize 
other resources, especially financial resources, by holding fund­
raisers, hiring a consulting firm, paying signature gatherers to qual­
ify the measure, and buying campaign advertisements. Note that 
once groups take these steps to signal their intentions, it may be rel­
atively inexpensive to follow through with their initiative and pur­
sue direct influence. Thus, when players have a great deal of uncer­
tainty, groups may find indirect influence to be relatively costly and 
may choose direct influence instead. 
While it is possible to identify conditions under which interest 
groups can theoretically achieve indirect influence, identifying ex­
amples where such indirect influence actually occurred is inher­
ently problematic. Given the nature of the dynamic described 
above, it is often very difficult to infer intent from an interest 
group's actions. In fact, in equilibrium under complete information, 
the interest group never acts; simply being able to pose a credible 
threat is sufficient to induce the legislature to act favorably. Under 
incomplete information, the interest group takes actions such as 
drafting, qualifying, and campaigning for an initiative that could, in 
fact, be intended to achieve either direct or indirect influence. In 
other words, the interest group's strategy is often either unobserv­
able or indistinguishable from strategies adopted for other purposes. 
This makes it very difficult to establish whether the legislature's 
policy is indeed the result of an interest group's threat or of some 
other cause. 
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Still, despite these problems, there are several examples that are 
strongly suggestive of the dynamic described above. One example in 
which interest groups clearly took steps to pressure a state legisla­
ture, and the legislature responded by passing favorable legislation, 
occurred in the area of environmental regulation. In 1993, the Cali­
fornia state legislature passed a package of laws that reformed the 
California Environmental Quality Act [CEQA].22 Before this pack­
age, numerous efforts to reform the environmental protection regu­
lations contained in the CEQA had failed in the legislature. In re­
sponse, a number of organizations formed a coalition called CART 
(Citizens Against Red Tape) to lobby in favor of reforming the 
CEQA. Several subsequent reforms were introduced in the legisla­
ture. Although the opponents of these reforms argued that they 
were too favorable to the California Chamber of Commerce and the 
petroleum industry, both well represented in CART, the measures 
ultimately passed. Whether or not their passage directly resulted 
from CART's effort is impossible to know,- however, Barber notes 
that there was "fear that CART might try to change the law through 
the initiative route if it did not get its way in the Legislature. As ev­
idence of this fear, environmentalists pointed to CART's hiring of 
Woodward-McDowell—a public relations company specializing in 
ballot measure "campaigns. CART denied considering an initiative 
campaign" (Barber 1993, 37). 
Signaling the Group's Support or Opposition 
Instead of threatening to pass an initiative that legislators oppose, 
groups may also seek indirect influence by signaling their support 
for a policy. Groups pursuing this second form of indirect influence 
recognize that there is no fundamental disagreement between their 
interests and legislators7 preferences. Consequently, to influence 
legislative behavior, interest groups must simply be able to inform 
legislators about an issue and, most important, about their position 
on the issue. In the context of the model above, legislators must 
know an interest group's policy preferences to anticipate whether 
and how the group will act in response to the legislature's choices. 
More generally, legislators respond to interest group preferences in 
exchange for resources and services from the group such as cam­
paign contributions, electoral support, information, and expertise.23 
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In recent years, the proliferation of interest groups, increased 
competition for campaign contributions, and other factors have 
made it more difficult for interest groups to signal their policy posi­
tions (Smith 1995). In fact, because interest groups face intense 
competition from other groups for a legislator's attention, and be­
cause legislators must cultivate relationships with many groups to 
fund increasingly expensive campaigns, it may now be extremely 
difficult for interest groups to make their positions known. Further­
more, this increased competition distorts interest group incentives; 
even if interest groups can attract a legislator's attention, policy 
makers may discount the group's statements, knowing that interest 
groups have incentives to mislead legislators, or at least overstate 
their positions, to attract the legislators' attention. 
Initiatives provide a way of signaling a group's position on an 
issue. Groups can use initiatives to signal their support for, or oppo­
sition to, an initiative by expending two types of resources. Eco­
nomic interest groups and other groups with abundant monetary re­
sources can signal their policy position by contributing money to 
campaigns to support or oppose ballot measures.24 This spending, of 
course, is voluntary in the sense that groups need only provide re­
sources to support or oppose measures from which they expect to 
benefit and about which they feel intensely. By observing that a 
group chose to spend money.to support or oppose a measure, legis­
lators can rightly infer that the group expects to gain from the out­
come of the election net of the costs of the campaign. Otherwise, 
the group would keep the money or spend it on some other purpose. 
Interest group spending on initiatives therefore serves as a costly 
signal of the interest group's preferences to the legislature.25 In addi­
tion, spending on initiative campaigns is done outside of the direct 
market for interest group campaign contributions. Such spending 
may thus be viewed as less subject to the competitive pressures of 
campaign financing and therefore as more credible. 
Citizen groups and other groups with abundant personnel re­
sources (i.e., members, volunteers, and experts) can also use initia­
tives to signal their position on an issue. Since these groups tend to 
lack the monetary resources of economic groups, however, their 
strategy for achieving indirect influence must differ. Citizen groups 
signal their position to the legislature by mobilizing electoral sup­
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port for an initiative. By placing initiatives on the ballot that draw a 
great deal of public support, organized interest groups serve as the 
links between legislators and voters by framing an issue on which 
legislators and voters agree. In providing this linkage, interest groups 
may be able to prompt legislators to behave as the group wishes by 
mobilizing electoral support that the legislators cannot ignore. 
Under what conditions do we expect interest groups to be able to 
use initiatives to pressure the state legislature by signaling their pol­
icy positions? For the legislature to respond to an interest group's 
pressure, three conditions must be met. The first condition is that 
the group has sufficient resources to attract the legislature's atten­
tion. Some groups feel strongly about an issue but lack the monetary 
resources to organize and finance an initiative campaign. Other 
groups lack the personnel resources to mobilize electoral constituen­
cies in support of or in opposition to an initiative. Groups that lack 
both monetary and personnel resources may be unable to engage in 
campaign activities that would attract the legislature's attention. 
The second condition that must be met for the legislature to re­
spond to an interest group's pressure is that the group must have 
something the legislature wants. In particular, groups must have ei­
ther monetary resources that they can promise as future campaign 
contributions, or the backing of a large, important electoral con­
stituency that they can pledge to mobilize in support of a candidate. 
If the group lacks both of these resources, it cannot promise future 
payment for the legislature's cooperation. Thus, even if the group 
successfully signals its position to the legislature, the legislature 
has no incentive to respond to the group's signal. 
The third condition that must be met for legislators to respond to 
an interest group's pressure is that legislators must be electorally 
vulnerable. When legislators face tough competition and their jobs 
are at risk, they have a greater incentive to respond to the demands 
of important constituencies. Historically, numerous incumbency ad­
vantages meant that campaigns for legislative offices were rarely 
competitive and sitting legislators were rarely vulnerable. Nonethe­
less, legislators spent much of their time fund-raising and garnering 
the support of electoral and financial constituencies. Many observers 
argue that there are now few safe seats in state legislatures. In par­
ticular, in the era of term limits in many states, incumbency is likely 
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to be much less important. I expect term limits and other recent 
changes in state political environments to result in more competi­
tive elections and seats, and therefore more attention paid by state 
legislators to the issue preferences of their electoral constituencies. 
Note that a ballot measure need not pass for it to provide an ef­
fective signal of an interest group's policy position. Indeed, to 
achieve indirect influence, it is the signal rather than the outcome 
that is key. When groups expend monetary resources to signal their 
position, the outcome of the election is irrelevant. What matters are 
the interest group's behavior and the cost it is willing to incur to 
support or oppose the measure. When groups expend personnel re­
sources to signal their position, the outcome of the election is im­
portant insofar as it provides a gauge of support by important elec­
toral constituencies for the measure.26 
Note further the differences between this approach to indirect 
influence and the approach discussed earlier. In the first approach, 
legislators and interest groups have divergent policy preferences. 
The interest group's strategy is therefore to establish that it can and 
will propose an initiative in response to the legislature's action or 
inaction. If legislator, interest group, and voter preferences are con­
figured such that the interest group can propose a majority-pre-
ferred initiative that makes it better off than the legislature's policy 
and makes the legislature worse off, the legislature responds to 
avert the initiative proposal. In this second approach, legislators 
and interest groups generally agree on policy. However, legislators 
are uncertain about the interest group's preferences on a particular 
issue. Therefore, the interest group's strategy is not to establish that 
it has the resources to punish the legislature with an adverse initia­
tive. Instead, the interest group uses the initiative merely to signal 
its convergent position to the legislature. Note also that once the 
legislature obtains information about the group's preferences, it 
uses this information for very different purposes. In the first form of 
indirect influence, the legislature uses information about the 
group's preferences to avert initiative proposals. In the second form, 
the legislature learns about the group's preferences from its initia­
tive proposal and campaign activities and uses this information as 
it formulates future legislative proposals. 
Groups use initiatives to signal their policy positions to the leg­
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islature either because they lack the resources to pursue direct in­
fluence or because indirect influence represents a less costly way to 
achieve their policy goals. Groups that have monetary resources but 
little electoral support may find it extremely difficult to mobilize an 
electoral majority. By promising future campaign contributions, 
however, they may be able to pressure legislators who rely upon 
monetary resources to finance their ever more expensive campaigns. 
For these groups, direct influence is not an option, since they lack 
the resources and support to pass laws directly. Instead, they resort 
to indirect influence because they have no other options.27 
Groups that have abundant personnel resources but limited mon­
etary resources may have more direct legislation options available 
to them. If these groups have enough monetary resources to run a 
successful campaign, they may be able to pass laws directly by ini-
tiative.28 These groups thus choose between direct and indirect in­
fluence. For some, indirect influence may represent a less costly 
way to achieve the same policy goals. 
Recent California politics provide examples of groups expending 
both monetary and personnel resources in initiative campaigns to 
signal their positions to the legislature. An example of groups pres­
suring the legislature by expending monetary resources occurred in 
the area of health industry regulation. In 1996, labor organizations 
placed two initiatives, Propositions 214 and 216, on the California 
ballot. Nearly identical in content, these two propositions would 
have regulated many of the operations of Health Maintenance Orga­
nizations (HMOs) in the state. Proposition 214 was proposed, sup­
ported, and largely funded by the Service Employees International 
Union and AFL-CIO, while Proposition 216 was proposed, sup­
ported, and largely funded by the California Nurses Association. 
After a grueling campaign period and expensive opposing campaigns 
by the insurance industry, both initiatives failed. However, in the 
three months immediately following the 1996 general election, the 
legislature proposed at least 27 HMO regulation bills that included 
many of the provisions contained in the initiative measures.29 
While none of these bills have passed both houses of the state legis­
lature, 23 are still under consideration. By contrast, only 1 HMO 
regulation bill was introduced during the entire 12-month period 
before the 1996 election. Thus, while the HMO regulation bills 
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introduced in early 1997 may or may not have been introduced as a 
direct consequence of the failed initiatives, the increase in the num­
ber of bills in this area since their failure implies some connection. 
An example of groups expending personnel resources to signal 
their position recently occurred in California as well. In 1993, an in­
dividual named Mike Reynolds drafted a measure to require a life 
prison sentence for persons convicted of three felonies. Known as 
the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law, or simply "Three Strikes/' 
the measure received enthusiastic support from many individuals, 
citizens groups, and law enforcement organizations, and easily 
qualified for the ballot with primarily volunteer signatures. The 
measure was wildly popular, with an early Field Poll survey regis­
tering fully 84% approval (Field Research Institute, 1994). 
Observing this overwhelming popularity, the legislature, not 
willing to miss the opportunity to act on such a popular issue, 
passed an identical law in 1993. Still, with little additional cam­
paign effort, the measure remained on the ballot and passed with 
72% of the vote in November 1994 (California Secretary of State, 
1994). Thus, while the legislature's law was nullified by the passage 
of "Three Strikes" as an initiative, its action in passing the law was 
clearly in response to the signal of strong popular support for the 
initiative proposal. 
Implications 
The discussion of indirect influence has several important implica­
tions for our understanding of the initiative process. First, the 
analysis provides a compelling explanation for both the low initia­
tive passage rate and the continued use of initiatives in the face of 
low passage rates and high costs. When groups pursue indirect in­
fluence, they place propositions on the ballot that are never in­
tended to pass. This is not to say that groups prefer for their initia­
tives to fail. Rather, groups recognize that even if their initiatives 
do fail, their efforts may still be worthwhile. If the legislature re­
sponds to a group's threats or signals, then the group may receive 
some policy benefit even from "unsuccessful" initiative proposals. 
Second, the analysis of indirect influence shows that there are 
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systematic patterns in how groups can indirectly influence policy 
through the use of initiatives. Groups can pressure the legislature 
by posing a credible threat to pass an initiative that the legislature 
opposes. Or they can propose initiatives as a means of signaling 
their support for a policy. Each of these approaches to pressuring 
the legislature involves undertaking particular activities, and each 
requires specific resources. Groups that are able to mobilize the 
necessary resources have the option of indirect influence open to 
them. Those same resources, however, may also be used to achieve 
other forms of influence, including status quo-modifying direct in­
fluence and status quo-preserving direct influence. Thus, while the 
two forms of indirect influence described above are available to 
groups that can mobilize the necessary resources, they may not rep­
resent the most valuable use of those resources. 
Third, the analysis identifies some of the limits of indirect influ­
ence. Not all groups can achieve indirect influence, and a given 
group may be limited to influencing the legislature in certain issue 
areas only. Achieving indirect influence requires either prior access 
to the legislature or the resources and electoral support to pass ini­
tiatives directly. The groups that can mobilize those resources thus 
have other forms of political influence available to them, either 
through the initiative process or other political arenas. Thus, the 
ability to achieve indirect influence enhances the power of groups 
that are already successful politically. The two forms of indirect in­
fluence identified in this analysis do not provide a means for other­
wise underrepresented groups to influence policy outcomes. Rather, 
they provide yet another way for politically important groups to 
promote their political interests. 
NOTE S 
1. Public Affairs Research Institute 1992b. 
2. California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992. 
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3. California Secretary of State 1994. 
4.1 use the term "interest groups" to refer to both preexisting organiza­
tions that engage in a range of political activities as well as newly formed 
organizations that form for the immediate purpose of proposing an initia­
tive. See Gerber 1997. 
5. Kennerk 1992; Mulligan, Lillienthal, and Gesmundo 1994; Mulligan 
1996. 
6. A second explanation is that interest group behavior is not, in fact, 
irrational in an economic sense. This explanation allows for the possibility 
that while the probability of a given initiative passing may be quite low, the 
potential benefit if it does pass may be extremely high. In fact, if the ex­
pected utility—that is, the expected benefit times the probability of 
passage—outweighs the cost, then the group is (economically) justified in 
pursuing even a low-probability initiative. Based on surveys with interest 
groups that use initiatives, both explanations appear to be important. See 
Gerber 1997. 
7. In this chapter, I consider the use of initiatives to pressure legislators 
in an interest group's state. Interest groups may also use initiatives to pres­
sure other policy actors, such as bureaucrats, legislators in other states, and 
members of Congress. 
8. In fact, the group's initiative need not be majority preferred; rather, 
the legislature must believe that it is. 
9. These examples are based on a model developed in Gerber 1996. 
There, I provide additional motivation for the model and consider the full 
set of equilibrium choices and behavior. For the current purposes of identi­
fying the conditions under which interest groups can have certain kinds of 
indirect influence through their use of initiatives, the simple examples pre­
sented here suffice. 
10. Since the game is an abstract, simplified representation of the policy 
process, I omit many of the details of legislator-interest group-voter inter­
action in order to isolate key aspects of the interaction. I relax some of 
these simplifications after presenting the basic model. 
11. For the purposes of the examples, I assume the Legislature and the 
Interest Group each behave as unitary actors. A more detailed description 
of the policy process would also model the complex interactions between 
actors within the state legislature and the proposing interest group. See 
Gerber 1996 for a discussion of these interactions. I also simplify my treat­
ment of voter behavior and focus strictly on the decisions of the median 
Voter. Since voters in the model ultimately choose between two policy al­
ternatives, the preferences of the median Voter are decisive. 
12. This formulation implies that all players, including the Legislature, 
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receive utility from policy outcomes. An alternative assumption treats leg­
islators strictly as position-takers, i.e., they only care about how they vote, 
rather than about the ultimate policy consequences of their actions (May­
hew 1974). My formulation allows legislators to be reelection oriented, so 
long as their constituents hold them accountable for policy outcomes. 
13. This assumption implies that player utility functions are linear, 
symmetric, and single-peaked at their ideal point. 
14. Assuming a unidimensional policy space greatly simplifies the game 
and exposition of the results. 
15. Comparable results hold for the reverse case, where V < I < L. 
16. These costs represent the costs of qualifying and campaigning for an 
initiative. 
17. What is important with respect to costs is not the absolute level of 
resources required to draft, qualify, campaign for, and defend the initiative, 
but rather the ease with which the group amasses and mobilizes those re­
sources. 
18. Since the proposer (either alone or in coalition with other groups) 
must pay the costs of proposing, qualifying, and campaigning for the initia­
tive, I assume the Interest Group must absorb these costs. By contrast, I as­
sume the Legislature has already committed to considering policies in a 
given policy area, and so its costs are effectively zero. If we assume the Leg­
islature must also absorb the costs (both direct costs and opportunity costs) 
of passing its law, the results extend straightforwardly. 
19. Specifically, the Legislature passes its law C units from /. 
20. When L<V<I and C = 0, the Legislature and the Interest Group each 
tries to obtain the policy outcome closest to their own ideal point, and both 
converge to the median Voter's ideal point. When C > 0, the Legislature only 
needs to move L* to the point that its law is a distance equal to half the In­
terest Group's costs. At that point, the Interest Group is willing to keep C 
and accept a policy C units from its best response on the other side of V. 
21. Comparable results hold for the reverse case, where V < L < I. 
22. Much of this discussion draws from Barber 1993. 
23. See Smith 1995 for a review of the recent literature on legislator-
interest group exchanges. 
24. See Gerber 1997 for a discussion of the relationship between a 
group's internal characteristics, resources, and strategies. 
25. See Banks 1991 for a review of the literature on costly action in sig­
naling games in political science. 
26. The legislature may respond to support by a constituency that 
makes up far less than an electoral majority. See Fenno 1978. 
27. Groups that have the monetary resources to signal their position to 
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the legislature and promise future campaign contributions may have other 
options outside the initiative process. Specifically, they may be able to ef­
fectively lobby the legislature through traditional means. 
28. Running a successful modern initiative campaign requires at least 
some monetary resources to purchase campaign ads. To some extent, per­
sonnel resources substitute for monetary resources. Groups that lack mon­
etary resources may also rely on free media to publicize their initiative. 
29. Lexis-Nexis State-track, search by keywords HMO and California. 
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Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: 
The Contextual Basis of Support for Anti-
Immigrant and Official English Measures 
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT AND RODNEY E. HERO 
While race/ethnicity is often seen as important in U.S. politics, it 
has not always been systematically incorporated into political sci­
ence research (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Radcliff and Saiz 1994). This 
chapter examines voting patterns on two initiatives adopted by bal­
lot initiative in California: ''Official English/7 commonly referred to 
as Proposition 63 (1986), and the "illegal immigration77 initiative, 
referred to as Proposition 187 (1994). Consistent with a "racial/eth-
nic diversity" interpretation of politics and policy in the states, we 
find that racial/ethnic context and diversity play an important role 
in explaining county-level support for both anti-immigrant and Of­
ficial English propositions (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero, Tolbert, 
and Lopez 1996; cf. Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968). 
California voters adopted an English Language Amendment 
(Proposition 63) to the state's constitution in 1986, which aimed to 
enforce the status and primacy of English as the state's official lan­
guage and to "preserve, protect and strengthen the English language, 
the common language of the people of the United States." That 
measure was the model for initiatives adopted two years later in 
Colorado, Florida, and other states. In all three states Official Eng­
lish measures were adopted by wide margins; the popular vote in 
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favor was 64% in Colorado, 73% in California, and 84% in Florida. 
In each state, the initiative amended the state's constitution and 
prevented the state legislature from making any law that dimin­
ishes or ignores the role of English as the state official language. The 
sentiments expressed in the Official English measures continue to 
resonate. The U.S. Congress proposed an English Language Amend­
ment to the U.S. Constitution in 1996. 
In 1994, California voters supported Proposition 187 by a 59% to 
41% overall margin. The ballot initiative denies social services, 
nonemergency health care, and education to illegal immigrants and 
requires public agencies to report suspected illegal immigrants to 
state and federal authorities. Although federal courts placed an in­
junction on implementation of parts of the measure days after the 
election, this policy has important implications for both national 
and subnational politics. 
Proposition 187 and the Official English initiative are not unique 
in the history of California, or in other states, but are part of a series 
of policies that are more likely to be adopted in states with high 
racial/ethnic populations (Hero and Tolbert 1996). Other policies 
relevant to minority groups considered or adopted by ballot initia­
tive in California include the repeal of fair housing legislation in 
1965 and the California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209) on 
the 1996 statewide ballot, which would prevent the consideration of 
race, ethnicity, or gender in awarding governmental contracts, col­
lege admissions, and a range of other government-funded programs 
(Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968; Citrin et al. 1990a; Cain 1992b; 
Citrin et al. 1990b). 
A Racial/Ethnic Interpretation of Anti-Immigrant 
and Official English Measures 
Interpretations of state (and substate) politics tend to focus primar­
ily on how political-governmental factors on one hand, or economic 
conditions on the other, drive policy adoptions (Gray 1990; Dye 
1966; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Lewis-Beck 1977; Carmines 
1974). In contrast, we contend that a state's racial/ethnic diversity— 
the mixtures or cleavages of various minority and or racial/ethnic 
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groups—is central to explaining public policies, especially policies 
adopted by ballot initiative that affect minority groups (Key 1949; 
Giles and Evans 1986; Blalock 1970; Hero and Tolbert 1996). We 
suggest in this chapter that the passage of California's Official En­
glish and illegal-immigration initiatives can be understood in terms 
of the state's racial/ethnic composition. 
State racial and ethnic diversity includes a state's black (African 
American), Latino/Hispanic, and Asian populations, i.e., those 
groups that are defined as "minority groups" or "protected classes" 
in (implicit) recognition of unique historical experiences in the 
United States. The diversity interpretation brings careful attention 
to these emerging minority groups in the states. A state's politics 
are a product of the cooperation, competition, and/or conflict be­
tween and among (pre)dominant and subordinate groups within a 
state. The extent of cooperation or conflict is, in turn, significantly 
affected by racial/ethnic similarity or dissimilarity (Hero and Tol­
bert 1996). 
This interpretation, and related measures of racial/ethnic diver­
sity, also distinguish between northern and western European popu­
lations versus nonnorthern and nonwestern Europeans who immi­
grated in large numbers to the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. 
Based on the size of the minority population and "white ethnic" 
populations, the states are ranked (or indexed) on two scales. State 
racial/ethnic diversity is a product of both minority and white eth­
nic diversity. 
The states can be delineated into three broad categories, accord­
ing to the degree of racial/ethnic diversity: "homogeneous," "het­
erogeneous," and "bifurcated." States with large minority popula­
tions (primarily black or Latino) and large white (nonethnic) 
populations are classified as having a bifurcated social structure. 
States with large white ethnic populations (nonnorthern and non-
western European white) and moderately sized minority popula­
tions have a heterogeneous social structure. Finally, states low in 
both racial and ethnic diversity, i.e., with small minority and white 
ethnic populations, are relatively homogeneous. 
A racial/ethnic diversity interpretation predicts that policies tar­
geting minority groups are more likely to be adopted in bifurcated 
political jurisdictions (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Key 1949; Giles and 
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Evans 1986; Blalock 1970). Large minority populations are perceived 
to pose the greatest "threat" to the dominant white population. 
Thus, the adoption of policies such as Official English and Proposi­
tion 187 can be understand as a product of high minority diversity 
within states. Homogeneous political jurisdictions with low 
racial/ethnic diversity may also be concerned about minority popu­
lations. A racial/ethnic interpretation of California politics con­
trasts with others that have viewed California as a "progressive" or 
a "moralistic" state (Elazar 1966, 1984). 
California's Racial/Ethnic Composition 
Based on its large minority population and relatively small white 
ethnic population, California can be classified as having a bifurcated 
social structure (Hero and Tolbert 1996). Although the state has a 
diverse population, it is dominated by a white (nonethnic) majority 
and a large minority (primarily Latino) population. Internally, the 
state's racial/ethnic composition varies by region. The southern and 
south-central part of the state has a bifurcated racial/ethnic compo­
sition, the central/coastal regions of the state are more heteroge­
neous, and the extreme northern part of the state is relatively ho­
mogeneous. California's 1990 population includes 57% whites, 
26% Latinos, 9.5% Asian-Americans, and 7.5% African-Americans. 
While whites make up 57% of California's population, they consti­
tuted 81% of voters in the 1994 election. Latinos make up 26% of 
the state's population, but only 8% of the voters (Hayes-Bautista 
and Rodriguez 1994). 
Ten of California's 58 counties have a sizable Latino population 
of between 30% and 66% of the population. These counties are con­
centrated primarily in the southern and south-central part of the 
state. Latinos make up between 20% and 29% of the population in 
12 counties, and an additional 10 counties have between 11% and 
20% Latino population. Thus 55% [N = 32) of the counties in Cali­
fornia have a Latino population over 10%. The average Latino popu­
lation per county is 17.5%, ranging from a low of 3.3% to a high of 
65.8%. Counties with the largest Latino populations include Los 
Angeles (33%) and Imperial County [66%). 
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Cain (1992a) suggests that a "new populism" has arisen in Cali­
fornia politics, a product of white/Anglo concerns over the increased 
size and political influence of blacks and Latinos in the state. This 
new populism represents a voter backlash against the gains of mi­
nority groups in the 1970s to inhibit their access and influence in 
government. A clear manifestation of this new populism is the use 
of ballot initiatives to circumvent representative institutions, espe­
cially the state legislature, where blacks and Latinos have gained in­
fluence. Previous research found that bifurcated states with large mi­
nority populations are more likely to adopt Official English laws and 
other policies aimed at minority groups (Citrin et al. 1990a). 
Voter Self-interest and the 
California Initiative Process 
A growing body of research has examined the role of the initiative 
process in shaping state policy and the role of voter self-interest in 
direct democracy elections (Donovan and Snipp 1994; Citrin et al. 
1990a; Bowler and Donovan 1994a, 1994b; Lupia 1994a, 1994b). 
States with the initiative process provide a mechanism for policies 
to be adopted directly by the voters. With whites representing 80% 
of the electorate in California's 1994 elections, the initiative process 
provides a mechanism for the dominant white majority to adopt 
policies they prefer, over the opposition of minority groups. The 
presence of an electoral institution such as the initiative process— 
in combination with high racial/ethnic (minority) diversity—may 
help explain past and present state policy adoptions. 
Background on Official English 
California was the first state in the nation to adopt an Official Eng­
lish amendment via ballot initiative in 1986. A U.S. senator from 
California, S. I. Hayakawa (R), first proposed an amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution in 1981 to declare English the nation's official 
language. This English Language Amendment was reintroduced in 
1983 and 1985, but did not win legislative approval. In 1983, 
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Hayakawa founded the advocacy group "U.S. English/' which spon­
sored ballot initiatives to declare English the official language 
across the states. Proponents of Official English argue that their goal 
is to speed assimilation and end bilingual education that keeps chil­
dren in their native tongue. Recently, some proponents of Official 
English support it because they claim it will discourage immigra­
tion itself (Woodward 1995). They contend that historical experi­
ence teaches that linguistic diversity threatens political cohesion 
and stability. Proponents contend that previous generations of im­
migrants understood that English proficiency was necessary for eco­
nomic mobility and social integration, creating the great "melting 
pot" that defined American society. Opponents argue that Official 
English targets linguistic minorities (primarily Latinos and Asians). 
Such measures are seen as mechanisms of exclusion rather than as­
similation that threaten the cultural traditions of minority popula­
tions. Official English laws also imply future discrimination against 
language minorities and threaten the continuation services that are 
necessary for participation in the political process. Critics contend 
that the campaign for Official English is "at best unnecessary and at 
worst a thinly veiled form of racism and xenophobia" (Citrin et al. 
1990a, 539). 
Public opinion polls conducted after the 1986 election in Califor­
nia indicate that the Official English initiative polarized the elec­
torate along ethnic lines, with strong support among white voters 
and lower levels of support among other ethnic groups. In Califor­
nia, whites voted almost 2 to 1 in support of Official English (72% 
approval rate). Blacks also widely supported the measure. Latinos, 
in contrast, opposed the measure 61% to 39% (Citrin et al. 1990a, 
1994 [see table 10.1]; also see Hero 1992). 
Currently 20 states have laws designating English as the official 
language. Racial/ethnic diversity explains much of the pattern of 
states' adoptions (Hero and Tolbert 1996; cf. Citrin et al. 1990a). Of 
the states with Official English measures, a number (California, 
Colorado, Arizona, and Florida) were passed by ballot initiative that 
amended the state constitution. Although the majority of these 
measures were adopted in the late 1980s, this issue has resurfaced 
in popular discussion. Three "homogeneous" states (Montana, New 
Hampshire, and South Dakota) adopted measures in 1995. 
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Background on Proposition 187 
Proposition 187 was commonly referred to as the "Save our State" 
(SOS) initiative. Supporters (including GOP Governor Pete Wilson) 
argued that California could not afford the cost of serving a large 
and growing illegal immigrant population. The ballot measure was 
devised as a means to save billions of dollars in state tax dollars and 
to "send a message to Washington" about the economic and social 
problems posed by the estimated 1.6 million illegal immigrants in 
the state. 
Opponents argued that the proposition bordered on being racist 
and its passage would create a two-tiered society if implemented. 
They argued that the proposal did nothing to strengthen border en­
forcement or prevent employers from hiring illegal immigrants. Op­
ponents also argued that the measure would foster a police-state 
mentality in which legal residents would be questioned simply be­
cause of their accent and/or skin color. 
A Los Angeles Times exit poll found that the illegal immigration 
initiative polarized the electorate along racial lines, getting broad 
support among white voters while losing among other ethnic groups 
(see appendix). Whites voted almost 2 to 1 in support of Proposition 
187. Latinos, in contrast, opposed the measure 77% to 23%. The 
poll also shows that 53% of black and Asian voters opposed the 
measure, suggesting the measure may have been broadly conceived 
of as antiminority or anti-Latino. 
County-Level Race/Ethnicity and the 
Official English and Anti-Immigration Vote 
This analysis examines the hypothesis that racial/ethnic diversity is 
a central explanation for county-level variations in the vote for two 
policies targeting minority groups: Official English and Proposition 
187, We suggest that racial/ethnic diversity and context are critical 
beyond individual-level factors,- social context shapes individual 
perspectives on politics and policy. To measure this context, we use 
1986 and 1990 census data from California's 58 counties on the 
percent of Latino, black, Asian, and white populations. California 
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counties are powerful governmental entities and the direct 
providers of major social services, the same services Proposition 187 
would deny to illegal aliens or Official English would deny to non-
English speakers. There was a wide range in the county-level vote 
for each measure. The vote for Official English initiative ranged 
from a low of 53% in San Francisco County to a high of almost 90% 
in a number of counties. The vote for Proposition 187 ranged from a 
low of 29% in San Francisco County to a high of 77% in Colusa 
County (Colusa is over 33% Latino). 
The Vote for Official English (1986) 
We first examine the relationship between racial/ethnic context 
and the county-level vote for Official English. A series of Ordinary 
Least Squared (OLS) regression equations are used to estimate the 
impact of racial/ethnic context on county-level support for Official 
English. In each model, racial/ethnic populations are the indepen­
dent variables and the county-level vote for Official English is the 
dependent variable. Bivariate regression analysis (not shown) indi­
cates that larger Latino, black, and Asian populations are inversely 
related to support for Official English in California; as the size of the 
Latino, black, and Asian populations rose in a county, the vote for 
the language proposal decreased. As expected, the size of the white 
population is positively correlated with the vote for this policy in 
each state (cf. Citrin et al. 1990a). 
Table 10.1 (models 1, 2, and 3) displays the estimates of the im­
pact of race on the county vote for Official English controlling for 
the percent Latino. This control is used because the Official English 
measure was widely perceived to target Latinos, who represent the 
largest linguistic minority in California and in the United States. 
Controlling for the percent Latino does not change the strength of 
the inverse relationship between higher black and Asian popula­
tions and lower approval levels. 
Across counties, the size of the white population was positively 
associated with higher approval levels for the ballot initiative: as 
the size of the white population increased, so did the vote for Offi­
cial English. White voters in California counties with quite small 
minority (and Latino) populations strongly approved of the English 
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Table 10.1 Race/Ethnicity and the Vote for Official English in Cali­
fornia Controlling for % Latino Population, Party, and Economic 
Conditions (County-Level Data) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
% Latino -.10 -.09 .32*** -.23*** 
(.05) (.05) (.10) (.05) 
% Black -.69*** .35* 
(•20) U7) 
% Asian -.63*** -.23* 
(.12) (.12) 
% White 
(.08) 
Unemployment .79*** 
rate(%) (.17) 
Republican Party 71.12*** 
(% Registered) (9.78) 
Constant 81.12*** 81.62*** 41.45*** 46.29*** 
(1.32) (1.20) (7.58) (4.81) 
Adjusted R2 .22 .36 .35 .68 
Standard error 5.42 4.93 4.96 3.50 
N 58 . 58 58 58 
F 9.07*** 16.72*** 16.36*** 24.71*** 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, City and County Data Book 1986; and the 
Secretary of Stated office in California, Colorado, and Florida. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients,- standard errors in 
parentheses. "Minority": % Latino, black, and Asian population. 
*p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). 
Language Amendment. In California, when we control for the white 
population, the coefficient for Latino is positively related to the 
vote for Official English. Individual-level data also indicate Latinos 
strongly opposed the initiative. This suggests that white voters in 
bifurcated counties with large Latino populations and white voters 
in homogeneous counties with quite small minority (and Latino) 
populations strongly supported Official English. 
Historically, economic conditions have been an important factor 
in white responses to immigration and ethnic groups, often resulting 
from concern over competition for jobs (Hayes 1957; Hofstadter 
1955). Therefore, model 4 (table 10.1) extends the analysis to account 
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for county unemployment rates and for political party affiliation 
(cf. Citrin et al. 1990a; City and County Data Booh 1986 California). 
In California, poor economic conditions are positively associated 
with the vote for Official English. As the county unemployment rate 
increased, so did the vote for the language initiative. 
Model 4 also examines the impact of political party, measured by 
the percentage of registered Republicans per county in California 
(1986). Republican Party leaders tended to be more supportive of Of­
ficial English, although many Republican leaders called the mea­
sure unnecessary and said that it could arouse resentment among 
minority groups. State Democratic Party leaders generally opposed 
the measure. Counties with higher Republican Party affiliation 
were much more likely to vote for the language proposal. Model 4 
accounts for nearly 70% of the variation in the county-level vote for 
Official English. Previous research found strikingly similar county-
level voting patterns on Official English initiatives in Colorado and 
Florida (cf. Hero, Tolbert, and Lopez 1996). We suggest that racial/ 
ethnic diversity accounts for similar voting patterns not only across 
states but also across policy areas. 
The Vote for Proposition 187 (1994) 
We next examine the relationship between racial/ethnic context 
and the county-level vote for Proposition 187, adopted by California 
voters eight years after Offical English. Since Latinos account for 
the majority of illegal immigrants in California, first analyzed is the 
relationship between percent Latino and the county-level vote for 
Proposition 187. Figure 10.1 suggests that the relationship between 
the size of the Latino population and support for this policy is more 
complex than a simple linear relationship (see figure 10.1). As the 
size of the Latino population increased, voters were significantly 
more likely to support the initiative (upper-right quadrant of graph). 
But individual-level data indicates that Latinos voted against the 
measure by almost a 4 to 1 margin (see appendix). White voters in 
bifurcated counties with large Latino populations (over 20%) 
strongly supported the measure. 
The vote for Proposition 187 was also high in homogeneous 
counties with very small minority populations. Homogeneous 
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Figure 10.1 California's Latino Population and the Vote for Proposition 187 
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counties with a predominant white (nonminority) population and 
small Latino population (less than 10%) are concentrated in the 
lower-right quadrant of the graph. The vote ranged between 70% and 
80% in these counties, well over the county-level mean of 64%. 
This may suggest that illegal immigration was viewed as a statewide 
problem, irrespective of the size of the Latino (and/or illegal alien) 
population. Indeed, the measure was referred to as "Save Our State/7 
i.e., framing the issue as one of statewide importance. It also sug­
gests that the immediate presence of Latinos (or illegal immigrants) 
is not necessary for whites to be concerned with growing minority 
populations (cf. Key 1949; Giles and Evans 1986). On the other hand, 
the lowest levels of voter support occurred in heterogeneous coun­
ties, those with moderately large black and Asian populations.1 
Again, a series of OLS regression equations are also used to esti­
mate the impact of race/ethnicity on county-level support for 
Proposition 187. In each model, racial/ethnic populations are the in­
dependent variables and county-level vote for Proposition 187 is the 
dependent variable. Bivariate regression analysis (not shown) indi­
cates that larger black and Asian populations are inversely related 
to support for Proposition 187; as the size of the black and Asian 
population rose in a county, the vote for the immigration proposal 
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decreased. The size of the Asian population alone accounts for 40% 
of the variation in support for the initiative at the county level. As 
expected, the size of the white population is positively correlated 
with the vote for this policy. 
Table 10.2 estimates the impact of race on the vote for Proposi­
tion 187 controlling for the percent Latino. This control is used be­
cause the initiative was widely perceived to target Latinos, who rep­
resent the majority of illegal aliens in the state. In Model 3 the size 
of both the Latino and white populations is positively correlated 
with the vote of the proposition at the county level. As the size of 
the Latino population increases and/or as the size of the white pop­
ulation increases, so did the vote for the initiative. But individual-
level data make clear that Latinos strongly opposed the measure. 
Thus, white voters in counties with large Latino populations and in 
counties with quite small minority (and Latino) populations 
strongly approved of immigration control. A similar voting pattern 
Table 10.2 Race/Ethnicity and the Vote for Proposition 187 Con­
trolling for % Latino Population (County-Level Data) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
% Latino .03 .06 .87*** 
(.10) (.09) (.17) 
% Black -1.33*** 
(-35) 
% Asian -1.28 
(-20) 
% White .81*** 
(.14) 
Constant 68.44*** 69.66*^ -11.02 
(2.41) (2.00) (12.87) 
Adjusted R2 .19 .40 .37 
Standard error 9.60 8.27 8.41 
N 58 58 58 
F 7.48*** 19.64*** 18.02*** 
Sources: California Secretary of State's Office. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients,- standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
***p < .001 (two-tailed). 
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was found for the Official English initiative. Controlling for the per­
cent Latino does not change the inverse relationship between higher 
black and Asian populations and lower approval levels. 
These findings are not unlike those of Key concerning the 1940s 
South (1949). Key found that "black belt" counties with large black 
populations were more strongly segregationist than neighboring 
counties and regions where blacks represented a smaller segment of 
the population. Blacks did not, of course, support segregationist 
policies,- rather, blacks in these counties were largely prevented 
from participating in elections by various legal constraints. Key also 
found especially high white-voter turnout in "black belt" counties. 
Similarly, turnout in California's 1994 election was unusually 
high—60%—in counties with large white populations for a 
midterm election. These findings suggest California's white/Latino 
bifurcated racial/ethnic composition may parallel the white/black 
bifurcation of the Deep South in an earlier era. 
Economic conditions also appear to have an impact on support 
for Proposition 187. Table 10.3 introduces controls for county un­
employment rates, historically an important factor in responses to 
high immigration (Hayes 1957; Hofstadter 1955). County-level data 
on the percentage unemployed of the civilian workforce is from the 
City and County Data Book (1990). In each model, as the unem­
ployment rate increased, so did the county-level vote for the 
statewide initiative; the coefficients for racial/ethnic composition 
remain strong and statistically significant. These findings suggest 
that econoraic conditions and racial/ethnic context had a combined 
impact on support for the illegal immigration initiative, especially 
among white voters. 
Table 10.4 includes controls for the impact of economic condi­
tions and party registration levels. Party is measured by the percent­
age of registered Republicans per county in 1994 (California Secre­
tary of State 1994). California's Republican Party members, 
including incumbent Republican Governor Pete Wilson, were vocal 
advocates of Proposition 187, while the state's Democratic Party 
leaders, including Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, generally opposed 
the measure. It is not surprising, then, that Republican-dominated 
counties were much more likely to vote for the immigration pro­
posal. The models in table 10.4 account for between 86% and 89% 
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Table 10.3 Race/Ethnicity and the Vote for Proposition 187 Con­
trolling for Economic Conditions (County-Level Data) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
% Latino -.15 -.08 .57** 
(.11) (.10) (-17) 
% Black -.91** 
(-36) 
% Asian -1.04*** 
(.21) 
% White .65*** 
(.14) 
Unemployment 1.24*** .93** .91** 
rate(%) {•38} (.34) (.35) 
Constant 58.70*** 62.33*** -2.14 
(3.68) (3.30) (12.72) 
Adjusted R2 .31 .46 .43 
Standard error 8.85 7.83 8.01 
N 58 58 58 
F 9.43*** 17.05*** 15.47*** 
Sources: City and County Data Book 1986; and the Secretary of State's 
Office. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Correlation diagnostics indicate no problems of multicolinearity be­
tween unemployment rate and racial/ethnic composition. Largest Pearson 
(r) correlation is .43 between county unemployment rate and % Latino. 
**p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed). 
of the variation in the county-level vote for the initiative, using 
only three or five parameter estimates. 
Controlling for political party and economic conditions further 
clarifies the relationship between race/ethnicity and county-level 
voting patterns. Model 1 (table 10.4) indicates that when we control 
for these factors, percent Latino is inversely related to the vote for 
the ballot measure. Controlling for party and unemployment rates 
statistically eliminates the effect of the high vote for Proposition 
187 in counties with large Latino populations, because these coun­
ties have the highest unemployment and registered Republicans. 
The remaining (homogeneous) counties show a slight negative rela­
tionship. Similarly, controlling for percent white statistically elimi­
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Table 10.4 Racial/Ethnic Diversity and the Vote for Proposition 187 
(County-Level Data) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
% Latino -.16*** -.15*** 
(-05) (.05) 
% Black .06 .54** 
(.18) (.17) 
% Asian -36*** ...42*** 
(.12) (.12) 
% Minority -.12*** 
(.03) 
Unemployment 1.32*** 1.09*** .95*** 1.18*** 1.26*** 
rate (%) U6) (-16) (.15) (.14) U9) 
Republican Party 1.19*** 1.23*** 1.08*** 1.12*** 1.16*** 
(% Registered) (-07) (.09) (.09) (.08) (.08) 
Constant 8.36** 5.45 14.76*** 12.28*** 9.93** 
(3.18) (4.39) (4.21) (3.58) (3.93) 
Adjusted R2 .86 .83 .86 .86 .89 
Standard error 3.93 4.33 4.02 3.95 3.55 
N 58 58 58 58 58 
F 120.68*** 96.14*** 114.93*** 119.78*** 92.12*** 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, City and County Data Book 1986; and California 
Secretary of State's Office. 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in paren­
thesis. "Minority": % Latino, black, and Asian population. Correlation diagnostics 
indicate no problems of multicolinearity. 
**p < .01, ***p< .001 (two-tailed). 
nates the effect of high support for the measure in counties with 
very low Latino populations, because it is in these counties that we 
find the largest white populations. The remaining (bifurcated) coun­
ties indicate a positive relationship (see table 10.2, model 3). Both 
models are correct; counties with both high and very low Latino 
populations strongly supported the measure (see figure 10.1). Thus, 
while unemployment and party may be important, these factors 
alone are not sufficient to explain the complex voting patterns on 
Proposition 187. Race/ethnicity remains critical. 
Counties with moderately large Asian populations strongly op­
posed the measure, even controlling for party and economic condi­
tions. When we control for party and high unemployment, however, 
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larger black populations are associated with higher levels of support 
for the initiative. This suggests that an interminority competition 
may exist between Latinos and blacks for employment and even 
governmental social services. Previous studies support this finding. 
McClain (1993) found evidence for competition among blacks and 
Latinos for municipal unemployment (399-414). 
Proposition 187 and the Wilson 
Gubernatorial Campaign 
Proposition 187 was also related to several candidate-based races in 
California, especially for governor. In 1993, public opinion of the in­
cumbent governor, Pete Wilson (Republican), reached record lows 
in the face of recession, tax increases, and defense cutbacks that 
weakened the California economy. In the early stages of the cam­
paign, Democratic candidate Kathleen Brown was leading Wilson in 
the opinion polls by as much as 23%. Wilson made illegal immigra­
tion the central issue of his reelection campaign. In contrast, the 
Democratic candidate linked her campaign closely to the opposi­
tion to Proposition 187. 
Since Wilson allied his reelection campaign closely with his sup­
port for Proposition 187, it is not surprising that race/ethnicity also 
played a central role in the 1994 vote for governor. The county-level 
vote for Wilson and Proposition 187 are strongly related (Pearson [r] 
correlation - .85; R1 =.72; p = .0001) in California's 58 counties. The 
Los Angeles Times exit poll indicates 61% of whites voted for the 
Republican incumbent candidate, Wilson, and 35% for the Democ­
ratic candidate. Seventy-two percent of Latinos voted for Brown and 
23% for Wilson. Blacks strongly supported the Democratic candi­
date (77% to 20%), while Asian Americans split their vote evenly 
between the Republican and Democratic gubernatorial candidates. 
This suggests issue elections (ballot initiatives) may play a role in 
structuring candidate-based elections. 
Conclusion 
Official English and Proposition 187 appear to be two policies in a 
series of policies adopted through the initiative process in "bifur­
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cated" racial/ethnic contexts. Our findings suggest that states with 
bifurcated racial/ethnic populations may be more likely to adopt 
policies, especially through the initiative process, that target minor­
ity groups. These findings directly parallel and reinforce those of a 
state-level analysis of racial/ethnic diversity. Although voter ap­
proval was expected to increase with the size of the Latino popula­
tion, the relationship was more complex. Support for Official Eng­
lish and Proposition 187 were high in bifurcated counties, with 
above-average Latino populations and a dominant white population. 
Surprisingly, support for both policies was also very strong in homo­
geneous counties with very small minority populations. Previous re­
search on race and public policy in the states does not anticipate or 
explain the dynamics of race/ethnicity in homogeneous contexts. 
The lowest support occurred in racially heterogeneous counties with 
sizable black and Asian populations. These patterns are consistent 
with state-level findings examining the impact of racial/ethnic di­
versity on various policy outcomes (cf. Hero and Tolbert 1996). 
Economic conditions (unemployment) and party (registered Re­
publicans) also played a role in county-level voting patterns. The 
analysis shows that racial/ethnic diversity (context) was important in 
shaping voting patterns, even when these factors are accounted for. 
The importance of the theory and empirical findings presented 
here extend beyond California to national and subnational politics. 
It is likely that measures similar to Proposition 187 (and Official 
English) will diffuse to other states with bifurcated racial/ethnic 
contexts, especially large Latino (and illegal immigrant) popula­
tions, such as Arizona, Colorado, Florida, and Texas. Previous re­
search leads us to expect that the diffusion will occur first in "pop­
ulist" states with high usage of the initiative process (Tolbert 1996; 
see chapter 8, this volume). However legitimate concerns over im­
migration and the primacy of the English language may be, this re­
sponse to immigration and ethnic groups follows patterns familiar 
in California, state politics, and indeed, in U.S. history. 
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APPENDIX 
Votei Voted for Voted against 
Demographics Prop 187 (%) Prop 187 (%) 
RACE/ETHNICITY 
White 81 % 63 37 
Black 5% 47 53 
Latino 8% 23 77 
Asian 4% 47 53 
EDUCATION 
High school or less 20% 66 34 
Some college 30% 61 38 
College graduate 50% 53 47 
AGE 
18-29 years old 14% 47 53 
30-49 years old 45% 55 45 
50-64 years old 25% 63 37 
More than 65 years old 16% 68 32 
PARTY AFFILIATION 
Democrat 40% 36 64 
Independent 16% 62 38 
Republican 4 1  % 78 22 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
Liberal 17% 26 74 
Moderate 46% 55 45 
Conservative 37% 78 22 
Source: Los Angeles Times exit poll of 5,336 voters as they exited 85 
polling places across the state. Precincts were chosen based on the pattern 
of turnout in the past general elections. The survey was by confidential 
questionnaire. The margin of sampling error for percentages based on the 
entire sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Davis Market Re­
search Services Inc. of Calabasas assisted the Times in this poll. (Contact: 
Rob Cioe, Los Angeles Times, email: cioer@news.latimes.com or 
cioer@aol.com) 
NOTE S 
1. These data might be interpreted as showing that, at moderate levels of 
minority population, a process of social contagion goes on in these hetero­
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geneous counties that generates more tolerance (or less fear) of minorities. 
Contrary to Key (1949), Huckfeldt and Sprauge (1987) and others (Carsey 
1995) contend that interaction among races encourages acceptance of the 
minority groups. Higher levels of support for Official English and Proposi­
tion 187 in counties with the largest minority populations might suggest 
that, beyond some threshold of minority populations' share, white accep­
tance of minorities decreases. 
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Direct Democracy and Minorities: 
Changing Attitudes about Minorities 
Targeted by Initiatives 
JAMES WENZEL , TOD D DONOVAN , 
AN D SHAUN BOWLER 
The advocates of some forms of direct democracy claim that use of 
these institutions can stimulate political interest and facilitate 
learning about politics (Barber 1984; Butler and Ranney 1994; Dol-
bare and Hubble 1996). Democratic theorists (Macpherson 1977; 
Pateman 1980) have suggested that direct participation in policy 
making can play a pedagogic role, and some empirical studies of 
highly salient national referenda illustrate that voters absorb con­
siderable information on the issues from referenda campaigns (Elk­
lit and Peterson 1973; Hansen et al. 1975; Siune 1993). 
Critics, on the other hand, note the potential for majoritarian 
tyranny, particularly when unpopular minority groups are made the 
subject of an initiative (Gamble 1997; for a review, see Cronin 1989, 
chapter 5; Butler and Ranney 1994, 19-21; Magleby 1984, 30). Those 
even more critical of direct democracy suggest that these institu­
tions provide an opportunity for highly visible political discourse 
that can have a stigmatizing effect on minority groups made the 
subject of the initiative (Bell 1978; Fountaine 1988; Goetz 1987; 
Gunn 1981; Linde 1989, 1993). This chapter builds upon these in­
sights and questions by examining how direct democracy affects 
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mass attitudes and opinions about minority groups targeted by citi-
zen's initiatives. 
Initiatives and the Tolerance of Unpopular Groups 
Issues that clearly subject minority groups to critical public scru­
tiny are by no means the most frequent topics to reach the ballot.1 
On occasion, however, initiatives qualify that appear designed to re­
strict the services provided or rights accorded to a relatively unpop­
ular group. Examples of initiatives from the 1990s include those tar­
geting the rights of homosexuals, services provided to welfare 
recipients, and the status of immigrants.2 If we assume that voters' 
attitudes about the specific policies proposed by these various ini­
tiatives are somewhat uncertain and malleable, and that opinions 
about these groups are also uncertain, what effects might the insti­
tution of direct democracy have on attitudes and opinions? 
One major problem for the maintenance of democratic institu­
tions is that tolerance of (or empathy for) political outgroups is not 
necessarily a "normal" response, particularly if the group in ques­
tion is perceived as potentially threatening. On the contrary, as 
Stouffer (1955) suggested, initial responses to outgroups, or to 
attempts to suppress them, are almost universally intolerant. Toler­
ant outcomes occur only when individuals are able to devote signif­
icant cognitive resources to the consideration of the broader impli­
cations of the proposed repression. Although Stouffer confined his 
analysis principally to the question of the level of tolerance of com­
munists, his findings are supported by similar studies using alter­
nate reference groups (Gibson and Bingham 1985; Nunn, Crockett, 
and Williams 1978). Our interest is in the process by which the 
"sober second thought" on which Stouffer depended to generate tol­
erant outcomes is influenced by the initiative process. 
A useful way to conceptualize the impact of initiatives on citizen 
willingness to support the rights and benefits accorded unpopular 
minorities is to model the process as one involving attempts at per­
suasion. Let us assume that mass opinion on the subject of the 
rights and status of political minorities is quite diffuse initially. 
Some members of the public may have positive views about the 
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group while many harbor distinctly negative feelings toward the 
group. As a rule, however, few give the group or its members much 
direct thought. When an initiative is proposed that would restrict or 
rescind rights and benefits granted (generally by statute) to the 
group, the campaigns in favor of and opposed to the initiative expose 
members of the public to stimuli designed to sway their opinions. 
In general, political tolerance at the individual level has been 
found to be a function of individuals' general commitment to the 
norms of democracy and the perceived threat posed by the target 
group. The stronger one's commitment to democratic norms, the 
more likely one is to respond in a tolerant fashion to the urge to re­
press. Conversely, the greater the degree of threat perceived, the 
more likely it becomes that the initial intolerant reaction will hold 
sway. The problem for tolerance, and hence for democratic govern­
ment, is that while the urge to repress potential threats has a strong, 
potentially genetically transmitted (see Willhoite 1977), affective 
component, a tolerant response requires the commitment of sub­
stantial cognitive resources. This ingrained propensity to respond 
in an intolerant fashion must be overcome by resort to reasoned ar­
gument. Citizens must be convinced that reason requires that they 
ignore their initial impulses toward what they perceive as self-
preservation and extend rights to those whom they view as threat­
ening and potentially destructive. Ballot choices involving unpopu­
lar minority groups create a context where citizens must make 
choices about these groups on the basis of their affect toward the 
groups, in combination with the information received during the 
petition drive and campaign. 
The Dynamics of Opinion in Direct Democracy 
Given the absence of panel data, and the absence of survey instru­
ments designed for the purpose of studying direct democracy, there 
are virtually no existing studies that examine change in individual 
opinions within the course of a direct democracy election or across 
years (with at least one exception being Mendelsohn's 1994 study of 
the Canadian Referendum of 1992). This being the case, there is lit­
tle empirical knowledge about how the institutions of direct 
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democracy affect citizen attitudes, preferences, or opinions about 
subjects of the initiatives and referenda. There are a number of the­
oretical points of departure for viewing the potentially dynamic na­
ture of voter preferences and opinions on initiative topics. 
One perspective on opinion formation suggests that mass opin­
ions on many if not most policies are shaped by elites. Rather than 
assuming that individual preferences are preexisting and stable (Or­
deshook 1992), opinions are assumed to be malleable during cam­
paigns (Converse 1964; Key 1966). Depending upon campaign inten­
sity and responsiveness to information, citizens can be exposed to 
information that alters their opinions about subjects of the cam­
paign (Converse 1962; Zaller 1989, 1992). 
Zaller (1991) notes that when looking at mass opinions in general, 
if there are ideological or partisan cues in the messages that elites 
send (that is, if elite messages display clear partisan/ideological dif­
ferences), then subgroups in the mass public can respond in a man­
ner consistent with messages supplied from elites of their respective 
groups. If partisan or ideological elites are divided, voters can re­
spond to the positions taken by partisan and/or ideological elites 
they identify with. Considering this, we might expect that attentive 
partisans respond to the positions and messages advanced by elites 
in their respective parties regarding the subjects of ballot initiatives. 
Gerber and Jackson (1993, 640), drawing from Cohen and Axelrod 
(1984), describe a similar "adaptive utility model" that assumes vot­
ers in candidate contests have uncertain preferences about programs 
being debated publicly. As parties propose and discuss their pro­
grams in public, individuals acquire information about possible out­
comes. Gerber and Jackson identify shifts in party positions as pro­
viding the spark that causes voters to "update" their preferences. 
Following March and Olsen, their findings illustrate the important 
role that political institutions play in "helping individuals learn 
preferences and roles'7 (1994, 654). 
But what of the institutions of direct democracy? If the adaptive 
utility model is appropriate in the direct democracy setting, then 
what, if anything, might individuals learn when they are exposed to 
information about policies that have clearly identifiable minority 
groups as subjects? If preferences (attitudes and opinions) are flexible 
or malleable, what happens to mass attitudes when the institutions 
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of direct democracy are used in attempts to restrict the political sta­
tus of minorities? The fear of majority tyranny over minorities, after 
all, is one of the fundamental criticisms of direct democracy. 
If the successful inculcation of the mass public to norms of 
democracy such as tolerance is to have an impact on public policy, 
citizens must be able to identify situations in which tolerance is an 
appropriate response. One palliative for this problem may be the 
role that social and political elites play in providing guidance for the 
public. Many theorists, Stouffer (1955) included, have suggested 
that elites, by virtue of their having better inculcated the norms of 
democracy, and being able to better identify situations in which tol­
erance is a democratically appropriate response, are more likely to 
respond in a tolerant fashion (see also Nunn, Crockett, and Wil­
liams 1978; McCloskey and Brill 1983). 
Initiatives and referenda present the potential for substantial dif­
ficulties for the maintenance of broad democratic values. What hap­
pens when, as in the situation of a citizen's initiative, the role of 
elites in promoting tolerance is negligible, or at least reduced? By 
assuming the mantle of policy promoters, the organizers of the ini­
tiative movement may tend to usurp the traditional role that elites 
play in mitigating intolerant mass opinion. This apparent inversion 
of the elite role from one that promotes tolerance and democratic 
values to one calling for a recision of those values may well have 
substantial consequences for the maintenance of tolerance and 
democracy.3 
Models estimated in this chapter are designed to test hypotheses 
derived from the assumption of adaptive (flexible) mass opinions 
and preferences. We anticipate that the process of contesting the 
ballot issue can affect the attitudes and preferences that citizens 
hold about things made the subject of an initiative. Prior to a topic's 
appearing as an initiative (Tl), voters can have some relatively un­
certain preexisting opinions about the group that the initiative deals 
with and the general policy issues associated with the topic. These 
opinions and preferences might be, in part, associated with the 
voter's stock of political information, past political socialization, 
education, partisanship, and demographic traits. Later (T2), the 
voter is placed in a position of evaluating a specific proposal in the 
form of an actual policy proposal. At this time, the voter can be ex­
posed to new information about the (new) policy proposal, about the 
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group, and about how the group is affected by the policy. Informa­
tion regarding the initiative proposal can come from a variety of 
sources—political parties, political elites, the news media—and 
may provoke changes in mass opinion distributions from that seen 
early in the campaign (Darcy and Laver 1990; Magleby 1989; Karp, 
chapter 7 in this volume). 
To the extent that opinions are relatively malleable, the influence 
of messages about groups targeted by initiative efforts ought to be 
observable in opinion data. It would seem that they are. Sniderman 
et al. (1991), for example, found attitudes toward racial policy to be 
quite susceptible to persuasion. Moreover, the degree of susceptibil­
ity to persuasion was asymmetric with respect to the respondents' 
initial policy positions. On the subject of government assistance to 
nonwhites, those who initially professed support for assistance were 
substantially more vulnerable to conservative arguments than those 
initially expressing opposition to assistance were to liberal argu­
ments. In fact, after both counterarguments were applied, a 5-4 ma­
jority in favor of government assistance to blacks had been con­
verted to a 5-4 majority in opposition to such assistance.4 
If information received during the initiative campaign affects 
preference and opinions, voters residing in places experiencing an 
initiative on topic Y should be more likely to display changes in 
opinions and preferences related to Y from Tl to T2, above and be­
yond that displayed by voters residing in states having no such ini­
tiative. A simple dummy variable indicating that a respondent re­
sides in states with certain initiative movements is not likely to 
capture completely the relationship between an individual's opin­
ion change and that person's experiences associated with direct 
democracy. If the initiative context actually creates the opinion 
change, we expect that change from Tl to T2 should be affected by 
an interaction between living in the direct democracy state and 
some indicator of attentiveness to politics, or be affected by an in­
teraction between the direct democracy context and identification 
with the political party supporting the initiative. This follows from 
our assumption that attentive and partisan voters will be more 
likely to be exposed to and receptive to messages about the initia­
tive (Converse 1962; Zaller 1989). 
Consider initiatives dealing with the civil rights of gays and les­
bians. Prior to the 1990s, very few of the state initiatives that were 
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circulated dealt explicitly with gay rights.5 Voters had (possibly 
uncertain) opinions about gay rights policies and about gays and 
lesbians as a group. In 1994, however, anti-gay rights initiatives 
were filed in eight states and broached in another (Donovan and 
Bowler n.d.).6 We assume that this issue was not as highly salient in 
these states in the early 1990s as it was by the mid-1990s. Many 
voters might been unaware of the positions that state, party, and 
ideological elites took on gay rights prior to 1992/ However, by the 
time a state's antigay initiative is drafted and circulated, parties and 
elites are often forced to take visible public positions (Witt and Mc-
Corkle 1997). As the petition campaigns progressed in each state, 
editorials, news coverage, "decline to sign" efforts, and even occa­
sional commercials focused not only on the policy proposals, but on 
the group targeted, the group's lifestyle, and the policy and the posi­
tions that elites were taking on the policy. This was particularly 
true in those states where initiatives qualified for the ballot. By late 
1994, some voters, particularly those attentive to political informa­
tion or those responsive to party cues, might have shifted their 
opinions about gay rights and gay and lesbian lifestyles. In terms of 
this example, we are interested in determining if there were signifi­
cantly larger shifts in opinions about gays from 1992 to 1994 among 
citizens living in states having antigay petition efforts in 1994. We 
expect the effect to be most pronounced among partisan and atten­
tive voters in these states. 
This begs the question, however, of the expected direction of 
opinion change. From one perspective, the intervention of choices 
and discourse presented by direct democracy might have an impact 
on moving attitudes toward greater tolerance if elites assume a con­
sensus in favor of the tolerant position and these messages are trans­
mitted through the campaign. March (1970) and March and Olsen 
(1984, 739) see such a situation as a classic model of political lead­
ership in democracy. If, however, we consider the critique of direct 
democracy offered by Hans Linde, Derrick Bell, and others (as well 
as that implicit in Madisonian theory) who suggest that the mere 
existence of initiatives targeting minorities can stigmatize the 
group—particularly if visible elites of at least one party or ideologi­
cal group promote the intolerant position—evidence of 'learning" 
or attitude change might be reflected in opinions shifting toward 
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less acceptance of the target group. What if opinion change associ­
ated with direct democracy choices breeds greater disdain of mi­
norities? If there is any evidence of this, we might have to conclude 
that there is some merit to the idea that heated public debates gen­
erated by placing such questions on the ballot can have adverse con­
sequences for targeted groups, regardless of the policy implications 
of the proposals. 
Cases, Data, and Methods 
This study makes use of 1990-1992 and 1992-1994 NES panel stud­
ies to model changes in opinions about groups made the subject of 
ballot initiatives. Emphasis is given to attitudes about gays and les­
bians, welfare recipients, and illegal immigrants. Hypotheses about 
the effects that exposure to initiative campaigns, political attentive­
ness, and partisanship have on feeling thermometer ratings are 
tested. We also test hypotheses about changes in attitudes about 
public policies related to these initiatives. Lagged endogenous mod­
els of individual-level opinion change are estimated to test our hy­
potheses (Marcus 1979, 47). 
The NES provides some opportunities for examining how direct 
democracy might affect attitudes about minorities targeted by ini­
tiatives. Since we are interested, in part, in testing if these initia­
tives stigmatize groups, we examine change in perceptions of rele­
vant groups as reflected in panel studies. Perceptions are measured 
with standard feeling thermometer scores. Multiple wave of NES 
panels repeated questions asking respondents to rate their feelings 
about gays, illegal immigrants/ and welfare recipients on a scale 
from 0 to 100, with 100 being warm, 0 cold, and 50 neutral.8 We are 
also interested in assessing the impact the initiative has on citizens' 
attitudes toward the treatment of these groups. Since the NES is not 
designed to assess opinions about specific initiatives, tests of these 
policy-related hypotheses are based on NES questions that deal with 
questions related to, but not specifically drawn from, the policies 
proposed in the various initiatives. 
Our measures of change in attitudes about treatment of these 
groups are different across the three targeted groups we examine. 
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For example, concurrent with the filing of antigay initiatives in 
1994, NES panel respondents were asked in 1992 and 1994 how 
strongly they agreed/disagreed that "different moral standards 
should be tolerated." Likewise, a California initiative appeared on 
that state's November 1994 ballot (Proposition 187) ostensibly de­
signed to reduce illegal immigration by denying state and local ser­
vices to illegal immigrants and their children. Corresponding with 
this, 1992-1994 panel respondents were asked their opinions about 
how much illegal immigration should be increased or decreased na­
tionally. California also had a "welfare reform" initiative on the 
November 1992 ballot (Proposition 165) that would have reduced 
AFDC payments in the state by 25%. Corresponding with this, 
1992 NES respondents were asked if "spending on welfare" should 
be increased, left the same, or decreased.9 
We expect that attitudes change as people are exposed to new in­
formation about policies concerning which they have only loosely 
formed preferences. Since we are interested in testing if opinion 
change is associated with something emanating from the process of 
direct democracy, we need to isolate the effect of information expo­
sure that is unique to citizens residing in states having relevant ini­
tiatives. NES has no direct measure of exposure to information 
about initiatives during these campaigns. We can, however, use 
measures of state residence to isolate individuals who reside in 
states having relevant initiatives. Thus, we create a dummy vari­
able representing potential exposure to antiminority initiatives and 
their associated campaign messages. For the models of opinion 
change associated with antigay initiatives, individuals residing in 
states where the antigay initiatives were filed in 1994 are coded 
as 1, others as 0. For the models of opinion change associated with 
the 1992 welfare and 1994 immigration initiatives, individuals re­
siding in California in 1992 and 1994 (respectively) are coded as 1, 
others as 0. These variables isolate the contextual effect of exposure 
to campaign discourse associated with direct democracy.10 
In testing for the interaction between partisanship and potential 
responsiveness to messages emanating from these initiative contests 
targeting these minority groups, we focus on Republican identifiers. 
In each of the cases we examine, elites within the Republican Party 
were more likely to be associated with advocacy of the initiative pe­
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titions. This is most clear in the case of the two California initia­
tives. Proposition 187, the anti-immigration measure, was supported 
by GOP Governor Pete Wilson11 and was sponsored by a GOP state 
assemblyman [California Journal September 1994, 10). Proposition 
165, the antiwelfare measure, was sponsored and supported by Gov­
ernor Wilson [California Journal, September 1992, 6). 
Identifying distinct partisan advocacy of the antigay initiatives is 
a bit less certain. Nevertheless, the antigay measures in some states 
were sponsored by conservative activists who had displaced tradi­
tional Republican state party officials and were assuming control of 
state party organizations (i.e., Oregon, Idaho). In other states (i.e., 
Washington, Michigan) initiatives were sponsored by conservative 
groups associated with, but not in control of, their state's GOP orga­
nizations (Liechtling et al. 1993). Advocates of the antigay initia­
tives were clearly conservative and often involved with their state's 
Republican party,* however, unlike the California situation, these 
proponents typically came from outside the circle of elected offi­
cials (Witt and McCorkle 1997). To test for responsiveness to the 
initiative context associated with Republican partisanship, we in­
clude an interaction term in our models that represents Republicans 
residing in states having a relevant antiminority initiative. 
A Bivariate Example 
Before estimating models of opinion change, we illustrate, in simple 
form, the dynamic nature of opinions associated with one group tar­
geted by a ballot initiative. Consider, for example, the impact of the 
campaigns surrounding the proposed citizen's initiatives to rescind 
the provision of public services to illegal immigrants and their chil­
dren. In a world where opinion is perfectly consistent (time and the 
campaign have no impact) a scatterplot plotting opinion toward ille­
gal immigrants before the initiative (Tl) against opinion toward this 
group after the initiative (T2) should reveal all respondents lining up 
on the diagonal. In regression terms, the intercept would equal zero 
and the slope and R-square would equal l.O.12 A uniform aggregate 
shift in opinion (in the positive or negative direction) would result 
in an intercept of greater than or less than zero. Our expectations as 
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to the slope and R-square, however, do not change. If, however, the 
structure of opinion changes in response to the campaign, we would 
expect this to be reflected in a change in the slope. Higher slopes 
(greater than one) indicate that opinion at the extremes of the distri­
bution became more intense. Lower slopes (less than one) indicate a 
general attenuation of opinion. R-square in this model becomes a 
measure of consistency. Low values indicate a greater degree of scat­
tering of responses around the regression line. 
Although in the real world mass opinion is not perfectly consis­
tent, a comparison of the relationship between opinions toward ille­
gal immigrants before Proposition 187 was filed and opinions to­
ward illegal immigrants after the initiative was filed should offer 
some insights into the impact of the initiative process on mass 
opinions. By comparing the impact of pre-initiative opinion on post-
initiative opinion in California with the rest of the United States, 
we should be able to observe any obvious differential shifts in the 
structure of opinion associated with residence in a direct democracy 
state. 
As we suspected initially, the presence of an anti-immigrant ini­
tiative campaign does appear to exert some influence, although lim­
ited, on individual affect toward the group. Using panel data from 
the 1992-1994 National Election Survey, we conducted two regres­
sions, reported in table 11.1. In each, the dependent variable is the 
respondent's 1994 feeling thermometer evaluation of illegal immi­
grants, and the independent variable is the 1992 response to the 
same question. The first estimation includes only that portion of 
the respondents living in states in which no immigrant-related ini­
tiatives were filed during the 1992-1994 time period [N = 624). This 
produces an intercept of 15.22, and a b of .52, with an R-square of 
.23. Given the positive intercept, it would seem that for these re­
spondents, illegal immigrants are better liked in 1994 than in 1992 
(or disliked less), that opinion has moderated somewhat over the 
time period (indicated by a slope of less than 1), and finally, that 
opinion is somewhat inconsistent. 
The second regression is identical to the first, with the exception 
that only those respondents residing in California [N = 62) are in­
cluded. The lower intercept (8.05) and significantly steeper slope 
(.77) suggest that, compared to the population as a whole, affect to­
ward illegal immigrants among respondents in these states was sub­
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Table 11.1 Changes in Attitudes about Illegal Immigrants, 
1992-1994 (Dependent variable = feelings toward illegal immi­
grants in 1994, after initiative campaign) 
Estimate Std. Eiror Cases R2 
Rest of U.S. 
Feelings, 
1992 .52 .03 
Intercept 15.22 1.62 624 .23 
Californians 
Feelings, 
1994 .77 .11 
Intercept 8.05 4.86 62 .45 
Source: American National Election Study, NES 1992-1994 Panels, vari­
ables 317 (1994) and 5331 (1992). 
Note: The slopes are significantly different—test comparing the slopes 
produces a value of 2.20 (p < .025). A comparison of intercepts produces a t 
of 1.40 (p<. 10). 
stantially less influenced by the thaw that pervaded the rest of the 
electorate, while retaining a bit more of the intensity of the earlier 
period.13 Interestingly, the value of R-square (.45) suggests that the 
presence of an initiative campaign served to increase substantially 
the relative degree of consistency of opinion. 
Models of Opinion Change 
Potential exposure, however, is likely to be too crude a measure of 
any relationship between direct democracy and attitude forma-
tion/change. Beyond contextual measures of potential exposure, we 
require measures that tap the likelihood that someone in this con­
text will receive and respond to information associated with groups 
made the subject of these initiatives. 
For Zaller, the greater a person's level of general political knowl­
edge or awareness, "the more likely he or she is to be exposed to 
and comprehend . . . political messages" (Zaller 1992, 42-43). He 
assumes that people who are knowledgeable about politics are ha­
bitually attentive to communications on most issues. We follow 
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Zaller's lead and create an additive index from correct responses to 
six factual questions about politics.14 Our models of opinion change 
include this to represent the independent effect of knowledge on 
opinion change. We also include measures of the respondent's edu­
cation to account for potential exposure to political information. 
In addition to indicators of stored factual knowledge, our models 
of opinion change in direct democracy also include two measures of 
likelihood of receiving and responding to messages and discourse 
emanating from the initiative campaign context. We expect that 
voters in these initiative states who are most attentive to media 
coverage of politics should be more likely to receive information 
and thus be more likely to change their attitudes about groups and 
policies made the subject of the initiative. To assess this, we create 
an additive index of political attention that summarizes the respon-
dent's self-reported interest in politics, frequency of political discus­
sions, and attentiveness to television news coverage.15 If the rela­
tionship between attentiveness and opinion change is accentuated or 
amplified by the context of direct democracy, we should see a signif­
icant interaction between our attentiveness measure and the vari­
able representing the direct democracy context. In other words, at­
tentive voters residing in states having antiminority initiatives are 
expected to be more likely to change their opinions about groups and 
policies associated with these initiatives. 
Likewise, we also expect that Republican voters residing in ini­
tiative states should be more likely to change their opinions about 
groups and policies associated with these initiatives. Existing re­
search indicates that political parties (and party strategies and posi­
tions) affect and shape individual attitudes over time (Gerber and 
Jackson 1993; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Zaller 1991). As noted 
above, the initiatives included here were either proposed by or sup­
ported by elites within the Republican party (some more than oth­
ers), while opposition was most visible from mainstream Democra­
tic elites. 
Thus, we expect that GOP identification will be associated with 
opinion change, and that the relationship between partisanship and 
opinion change was amplified in states with initiatives. GOP voters 
nationally might be exposed to and respond to elites' messages 
about groups targeted by ballot initiatives, but not in the context of 
clearly defined policy choices. However, GOP voters residing in 
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states having initiatives on these subjects are more likely to receive 
additional cues and/or become aware of state-level partisan elites 
taking positions on actual ballot initiatives. For these reasons, we 
include a measure of GOP identification in our models, as well as a 
variable that represents the interaction between GOP identification 
and residence in states having initiatives. Our models also include 
controls for age, for respondents' opinions at Tl7 and in the case of 
opinions on welfare, for an indicator of respondent's race. 
Findings 
Results from these lagged endogenous models are decidedly mixed. 
They neither wholly relieve direct democracy from the critique that 
antiminority initiatives stigmatize targeted groups, nor do they to­
tally acquit direct democracy of these charges. Furthermore, the ev­
idence of accentuated attitude change among attentive and partisan 
voters exposed to direct democracy contests is also mixed. 
Table 11.2 presents the results of our analysis of the impact of 
the initiative process on individual affect toward the targeted 
groups. In general, Republican voters nationally were less sympa­
thetic to each group in latter stages of the panels. This effect can be 
seen as being consistent with cues given by GOP elites during the 
1990-1994 period. The effect, however, is most pronounced among 
GOP identifiers from California asked to evaluate illegal immi­
grants in 1994. After exposure to California's heated Proposition 
187 campaign, a GOP identifier in California rated their feelings for 
illegal immigrants nearly 20 points lower in 1994 than they did in 
1992. This compares to a change of 4 points associated with the in­
dependent effect of GOP identification. There appears to be no sig­
nificant partisan effect interacting with direct democracy from the 
models estimating feelings about welfare recipients and gays and 
lesbians. 
Looking at the interaction between attentiveness and feelings 
about these groups, there is also mixed evidence that the direct 
democracy context might be associated with opinion shifts that 
reflect stigmatization of targeted groups. After Pete Wilson's 1992 
initiative campaign to reduce AFDC (Aid to Families with De­
pendent Children) payments, politically attentive voters living in 
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Table 11.2 Individual-Level Changes in Attitudes toward Groups 
Targeted by Initiatives 
Illegal Welfare Gays and 
Immigrants Recipients Lesbians 
Knowledge -A7 -.37 .10 
(•54) (.43) (-51) 
Feelings (t - 1) .52** .38** .73** 
(.03) (.02) (.03) 
Age -.02 .05+ -.04 
(.05) (.03) (.04) 
Attention .19 .37* -.37* 
(.19) (-15) (.19) 
Attention* .78** -.26+ -.01 
Direct Democracy (.29) U9) (.19) 
GOP -3.99** -4.55** -5.54** 
(1.87) (1.26) (1.91) 
GOP* -19.91** 3.01 2.79 
Direct Democracy (5.91) (3.73) (3.80) 
Education 1.76** .22 1.05* 
(.57) (.37) (.51) 
Black 4.49** 
(1.72) 
Constant 9.85** 26.68** 11.90** 
(3.67) (2.50) (3.37) 
Adj R2 .26 .27 .53 
N 703 1032 6S6 
< .10 (one-tailed), *p < .05, **p < .01. 
California had slightly lower feelings for welfare recipients than 
they had in 1990. Conversely, our models indicate that attentive 
voters in California actually had warmer feelings for illegal immi­
grants after the 1994 immigration initiative than they did in 1992. 
Turning to table 11.3, we present the results of models estimat­
ing opinion change on policies related to the treatment of targeted 
groups. These results indicate that these same attentive respon­
dents from California, although significantly more sympathetic to 
immigrants, were more likely by 1994 to have shifted their opinions 
to a position calling for less immigration.16 Similarly, political at­
tentiveness was associated with shifts to opinions less tolerant of 
alternative lifestyles among voters living in states where antigay 
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Table 11.3 Individual-Level Changes in Attitudes toward Group-
Oriented Policy 
Illegal Welfare Gays and 
Immigrants Recipients Lesbians 
Knowledge -.07 -.00 .05* 
(.02) (.01) (.02) 
Opinion (t -1) .42** na .42** 
(.03) (.03) 
Age .00 .00 .00 
(-00) (.00) (.00) 
Attention -.10 .008* -.003 
(.008) (.004) (.01) 
Attention* .023* -.00 .012+ 
Direct Democracy (.012) (.00) (.010) 
GOP .03 .26** .28** 
(.09) (.03) (.10) 
GOP* -.34 .11 .38* 
Direct Democracy (•35) (.11) (.20) 
Education -.04* .01 -.03 
(.02) (.01) (.02) 
Black na .25** na 
(.05) 
Constant 2.82** 2.11** 1.46** 
AdjR2 
(.19) 
.23 
(.07) 
.05 
(.18) 
.23 
N 695 1,936 727 
Note: Low scores on the dependent variable are associated with greater 
aceptance of a liberal policy (more immigration, more welfare spending, 
greater tolerance). 
+p < .10 (one-tailed), *p < .05, **p < .01. 
initiatives were filed in 1994, although this effect fails to attain con­
ventional levels of statistical significance (p < .10, one-tailed). There 
is also additional evidence here of direct democracy turning opinion 
against targeted minority groups. By 1994, GOP respondents living 
in states where antigay initiatives circulated were significantly less 
likely to respond favorably about tolerating different lifestyles 
and moral standards. While GOP identifiers nationally shifted to 
opinions less tolerant of these lifestyles, the effect was even more 
pronounced among GOP voters in states where antigay initiatives 
were filed. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Recent scholarship has challenged one of the primary assumptions 
of many formal/positive theories about attitude formation and elec­
toral processes. As Gerber and Jackson note (1993, 654), "most the­
oretical models of electoral processes treat preferences as being 
fixed in order to study properties of different electoral systems/7 
Spatial election models and the Median Voter Theorem, for exam­
ple, assume voters have fixed, single-peaked preferences on issues in 
order to predict candidate convergence toward the median voter's 
preference (Black 1958; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
Empirical studies, however, often provide insights that run 
counter to this central premise. Empirical results illustrate that at­
titudes and policy preferences are not necessarily stable across elec­
tions (Zaller 1991; Granberg and Holberg 1990; Converse 1964) or 
within elections (Tedin and Murray 1981; Zaller 1989). Among 
other things, these studies note the role that campaign events, in­
formation, and party leadership cues can play in changing mass atti­
tudes over time. Findings also illustrate that opinions move pre­
dictably in response to the strategies and messages sent by parties 
and candidates (e.g., Gerber and Jackson 1993; Zaller 1991, 1992; 
Carmines and Stimson 1989). 
Such findings have implications for democratic theory and for 
evaluations of the role that institutions play as vehicles for making 
social choices. Many existing formal theories consider institutions 
simply as vehicles for aggregating the preexisting preferences of in­
dividuals into outcomes (e.g., Riker 1982). Citizen preferences and 
attitudes are supposed to be produced and changed by some process 
that is exogenous to the process of choice, and not by the rules and 
institutions that structure choices. Institutions are important to 
many formal theorists, but their main concern with rules and insti­
tutions deals with how political systems produce outcomes that 
may or may not be reflective of majority preferences assumed to be 
preexisting in the electorate. 
As March and Olsen note, conventional theories of politics as­
sume that a voter's exposure to the process of choosing does not 
change the voter's beliefs about the subject of the choice (1984, 739). 
Conversely, political institutions themselves (such as various elec­
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toral rules, systems, and forms of party competition) are seen by 
March and Olsen and others as having an important role in the for­
mation of individual policy preferences, attitudes, and opinions. 
We have illustrated instances where some changes in individu­
als7 opinions over time appear associated with the process and insti­
tution of direct democracy. Most notably, partisan voters in direct 
democracy states shifted their opinions about groups made the sub­
ject of one initiative in a manner that corresponds to party positions 
on the initiative. These voters also appear to shift opinions about 
policy-related attitudes in the direction of the position associated 
with their party. Furthermore, we find some evidence that opinions 
about targeted groups shift as a result of the interaction between 
political attentiveness and residence in a state having an initiative 
targeting the group. There is also some evidence that politically at­
tentive voters living in direct democracy states change their opin­
ions about policies associated with some initiatives. Our evidence 
also indicates that these shifts associated with direct democracy— 
particularly with Republicans7 feelings about immigrants and toler­
ance of different "moral standards"—are clearly toward less tolerant 
opinions. These results are particularly interesting (and disturbing) 
given that some opponents of antigay initiatives claim that hate 
crimes against gays increased when some antigay initiatives ap­
peared on state ballots. 
These results also suggest that, as a system for directly trans­
forming citizen preferences into policy, direct democracy might op­
erate to the detriment of the toleration of political outgroups. The 
same, however, might well be said of any sort of campaign. If, as 
was the case with Proposition 187 in California, state and local po­
litical elites use the presence of an initiative as a platform for fur­
thering their own political ambitions, which is responsible for the 
appeals to mass intolerance—the initiative process itself or elite 
demagoguery? At this point, with the data at our disposal, we are 
unable to completely differentiate between the two. Answers to 
these questions, among others, however, are required if we are to 
understand the impact direct democracy has on the deliberative 
processes that animate the "sober second thought77 on which Stouf­
fer placed so much reliance. 
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NOTES 
The authors contributed equally to this chapter. The order of names is re-
verse-alphabetical simply to spite Bowler, who usually goes first in these 
situations. 
1. Magleby notes that the subject matter of initiatives "is fairly evenly 
distributed across such issue categories as health, welfare, housing, busi­
ness regulation, revenue and taxes and public morality" (1984, 74). 
2. The relative unpopularity of these groups can be illustrated by re­
sponses to standard NES feeling-thermometer questions that ask voters to 
rate how they feel about various social groups. In 1992, the question was 
asked about 25 groups. These three groups targeted by initiatives in the 
1990s received mean ratings of 51.1 (people on welfare), 37.8 (gays and les­
bians), and 36.1 (illegal immigrants). Only lawyers (49.9) and liberals (50.1) 
were also ranked as low as these groups. 
3. Gibson (1990) has suggested that this may well be the case more often 
than we would suspect. He contends that contrary to the expectations of an 
elite theory of democracy, much political repression in the modern United 
States, in particular the Red Scare of the 1950s, is or has been elite driven 
(see also Jackman 1972). 
4. These findings are consistent with Gibson and Wenzel (1988). Con­
ceptualizing tolerance as a two-stage process, they conducted a quasi-exper-
iment in which respondents to the 1987 General Social Survey were first 
asked to respond to a set of questions regarding their willingness to allow 
members of a group the respondent disliked or found threatening to engage 
in a variety of acts of political participation. Those respondents giving an 
initially tolerant response were presented with a set of arguments designed 
to persuade them to adopt an intolerant position. Conversely, those giving 
an initially intolerant response were exposed to an argument presenting the 
virtues and benefits of tolerance. They found it significantly easier to per­
suade those giving initially tolerant responses to adopt an intolerant posi­
tion than to convince the initially intolerant of the efficacy of tolerance. 
5. Prior to the 1990s, most antigay initiative battles were local. Col­
orado and Oregon had explicitly anti-gay rights initiatives on their ballots 
since 1992. These were the first since California's 1978 Briggs Initiative. 
6. These states included Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Mis­
souri, Oregon, and Washington. The Florida petition was eventually invali­
dated by the courts and blocked from the ballot. An effort to qualify a peti­
tion in Ohio began but was not filed with the state. The Oregon and Idaho 
initiatives qualified for a ballot listing in 1994 (National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force 1994). The Maine initiative appeared on the 1995 ballot. In sev­
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eral states where these initiatives were filed but failed to qualify, there were 
well-organized and visible " decline to sign" campaigns opposing the peti­
tion efforts (see Witt and McCorkle 1997). 
7. At the national level, gay rights issues likely became more salient 
in 1993 after President Clinton's executive order on gays in the military. 
The effect of this on mass opinions should be relatively uniform across 
states. We test for state-specific effects associated with direct democracy 
by isolating respondents residing in states with antigay rights initiative 
movements. 
8.1994 feeling thermometer scores for gays and lesbians and illegal im­
migrants are from NES questions 318 and 317, respectively. 1992 scores for 
these groups and welfare recipients are from NES vars 5335, 5331, and 5318, 
respectively. 
9. 1994 policy attitudes on moral standards and attitudes on immigra­
tion rates are measured with NES questions 1032 and 1016, respectively. 
Corresponding questions from the 1992 wave of the panel are 6116 and 
6235. 1992 attitudes about welfare spending are measured with NES ques­
tion 3726. No corresponding welfare question was asked on the 1990 wave 
of the panel. 
10. The NES sample for 1994 resulted in 22.5% of respondents residing 
in states where antigay initiatives were filed. This reflects some fortuitous 
oversampling by NES in states where these petitions were circulated. Cali­
fornians comprise 9.5% of the sample. 
11. Wilson was clearly associated with each of these issues. In 1992, he 
linked the welfare issues in Proposition 165 to the protracted budget dead­
lock with the Democratic-held legislature. Proposition 165 would also have 
given the governor substantially more control of the state budget (Califor­
nia Journal, September 1992, 6-7). 
In 1994 illegal immigration became a major theme in the governor's 
reelection campaigns as he linked the state's difficulties to illegal immigra­
tion. The first commercial he aired during the November campaign "featured 
lurid scenes of illegals rushing across the southern border, then fanning out 
to disappear in the maw of California" (Martis and Block 1994, 21). 
12. Random inconsistency should be reflected in the measure of R-square. 
Inconsistent responses should depress R-square, leaving the slope and inter­
cept static. 
13. The retention of intensity is indicated by the regression coefficient. 
A slope of 1.0 would indicate that intensity remained more or less stable. In 
other words, those who expressed positive evaluations in 1992 expressed 
similarly valenced evaluations in 1994. A slope of less than 1 would suggest 
that opinion became less intense during the period as those expressing 
strongly negative or strongly positive initial evaluations tended to respond 
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with less extreme evaluations. Conversely, a slope of greater than 1 would 
suggest that opinion became more intense. 
14. For 1992, knowledge is a summary of correct responses to NES ques­
tions 5916, 5917, 5918, 5919, 5920, and 5921. For 1994: 1006, 1007, 1008, 
1009, 1010, and 1011. 
15. For 1992, attentiveness is a summary of NES variables 5102, 5107, 
and 5104. For 1994, variables 124, 126, and 130. 
16. In table 11.3, higher scores on the dependent variable measuring atti­
tudes about treatment of the groups represent responses least sympathetic 
to the targeted group. For immigrants, low scores represent a preference for 
more ease of immigration, higher values reflect a preference for decreased 
immigration. For welfare recipients, low values reflect a preference for more 
spending on welfare,- higher values represent a preference for decreased. For 
gays and lesbians, low values reflect strong agreement with the statement 
that different moral standards and lifestyles should be tolerated, while 
higher values reflect strong disagreement with this statement. 
12

Responsive or Responsible Government? 
TODD DONOVAN AND SHAUN BOWLER 
As academic interest in direct democracy waxes and wanes, vari­
ants of the process seem periodically to attract fans advocating its 
use and expansion (see for example Dolbare and Hubbell 1996; 
Schultz 1996; Barber 1984; Fishkin 1991). Critics of direct democ­
racy, as noted in the preceding chapters, are numerous and every bit 
as ardent in challenging its use as supporters are in defending it. 
This clear dichotomy between advocates and critics, and the unfa­
vorable reviews direct democracy typically receives, stand in con­
trast to research on representative democracy. Beyond issues of lim­
iting terms, regulating campaign finances, and applying some limits 
to legislative discretion, one is hard pressed to find much heated 
contemporary debate over the existence of the legislative process 
itself.1 
Scholarship associated with direct democracy frequently con­
cludes with some evaluation about the fundamental merits or legit­
imacy of the process, often with reference to how well it compares 
to representative democracy (e.g., Magleby 1984, 180-200). The 
standard normative critiques of direct democracy, furthermore, 
often emerge from these comparisons. Under direct democracy, vot­
ers are seen as being less competent, outcomes less likely to make 
sense, policies more abusive of minorities, and special interests 
somehow more advantaged. We hope that the chapters in this vol­
ume have illustrated that some of this criticism is unfounded. In 
this chapter, we assess in general terms how direct democracy 
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might measure up to the Progressives' goal of producing responsive 
and responsible policy. 
Evaluating direct democracy on these or any grounds is no sim­
ple task. First of all, direct and representative democracy are not 
mutually exclusive. Briffault (1985) notes that they coexist and in­
teract in the United States. If we are to evaluate the responsiveness 
or responsibility of the process, we need to recognize that the ques­
tion is not just how much better (or worse) direct democracy per­
forms when compared to representative democracy, but "whether 
the initiative corrects some of the defects of the legislative process" 
(Briffault 1985, 1350). In our introduction, we also pointed out that 
responsiveness could be evaluated, in part, in terms of whom the 
process is responsive to (i.e., what gets on ballots, who has access to 
professional campaigns, who can pass what, etc.). At various points 
in the book, we have suggested that well-financed interests might 
have defensive advantages, but that the process still results in pol­
icy making that might be seen as being responsive to the interests of 
broad, diffuse constituencies. 
Additional lines of reasoning can provide us some basis for mak­
ing concluding assessments about representative versus direct 
democracy, and about state-level direct democracy's potential abil­
ity to remedy problems associated with legislative government. 
The field of institutional analysis illustrates that we cannot ide­
alize representative processes when making comparisons. This lit­
erature illustrates how legislatures create incentives for representa­
tives to behave in ways that often cause them to fail to respond to 
public preferences. In evaluating direct democracy we should first 
consider how it affects institutional rules, or how it facilitates the 
"regulation of politics." Briffault (1985, 1368) argues that the best 
case for direct legislation is that it can play a key role in making leg­
islative institutions—and policy outcomes—more responsive to the 
public's will. Representative institutions create one paramount in­
centive for individual legislators: the need to get reelected (Mayhew 
1974). In pursuing this self-interest, legislators might be motivated 
to maintain policies such as weak campaign-finance regulations, 
unlimited discretion in fiscal policy, designing safe partisan dis­
tricts, unlimited tenure, and ballot access restrictions that increase 
their chances for reelection. 
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These legislators might also give particular advantages to politi­
cally active interest groups that contribute to their campaigns and 
mobilize voters. Such groups can have strong incentives to influ­
ence the fiscal decisions of a legislature, and might cause resulting 
spending policy to deviate from the preferences of the mass public 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1971). By forming "coali­
tions of high demanders" inside a legislature unchecked by direct 
democracy, they may drive total spending above that preferred by 
most voters (Briffault 1985, 1368; Denzau, Mackay, and Weaver 
1981). As illustrated in chapter 8, "governance policies" affecting 
the regulation of legislative taxing and spending powers are often 
adopted by the initiative. 
The field of electoral studies provides another basis for analysis. 
This literature examines, among other things, the effects of varia­
tion in election rules on representation and policy outcomes. Propo­
nents of various electoral reforms point out that institutional rules 
produce different outcomes—different winners and losers. In this 
chapter, we provide some final evidence about how variation in in­
stitutional rules, between direct versus representative democracy 
states, affects what governments do and who potential winners and 
losers might be. By exploring this issue we can evaluate, at least in 
part, the Progressives7 goal that direct democracy would produce 
public policies more responsive to the general public (Eaton 1912). 
Thus, in addition to considering how direct democracy might 
alter institutional rules, we need to examine the effects of rules on 
winners and losers. We do this in two ways. First, we review exist­
ing literature to examine what effect direct democracy has on state 
tax and spending policies. We seek to identify how tax and spending 
policies might be more (or less) responsive to mass preferences 
under direct democracy. We then look at responsiveness a second 
way, focusing on how direct democracy might determine who bears 
the burden of paying for state services. 
We also try to assess if the process produces "responsible" public 
policies. In an attempt to avoid a normative morass of contestable 
definitions of responsible or (irresponsible) policy, we examine if di­
rect democracy produces policies that might be viewed as irrespon­
sible given two fairly narrow criteria: fiscal prudence and treatment 
of minorities. We accept that there are numerous other criteria that 
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can be used to assess what responsible policy might be, but these 
two issues are frequently raised by critics of direct democracy. We 
examine if state-level direct democracy results in policies that cre­
ate long-term fiscal problems. We also examine what is perhaps the 
overarching critique of direct democracy, that it is overly responsive 
to majority preferences in the area of civil liberties, and that being 
too responsive, it is more likely than legislatures to produce policies 
that are abusive of minorities. 
Direct Democracy: Changing the Rules 
of the Game 
As we have seen, ballot propositions can generate heated opinions 
about the substantive policies put before voters. Some of the rea­
sons for this are quite straightforward: distribution issues (who 
wins, who loses) are often obvious, particularly when elites try to 
mobilize various sections of the population to take sides. Symbolic 
and moral issues, and questions about minority rights, can also en-
flame passionate opinions and debate. But often, the policy conse­
quences of these conflicts are very short-lived. Although they may 
affect a large number of people, possibly in a very harmful way, sub­
sequent court challenges and legislative acts do much to blunt their 
impact. Time and changing political fashions do even more to tem­
per the heat of the moment. The criticism linking the desirability of 
the initiative process to specific policies that result from the process 
(gay rights, services for immigrants, coastal protection, bottle bills, 
etc.) is, then, often based on short-term and quite possibly faddish 
normative evaluations of the observer. 
A concern about the desirability of specific policies that might 
emerge from the process also says little about the longer-term con­
sequences of the initiative process itself. And over the long haul, 
many of the specific policies that generate so much initial heat and 
anger may do much less to shape a state than initiatives that put 
longer-term political and institutional reforms in place. That is, an 
emphasis on the immediate policy proposal at hand often distracts 
attention from the broader institutional reforms resulting from citi-
zen's initiatives, which are likely to be of longer-lasting conse­
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quence. It is in these changes to institutional rules regarding the 
conduct of politics that the major consequences of the initiative 
process might be found. 
If anything, direct democracy opens a door that allows people 
other than legislators to regulate how politics are conducted. If we 
assume these "outsiders" do not share the same incentives as legis­
lators (i.e., reelection, maintaining party control, etc.), over time, 
rules about the conduct of politics can be different in direct democ­
racy states—or new innovations in the regulation of politics will be 
first adopted in these states. Historically, groups from outside the 
mainstream of politics have used the initiative process to change 
state institutions in order to further their own goals. A classic ex­
ample here is that of the women's movement, which used the ini­
tiative process to gain women's rights at the state level before gain­
ing them at the federal level (Banaszak 1996). Term limits are just 
one recent example of a whole series of institutional-reform initia­
tives that relate to the political process. Campaign finance reform, 
open primaries, and reporting of contributions and expenditures are 
all examples of ways in which the initiative process has been used 
to change the political system itself. The initiative process may, 
therefore, bring about a different way of doing politics, in large part 
because the groups and policy entrepreneurs using the process are 
not part of the standard cast of characters found in state capitols. 
The initiative process can also have profound long-run effects on 
the "getting and spending" of state revenues, not so much by target­
ing specific policies but by altering the rules under which fiscal pol­
itics are conducted. Tolbert (chapter 8) identifies several of these 
kinds of policies, most notably term limits, supermajority require­
ments, and tax and expenditure limits (TELs). The importance of 
policies such as these lies in the long-term effects they have over 
the conduct of state politics after adoption by initiative. 
While specific policies may come and go, cycling up into being 
very contentious and then down again into being ignored or over­
turned, institutional provisions that govern how policies may be 
dealt with have a much longer lasting impact. In Riker's apt phrase, 
institutions represent "congealed preferences." In general, we may 
distinguish between two sorts of ballot initiatives: those that at­
tempt to change a specify policy outcome, and those that attempt to 
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change the procedures by which outcomes are produced—i.e., the 
rules of the game. The formal literature shows that, while shifts in 
specific policies involve a change from one point to another along a 
given dimension, shifts in rules can involve a shift in the permissi­
ble range or set of choices, possibly over more than one dimension. 
Changing policy may involve shifting points within a given policy 
space, and altered rules can change the shape of the very policy 
space, removing some options from the agenda while creating new 
opportunities for others (Shepsle and Weingast, 1993). 
Changing the rules of the game, then, can produce far more pro­
found change over policy outcomes, over a long period of time, than 
can changes in a given policy outcome, no matter how thorough­
going. The importance of TELs is especially striking in light of re­
cent California history and reveals something both of the impor­
tance of changing institutions and of a dynamic to the initiative 
process. Perhaps no other proposition has the level of name recogni­
tion over such an extended period of time as California's Proposi­
tion 13. This policy put limits on the extent to which property taxes 
could be raised and also included a subsequent requirement that 
property tax rates could only be changed by a supermajority in a 
referendum. Proposition 13 has had profound effects on revenue 
sources in California, and the "spirit" of Proposition 13 (including 
policy entrepreneurs who worked on the measures in California) 
has diffused beyond the state to affect revenue policies elsewhere. 
By one estimate it has reduced California's tax revenues by $200 bil­
lion since 1978 (Price and Bell 1996, 246). Even for an economy the 
size of California's this is quite a loss—a loss which has led to a se­
ries of bitter fights and disputes between the counties and the state 
over jurisdiction and revenue sources. 
What Difference Does Direct Democracy Make? 
Taxes and Spending 
If it is the case that direct democracy provides a means to change 
rules about how politics are conducted, questions about the effect of 
initiatives on the responsiveness and responsibility of government 
should be examined in terms of the long-term consequences of 
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these rule changes. To date, there is limited but informative re­
search that can illuminate these questions. 
Direct democracy can affect how government responds to groups 
or the mass public in a variety of ways. Tolbert (chapter 8) demon­
strates that the initiative can allow citizens to directly draft and 
adopt laws affecting a state's governance structure—laws that legis­
latures would not usually impose on themselves (i.e., term limits, 
rules for tax increases, TELs). Gerber (chapter 9) demonstrates that 
the threat of a potential initiative also affects policies on parental 
consent and notification for abortion indirectly, causing state poli­
cies to match popular preferences more closely. 
We might expect, then, that if initiative states adopt term limits, 
TELs, and abortion policies that more closely mirror public prefer­
ences than the policies adopted in representative states, then other 
policies in initiative states, particularly tax and spending policies, 
could also more closely reflect mass preferences. Yet existing re­
search suggests that responsiveness associated with initiatives 
might not be constant across all policy areas. 
In one study of the relationship between mass opinion and policy 
in initiative versus noninitiative states, Lascher et al. (1996) found 
no evidence that spending policy was more responsive to mass pref­
erences in initiative states. Indeed, their data show that state activ­
ity in initiative states on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children), education, and Medicaid was significantly less than mass 
opinion would otherwise predict. Matsusaka (1995) also demon­
strates that government spending from 1960 to 1990 is significantly 
lower in initiative states when other factors are accounted for. He 
attributes this very generally to the theory that initiatives can force 
legislatures closer to the median voter's preferences, which, it is im­
plied, means less spending. However, Lascher et al. (1996) test this 
directly and find that initiative states are not just spending less, but 
less than mass opinion would predict. 
One possible explanation for conflicting interpretations of find­
ings, such as those in chapter 9 and those reported by Matsusaka 
(1995) and Lascher et al. (1996), is that by facilitating responsive­
ness to public demands to lower specific taxes (or general increases 
in spending), the long-run operation of direct democracy constrains 
the revenue available to state legislatures. This process, while 
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potentially effective in translating demands for lower taxes into pol­
icy, might be less effective in resolving conflicts about finding alter­
native, publicly acceptable tax sources that would fund programs— 
such as education—that voters might simultaneously support. 
We suggest that by being very responsive to citizen demands for 
adopting rules that constrain overall taxation, direct democracy can 
have the effect of institutionalizing rules (perhaps unintentionally) 
that might subsequently cause state spending policies to deviate 
from public preferences. As chapter 8 illustrates, several states have 
passed initiatives requiring that new taxes be approved only after a 
popular referendum (i.e., Colorado, Nevada, Washington). Some 
have changed rules such that all tax increases must be approved by 
legislative supermajorities (i.e., Arizona, Washington, Colorado). As 
Tolbert illustrates, direct democracy states are more likely to adopt 
TELs and supermajority requirements (table 8.2). 
Voter approval of these rules can reflect popular demand for con­
straint on taxation and expenditure growth, self-interest on the part 
of citizens who pay the most in taxes (Donovan and Bowler n.d.), or 
both. Yet it is another thing to expect that support for antitax poli­
cies reflects systematic popular judgments about the mixtures of 
tax sources and spending that legislatures must subsequently make 
after their powers are constrained via initiatives (or threat of initia­
tive). Once legislative taxing and spending powers are constrained, 
legislators could have a difficult time funding programs at levels the 
public might prefer, so we could see lower spending in these states 
as well as a gap between popular preferences for spending and actual 
spending. Implicit in this logic is the assumption that some voters 
might prefer to cut taxes while still expecting that government 
should be able to continue funding programs. If anything, voters are 
more likely to cut taxes than raise taxes (see table 12.1). All of this 
can create a paradoxical situation where the long-term conse­
quences of the fiscal rules adopted in direct democracy states might 
cause some spending policies to be less responsive to popular prefer­
ences. Responsiveness on one level (changing tax rules) hinders re­
sponsiveness at another level. 
Some of our previous research illustrated that voters are highly 
sensitive to property tax levels, and that this is the most unpopular 
tax used by any level of government in the U.S. (Bower and Dono­
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Table 12.1 Direct Democracy and the Public's Preferences for 
Budget Policy: Proposition Voting, California, 1979-1994 
Mean Yes N % 
Vote (%) N Pass Pass 
Tax Limits3 62 26 21 81 
Tax Hikesb 39 14 2 14 
Bonds0 56 68 52 76 
Other Propositions'1 54 216 132 61 
Source: Voting records, California Secretary of State's Office, various 
years. 
aIncludes tax exemptions referred by legislature, in addition to tax limita­
tion and rollbacks initiated by citizens. 
bIncludes tax increases and votes to make future increases easier. 
cReferred to voters by the state legislature. 
dThis includes all noneconomic propositions. These include issues of pub­
lic morality, business regulation, governmental organization, etc. 
van 1995). Many of the tax limitation rules adopted via direct 
democracy that continue to shape fiscal policies in states like Col­
orado, Oregon, and California are directed at property taxes. Voters 
are thus highly responsive to property tax levels, and direct democ­
racy can be very efficient at translating dissatisfaction with property 
taxes into rules limiting taxation. As table 12.1 illustrates, tax limi­
tations and exemptions (typically associated with property taxes) 
are more popular with California voters than tax increases. This 
does not mean that voters are necessarily against funding programs,-
they are likely to approve borrowing to fund projects when given 
the chance. In the long run, if antitax propositions cause less tax 
revenue to be available for state governments (and borrowing can­
not be a perfect substitute for revenue), spending in direct democ­
racy states can end up lower than in other states, and lower than 
what mass opinion might demand. 
All of this should not be interpreted as suggesting that the voting 
public is, by nature, fiscally irresponsible. We should stress that 
these tax limitation initiatives are rarely, if ever, linked to cuts in 
specific programs or the adoption of alternative revenue sources. In­
deed, single-subject restrictions might make it difficult to link such 
issues in one ballot measure. This being the case, voters are typically 
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allowed to express only one side of their potential fiscal preferences 
(e.g., a desire for property-tax relief), and these become institution­
alized. Direct democracy, however, provides no comparable, readily 
used mechanism for aggregating preferences about numerous deci­
sions and tradeoffs that must be made about spending over hun­
dreds of programs and agencies. It is not just that most voters might 
"want something for nothing" (Sears and Citrin 1982), but that they 
are typically faced with one-half of the fiscal equation when decid­
ing on ballot initiatives. Thus, voters seeking property-tax relief 
might institutionalize rules limiting the tax, but the same voters 
who might also favor continued funding of programs like parks or li­
braries are rarely asked simultaneously to find alternative funding 
sources. Legislatures are then forced to improvise within a constitu­
tionally constrained revenue situation, and might be unable to de­
liver services that match mass preferences for spending. 
What Difference Does Direct Democracy Make} 
The Distribution of Tax Burdens 
One of the persistent critiques of contemporary direct democracy 
is that wealthy elites hold sway at the expense of the general public 
interest. This might seem somewhat counterintuitive, given classic 
arguments that the expansion of direct popular participation in gov­
ernment would produce leveling and redistribute tendencies. The 
modern critique, however, is in part based on the idea that elites 
and "special interests" are advantaged by having an additional point 
of access to the policy-making process that, due to high campaign 
costs, broad-based groups might not have (see chapters 3 and 4). 
Wealthy interests are expected to pursue their own narrow ends, 
while quashing broad-based attempts at redistributive policies. Ulti­
mately, then, if narrow groups are advantaged by the process, rather 
than producing redistributive outcomes, direct democracy might 
shift the burden of paying for government services to those who can 
least afford to pay (Dwyer et al. 1994). 
As we have seen, however, the influence of narrow interests 
using the initiative industry is more muted than critics suggest. 
Broad-based groups still pass policies via direct democracy. Voted 
ballots also show evidence of ideological structure to voter choices, 
and campaign spending data show that there is far more value in 
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spending money to defeat propositions than to pass them. In short, 
few special interests will be able to find an ignorant, unanchored 
electorate and use vast sums of money to sell them a policy that is 
inconsistent with the voting public's ideas or interests. The diffi­
culty of this is increased since many people also decide on the basis 
of elite cues, or on a tendency to just vote "no." When we consider 
this, it appears that one of the primary (if not exclusive) advantages 
that well-funded interests have in direct democracy is a sort of veto 
over many things that reach the ballot. In fact, the initiative device 
can be seen as a fairly conservative process in which the odds are 
stacked against proponents of any scheme. 
Yet there are reasons to expect distributional effects of direct 
democracy independent of elite advantages in the campaign process. 
In addition to initiative states' spending less on some policies than 
state opinion might predict, there is also evidence suggesting that 
state legislatures respond to initiatives by making those who use 
public services pay a greater share of costs. Matsusaka has demon­
strated that initiative states rely more on user fees and charges than 
representative states, and Lascher et al. (1996) also found that initia­
tive states have less-progressive taxation systems than other states. 
So there is some evidence that the poor bear a greater share of the 
burden of funding public services in direct democracy states.2 
However, these findings might not reflect upon direct democracy 
per se but can reflect the corresponding weakness of political parties 
in states that experienced Progressive Era reforms (Hofstadter 1955). 
Consider the theory of representation proposed by Dwyer et al. 
(1994). Echoing V. O. Key (1949), they focused on the role of access 
to the policy-making process: states having well-organized parties 
that incorporate the "have nots" into electoral politics are expected 
to produce more-progressive taxation. On the other hand, the "frag­
mented" access created by "disorganized" Progressive Era institu­
tions, such as weak parties and direct democracy, should disadvan­
tage "have nots." According to Dwyer et al. (1994), narrow interests 
have access to state legislatures regardless of the party system, and 
initiatives can offer them additional access (even if only as a veto). 
The poor and unorganized groups, however, who are typically incor­
porated into legislative politics via strong parties are excluded by 
Progressive Era laws that weaken parties. Dwyer et al. (1994) con­
cluded that direct democracy and weak parties are two of the pri­
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mary reasons that New York State has more-progressive taxation 
than a direct democracy state such as California. In the former, the 
poor are, to some extent, "at the table" in the legislature. In the lat­
ter, they have less say in the legislature, and the initiative can be 
used to roll back progressive fiscal policies that might get through a 
legislature. 
In table 12.2, we extend this analysis to the 50 states by examin­
ing levels of tax progressivity in initiative and noninitiative states, 
while accounting for characteristics of the state's party system. Our 
simple model includes a dummy variable representing if a state al­
lows the initiative, a measure of the strength of traditional local 
party organizations, and a measure of party competition. These data 
do suggest that noninitiative states have slightly more progressive 
income and property taxation, with the effect of the initiative being 
largest on property taxes. The effect, however, is substantively 
small, even in this simple model, which fails to control for other 
economic factors that are likely to affect the distribution of tax bur-
dens.3 The initiative dummy (as well as an alternative measure of 
frequency-of-initiative use) explains very little variance in each 
Table 12.2 Direct Democracy and the Distribution 
of State Tax Burdens 
Property Income 
Variable Tax Sales Tax Tax 
Intercept 1.67** 1.82** -0.10 
Initiative (dummy) 0.21+ 0.10 0.15* 
Traditional party 
Organization score 0.07* 0.03 0.84** 
Very competitive 
Party state -0.24* -0.11 -0.52 
N 50 50 43 
R2 .11 .05 .24 
Sources: Tax data from Mclntyre et al. (1991); TPO scores from Mayhew 
(1986); party competitiveness data from Bibby et al. (1990). 
Note: Dependent variables = index of tax progressiveness; low scores re­
flect more-progressive taxation. 
Cell entries = OLS regression coefficients. 
**significant atp < .05 (two-tailed), * significant atp < .10 (two-tailed), 
+significant atp = .11 (two-tailed). 
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model. The two party variables, for example, explain 17% of the 
variance in income tax progressivity, while the initiative alone ex­
plains only 1.4%. 
Responsible Policies? State Debt 
and Direct Democracy 
When the long-term fiscal effects of direct democracy are consid­
ered, we see reasons that initiative-enhanced tax policy responsive­
ness might cause fiscal policies to depart from mass preferences. 
Over the long run, direct democracy might have other effects on 
state fiscal policies, effects associated with the tax-limitation rule 
changes discussed above. Table 12.1 illustrated that while citizens 
might typically approve tax cuts, they also might prefer debt financ­
ing to new taxes. We expect that legislators could also view debt fi­
nancing as an attractive way to fund things that the public might 
continue to expect after tax-limitation rules have been put in place 
(Buchanan and Wagner 1977). But state operating budgets are re­
quired by law to balance, and borrowing is often limited to capital 
projects. In the long run, however, rules that are often institutional­
ized via direct democracy (TELs, supermajority requirements for tax 
increases, and public referenda on increases) might create incen­
tives for a government not only to spend less, but to find "creative" 
uses of debt that maintain some programs within the bounds of bal­
anced budget requirements. 
It has been shown that direct democracy plays a role in affecting 
state and local budgeting (Sharp and Elkins 1987). State and local 
government indebtedness, furthermore, increased in the 1980s after 
the first wave of the "tax revolt" (Regens and Lauth 1992). Although 
the roots of this increase are complex, there is evidence that legisla­
tures might circumvent citizen-initiated TELs by issuing nonguar­
anteed debt or by offering voters' proposals to issue more full faith 
and credit debt (Clingermayer and Wood 1995). Thus, TELs and the 
initiative process can possibly contribute to greater levels of state in­
debtedness. This might occur, since full faith debt and "off-budget" 
debt are used by some legislatures to avoid the constraints of TELs 
(Bahl and Duncombe 1993; conversely, see Kiewiet and Szakaly 
1992). 
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As table 12.3 illustrates, from 1977 to 1990 initiative states using 
TELs do have higher long-term debt than other states. In a pooled 
cross-sectional analysis, we use several variables to predict the 
amount of annual full faith debt each state carries as a proportion of 
its revenue. First, the model accounts for the presence of population 
and economic pressures on states.4 We control for the growth in real 
per capita income over the 1980s in each state, and also the rate of 
growth in population. Second, we account for the presence of di­
vided government, since Fiorina (1992, 92-95) notes that divided 
government might promote deficits and debt. Third, we include 
variables that account for constitutional rules affecting debt issue. 
We include indicators that reflect (a) whether or not a supermajority 
in the legislature is required to issue bonds; (b) whether a public ref­
erendum is required to approve bonds; (c) whether there are explicit 
dollar limits on debt; and (d) whether "casual" debts are allowed 
(see Hackbart and Leigland 1990). 
Table 12.3 State Full Faith and Credit Debt as a Proportion of 
State Revenue, 1977-1990 (GLS-ARMA Estimates) 
Variable B SE t-value 
Constant 0.147 0.014 10.488** 
Economic growth 0.033 0.004 8.280** 
Population growth -0.001 0.000 -3.206** 
Divided D -0.006 0.005 -1.225 
Divided R -0.002 0.002 -1.005 
Supermajority 0.038 0.017 2.180* 
Referendum -0.075 0.011 -6.411** 
Dollar limit -0.044 0.012 -3.547** 
Casual -0.024 0.013 -1.830* 
Intervention 0.010 0.004 2.142* 
Combination 0.038 0.013 2.876** 
GLSR2 0.058 
Equivalent OLS R2 0.179 
N 700 
Sources: Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, various years; Book of 
the States, various years; Bureau of the Census, "Government Finances7'' 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various years). 
**p < .01 (one-tailed), **p < .05 (one-tailed). 
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We also include a dummy variable ("Combination") indicating 
whether a state has the initiative process and bond referenda simul­
taneously. This variable represents those states having the institu­
tional arrangements that allow voters the sort of choices illustrated 
in table 12.1: the ability to say "no" to taxes while simultaneously 
saying "yes" to debt.5 Finally, we include an intervention term that 
notes when TELs were adopted. This intervention variable takes a 
value of 1 for each state in each cross-section only after such a limit 
was introduced, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 12.3 illustrates that most of the institutional limitations 
have an impact of limiting the debt burden in states. Referenda for 
debt issue, casual debt limits, and dollar limits are associated with 
lower debt burdens. Legislative supermajority requirements appear 
to be associated with higher debt burdens, however. This latter find­
ing is not surprising when we consider that a certain amount of 
logrolling might be required to pass capital budgets (funded by debt), 
and when we consider that capital projects yield particularistic ben­
efits that can be concentrated in individual legislative districts. Su­
permajority rules thus might require that larger, "universal" legisla­
tive coalitions are formed to pass these budgets, thus causing 
greater debt appropriation (Weingast 1979). 
The potential long-term effects of direct democracy are illus­
trated by the coefficients for "Combination" (indicating states that 
allow initiatives and require referenda for debt) and "Intervention" 
(demarking the adoption of a TEL, in time). States having the com­
bination of bond referenda and citizen's initiatives tend to have sig­
nificantly higher levels of debt relative to revenue when other fac­
tors are controlled for. These are states where many direct choices 
over the taxing and borrowing are made by voters, with legislatures 
left to do budgeting later on. There also appears to be a longitudinal 
intervention associated with adoption of TELs that increases bor­
rowing in the long run. After these policy interventions are in place, 
states appear eventually to increase their debt burden as a propor­
tion of revenue. 
This suggests that direct democracy, by possibly being "respon­
sive" on one level to popular expressions of antitax sentiment, can 
lead to uses of debt that do not necessarily meet standard definitions 
of fiscal responsibility. Indeed, we have shown elsewhere (Bowler 
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and Donovan 1994d) that credit markets are sensitive to the debt 
levels estimated in table 12.3. States with more debt relative to 
revenue receive lower bond ratings, and those having the combina­
tion of bond referenda and citizen's initiative receive even lower 
ratings.6 
Thus far, we have attempted to evaluate the responsiveness of di­
rect democracy by asking several questions: Does it affect how state 
politics is conducted? Does it affect what states spend money on? 
Does it affect who pays what for public services? In evaluating re­
sponsibility, we asked, does it affect the long-term fiscal health of 
the state? 
On some levels, our findings are somewhat paradoxical. Direct 
democracy does allow citizens the ability to change rules about how 
legislatures do business, and it might be highly responsive to voter 
hostility to the property tax. But contrary to what classical democ­
ratic theorists might have feared about direct legislation, it does not 
cause a state to have more redistributive policies (i.e., progressive 
taxation). Contrary to what Progressive advocates might have ex­
pected, it does not necessarily cause more "responsible" budgeting 
in the long run. The problem is not simply with direct democracy as 
a process, but with how it interacts (or fails to interact) with the leg­
islative process. By frequently presenting voters with only part of 
the fiscal equation (cutting taxes, maybe borrowing, but rarely 
spending choices or raising new revenue), direct democracy places 
state legislatures in a position where it might be extremely difficult 
for them to write a budget. 
Responsible Policies? Direct Democracy 
and Minorities 
Perhaps the most resounding criticism leveled against direct 
democracy is that it will produce policies that are more hostile to 
minority interests than those passed by a legislature (Butler and 
Ranney 1994, 19-21; Bell 1978; Magleby 1984, 30; Linde 1993; 
Gunn 1981; Fountaine 1988). It is said that the problem is magnified 
by the fact that state courts are directly elected in these states, mak­
ing them unlikely to protect unpopular minorities (Eule 1990, 
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1994). Gamble argues (1997) that policies adopted via direct democ­
racy, lacking the filter of a deliberative legislative process, are more 
likely to facilitate majority tyranny. Echoing many critics of direct 
democracy in finding it abusive of minorities, Gamble concludes 
that "direct legislation only weakens us" as a nation (1997, 262). 
We do not dispute the possible validity of the antiminority cri­
tique as it might apply to the local level, but we suggest the criti­
cism is overstated and not supported by data when examined at the 
state level. The central question Gamble and others raise is, When 
citizens have the power to legislate issues directly, will the majority 
tyrannize the minority? (1997, 245). Gamble notes that Madison ad­
vocated a constitution that must control for the "mischief of (major­
ity) factions/7 since if factions were "united by a common interest, 
the rights of the minority will be insecure." She suggests that his 
cure for this "was not direct legislation," and that this was institu­
tionalized with "the absence of the initiative process" (1997, 247). 
We suggest that Publius's full treatment of the majority faction 
problem should be considered, since it offers additional insights 
into managing the threat of democracy in general (which was their 
primary concern), rather than the particular threat of direct democ­
racy. Publius's theory for controlling an abusive majority included 
much more than indirect democracy, which was fairly "progres­
sive" at the time (Roche 1961). In Federalist no. 9 Hamilton argued 
that the tyrannical capacity of majority factions in any democracy 
would be constrained by the "enlargement of the orbit" (Hamilton 
[1788] 1961, 73) of a political system over a large territory, a warning 
he addressed to anti-Federalist advocates of small homogeneous so­
cieties (Storing 1981). 
Madison further elaborated this theory of the extended republic. 
Speaking of democracy in general, in Federalist no. 10 he warned 
that in smaller, homogeneous jurisdictions "more frequently will a 
majority be found of the same party [and the] more easily will they 
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere 
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make 
it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens" ([1788] 1961, 83). 
In Federalist no. 51 he argues explicitly that minority rights and 
civil rights are protected by extending the scale of the physical area 
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governed by democratic practice so that "society itself will be broken 
into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights 
of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from inter­
ested combinations of the majority" (1961, 324). 
This emphasis on the calming effects of the size and scale is a 
central element of the federal argument about protecting minorities 
and is distinct, but complementary, to the role that representative 
democracy plays for Publius. Independent of the form of democracy, 
the scale over which it is practiced should also determine the 
prospects for majority tyranny of a minority. Larger units offer the 
social heterogeneity of interests that make it difficult for a politi­
cally cohesive majority to form and tyrannize a minority. 
This theory suggests distinct types of evidence that could be used 
in assessing democracy's capacity to oppress minorities. It suggests 
we should expect differences between examples drawn from smaller 
or larger jurisdictions regardless of the form of democracy. We sug­
gest that Publius's theory of democracy also indicates that local di­
rect democracy can be far more injurious to minorities than direct 
democracy at the state level, since states are typically larger and 
more socially diverse than localities.7 Evidence used by Gamble and 
others to support claims about direct democracy's abuse of minority 
civil rights should take this distinction into consideration. 
Most scholars who evaluate the antiminority critique of direct 
democracy offer only anecdotal examples to support their claims 
(e.g., Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984; Zimmerman 1986; Linde 1993). 
Gamble (1997) is perhaps the only scholar who has attempted to ex­
amine a sample of initiatives and referenda in order to assess how 
frequently voters limit the civil rights of minorities. She claims to 
have found "strong evidence that the majority has indeed used its 
direct legislative powers to deprive political minorities of their civil 
rights" (1997, 246). We use her study as a point of departure for eval­
uating how direct democracy might abuse minorities. 
Gamble's evidence includes results from state and local referenda 
on civil rights issues spanning three decades. She examines five 
areas where ballot measures limited minority rights: AIDS testing, 
gay rights, language, school desegregation, and housing/public ac­
commodations desegregation. The relatively high approval rates for 
referenda in these five areas are compared to lower approval rates 
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for all ballot measures. Evidence of a high approval rate is used to 
conclude that representative democracy protects minorities better 
than direct democracy. 
Yet rather than constructing a random sample or universe of 
cases, most of the cases Gamble examines are local measures that 
happened to attract the attention of journalists and academics. The 
use of this evidence is problematic. As noted above, there are theo­
retical reasons to expect that small, local democracies—through 
representative or direct means—might be relatively more abusive of 
minorities. For example, Wald7 Button, and Rienzo use an "urban-
ism/diversity theory/' similar to our reading of Publius, to establish 
that population size is the single largest factor differentiating be­
tween communities that adopt gay rights ordinances and those that 
do not. Councils in smaller places are less likely to adopt policies 
protecting the rights of gays and lesbians. 
Since Gamble's sample is so heavily weighted by a nonrandom 
draw of local cases, it is difficult to use it to evaluate how often 
places adopt antiminority policies via direct democracy, and it is 
impossible to compare this to what legislatures or councils do. 
However, since the population of state measures in these five areas 
is much smaller and known for some categories, we can examine 
claims about direct democracy's abuse of minorities with state-level 
data. For example, we (1997) have identified all state-level measures 
appearing from 1977 to 1995 dealing with civil rights of gays and 
lesbians, including measures dealing with AIDS.8 
Table 12.4 illustrates approval rates for these state-level gay 
rights and AIDS measures. Three passed (27%), but only two (18%) 
can be said to have produced decidedly antiminority policy out-
comes.9 This compares to a 38% approval rate for all state initia­
tives from 1898 to 1992 (Magleby 1994, 231), and the 82% approval 
rate of local antiminority outcomes that Gamble identified. Al­
though the number of cases here is small, we can be sure that our 
state-level sample is not biased. Contrary to Gamble's claim that 
voters are prone to abuse minorities via the initiative, we find 
strong evidence that state electorates do not deprive minorities of 
civil rights in these areas. Consistent with Publius's theory of the 
extended republic, antiminority policies tend to pass in smaller, ho­
mogeneous jurisdictions, not in larger, diverse jurisdictions (states). 
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Table 12.4 Approval of Statewide Antigay and Anti-AIDS Initiatives, 
1978-1995 
Vote in Anti-
Year/ Pass or Favor minority Court 
State Proposition Fail (%) Result* Overturned! 
California 1978, Prop. 6 Fail 41 No n/a 
California 1986, Prop. 64 Fail 29 No n/a 
California 1988, Prop. 69 Fail 32 No n/a 
California 1988, Prop. 96 Pass 62 Noa No 
California 1988, Prop. 102 Fail 34 No n/a 
Oregon 1988, Meas. 8 Pass 57 Yes Yesb 
Colorado 1992, Amnd. 2 Pass 53 Yes Yesc 
Oregon 1992, Meas. 9 Fail 43 No n/a 
Idaho 1994, Prop. 1 Fail 49 No n/a 
Oregon 1994, Meas. 13 Fail 44 No n/a 
Maine 1995, Meas. 1 Fail 47 No n/a 
Average yes vote 44.6 
% approved = 27.2 
% approved with antiminority result = 18.2 
Source: Donovan and Bowler (1997). 
aApplied to violent criminals, not to AIDS population. 
bInitiative overturned by U.S. Supreme Court in Romei v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 
134 L. Ed. 2d. 1996. 
cInitiative overturned by Oregon Court of Appeals, in Meriick decision, 1992. 
Even when we extend the analysis to include also all the state-level 
cases from each policy area included in Gamble's sample, evidence 
from the state level points to lower approval rates for anti-civil 
rights issues than Gamble identified with her sample. In table 12.5, 
we illustrate that when all state-level initiatives in these policy 
areas are considered, 50% had policy outcomes that may have con­
strained the civil rights of a minority.10 
Still, finding that state voters pass 18% or 50% of the few initia­
tives that limit minority rights says nothing about how much better 
minorities are treated by a legislature. State voters and state legisla­
tures alike approve policies that are abusive of minority rights (see 
Cronin 1989 on legislatures). Despite serious questions about the 
constitutionality of their efforts, in 1996 state legislatures across 
the U.S. rushed to ban recognition of same-sex marriages—all while 
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Table 12.5 Approval of Statewide Civil Rights Initiatives, 1960-1995 
Anti-
State/ Pass or minority Court 
Subject Year Fail outcome Overturned! 
Accommodations California, 1964 Pass Yes Yesa 
Accommodations Maryland, 1964 Fail No n/a 
Accommodations Maryland, 1964 Fail No n/a 
Accommodations Maryland, 1968 Pass Yes Nob 
Accommodations Wash., 1968 Fail No n/a 
Schools Arkansas, 1960 Fail No n/a 
Schools California, 1970 Pass Yes Yesa 
Schools Colorado, 1974 pass Yes Noc 
Schools Mass., 1978 Pass Yes Noc 
Schools Wash., 1978 Pass Yes Yesc 
Gay Rights California, 1978 Fail No n/a 
Gay Rights Oregon, 1988 Pass Yes Yesa 
Gay Rights Oregon, 1992 Fail No n/a 
Gay Rights Oregon, 1994 Fail No n/a 
Gay Rights Idaho, 1994 Fail No n/a 
Gay Rights Maine, 1995 Fail No n/a 
English California, 1986 Pass Nod n/a 
English California, 1988 Pass Yes Noc 
English Arizona, 1988 Pass Yes Yes 
English Colorado, 1988 Pass Yes Noc 
English Florida, 1988 Pass Yes Noc 
AIDS California, 1986 Fail No n/a 
AIDS California, 1988 Fail No n/a 
AIDS California, 1988 Fail No n/a 
AIDS California, 1988 Pass Noe n/a 
pass = 52% 
yes ~ 44% 
Source: Gamble (1997); Donovan and Bowler (1997). 
aState court ruled unconstitutional. 
bState law nullified by federal legislation. 
cFederal court ruled unconstitutional; affected future initiatives in this area. 
dA nonbinding initiative that did not affect policy. 
eApplied to violent criminals only. 
none of these states recognized such marriages. Legislatures were 
motivated by the fear that one state (Hawaii) might grant such a 
right. No state adopted the marriage ban via direct democracy. The 
problem with direct democracy is said to be that courts are willing 
to act as a check against legislatures, but are unwilling to take on 
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the voting public for fear of electoral reprisal. Gamble and others 
(Eule 1994) claim that the judicial system grants "deference" to di­
rect democratic processes. Yet the data do not support this claim. 
The two antigay initiatives with clear antiminority policy out­
comes listed in table 12.4 were both overturned by courts. In this 
policy area then, only two antiminority initiatives passed at the 
state level, and none have withstood court scrutiny. Indeed, in each 
policy area Gamble identifies, state or federal courts rejected in 
principle the antiminority elements of the major state initiatives 
that did pass. For each policy included in table 12.5, the observa­
tions are largely time-bound: court rulings chilled future initiative 
efforts in each area. 
These data suggest that it is not direct democracy per se that is 
abusive of minorities. Given Publius's theory, we could expect that 
the very same democratic process, indeed the very same initiative 
measure, could abuse a minority locally but not at the state (or per­
haps national) level. Consider what happened in Oregon during and 
after the battle over Measure 9. This anti-gay rights measure failed 
statewide, but opponents of gay rights subsequently petitioned to 
place very similar measures on local ballots in smaller, typically 
homogeneous, rural Oregon communities where support for Mea­
sure 9 was high. Indeed, 18 of the 39 local antigay measures that 
Gamble identified were these "sons of Measure 9." Nearly all of 
them passed. In this example, is it direct democracy that is abusive, 
or democracy as practiced in a social homogenous community? 
Puhlius predicts that minorities will find little protection from 
democracy in any form in such a context. 
Conclusion 
Along with findings reported in other chapters, all of this suggests, 
quite strongly we believe, that direct democracy "matters" greatly 
in our understanding of state politics and policy. It matters in terms 
of the sorts of public preferences government is more or less respon­
sive to, but it matters in ways that might be different than ex­
pressed in the fears and concerns of observers writing at the time 
these institutions were adopted. Although initiatives might make 
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policy and policy-making more responsive in terms of some issues 
(abortion policy, tax limitation rules, term limit proposals, etc.), it 
cannot easily "budget" or negotiate the long-term consequences of 
all issues. Policy, and rules about making policy, might better re­
flect mass opinion on some accounts, but this sort of responsiveness 
might cause things in other areas to be less representative of prefer­
ences over spending. If responsiveness to the actual spending priori­
ties of voters is something that is desired, direct democracy in the 
American states might need to be reformed in some way that links 
decisions over tax cuts and tax rule changes to decisions about 
spending. As it stands, direct democracy thus interacts with repre­
sentative democracy in ways that might partially remedy one defect 
of legislatures (regulating politics) but exacerbate other things legis­
latures already have a difficult time doing (budgeting). 
There is evidence suggesting that the process of state-level direct 
democracy ends up being somewhat conservative—not only in 
terms of the tendency for most initiatives to fail, but in the some of 
the fiscal patterns that emerge. When legislatures face fiscal con­
straints created by direct democracy, they might respond by shifting 
the burden of paying for government to those who are least likely to 
participate in elections and least likely to have access to legisla­
tures. In the end, then, "moneyed interests" are not advantaged in 
direct democracy by their ability to "buy" favorable policies via the 
initiative industry, but by the structural disadvantages that the poor 
might have in fiscal decisions in weak party legislatures over the 
long haul. Direct democracy, by altering rules by which budgeting is 
done and possibly constraining revenue, might force legislatures to 
make choices about spending trade-offs that cause the least harm to 
those interests who have constant access to the legislature. 
In our evaluation of how responsible outcomes might be under 
direct democracy, we find that on one level it might do better (or 
less badly) than many suggest. State-level direct democracy seems 
less likely to translate opinions about unpopular minorities into 
anti-civil rights policies than critics would suggest, or state voters 
might have less hostility to minority civil rights than some would 
have us expect. Although we do find that initiatives affect how peo­
ple think about some minority groups, we find that in some areas, 
state voters are less likely to pass policies that abuse minority rights 
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than they are to pass initiatives in general. When these policies do 
pass, courts consistently act to protect minority interests. Thus, 
one of the most enduring critiques of state direct democracy—that 
it is somehow more abusive of minorities than representative 
processes—rings a bit hollow. However, at another level—one that 
might receive less attention historically—the initiative and tax 
rules adopted via the initiative appear to lead to less responsible fis­
cal policies in the long run by causing states to use debt in a manner 
that has negative effects on their credit ratings. 
We conclude by stressing, again, that some of the observed faults 
of the initiative process are perhaps a product of rules affecting how 
it is used today, not of any inherent flaw in the mass public. Initia­
tives are a means by which citizens can remake the constitutional 
contract and amend the original terms of constitutions in a peaceful 
manner. As such they represent a fundamentally important mecha­
nism that deserves more consideration by scholars than is presently 
given. These issues have long been central to some of the research on 
law and policy. At least since Buchanan, political science has also 
had an interest in the idea of constitutional contracts. A whole series 
of rational-choice scholars—Nozick perhaps most prominently— 
have reconsidered the contractarian basis of society. Constitutions 
as contracts bind future generations to a contract specified at one 
point in time. Rigid constitutional rules, then, are not simply "con­
gealed preferences" but frozen ones. If the initiative process is good 
for facilitating responsiveness to simple questions about unpopular 
taxes, but bad for sorting out complex choices across multiple poli­
cies and multiple revenue sources (i.e., budgeting), the preferences it 
freezes as institutionalized rules might only reflect part of what citi­
zens expect or desire from government. 
NOTES 
1. We acknowledge that contemporary critiques of representative gov­
ernment do exist (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Buchanan and Wagner 
1977; Brennan and Buchanan 1985); however, they share different concerns 
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than those visible in many analyses of direct democracy. We suggest only 
that there are more observers who are quick to challenge the use of direct 
democracy than there are observers challenging the use of representative 
government (e.g., Riker 1982). Critics of representative government who 
advocate greater use of direct democracy might see it as a means of improv­
ing upon or constraining legislative processes (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan 
1985; Buchanan 1979), rather than as a virtue in and of itself. 
2. Bias in who participates could affect these observations. Lascher et al. 
(1996) assess opinions of the general public, not of participants in elections. 
3. These models are probably underspecified, but are included here for 
the purpose of illustration. For more complete models, see Lowery (1987) 
and Berch (1995). 
4. With use of the control variables, this dependent variable serves as a 
rough indicator of a state's debt extension relative to its ability to service 
its debt. 
5. We expect that this combination of direct democracy rules is partic­
ularly problematic for the long-term fiscal health of a state given the voting 
patterns reflected in table 12.1. 
6. Results are reported in Bowler and Donovan 1994d. A model esti­
mating Moody's Bond ratings similar to that in table 12.3, and including 
state full faith and nonguaranteed debt per capita, results in a fit (R2) of .23. 
7. By extension, this theory would suggest that within localities minor­
ity rights would receive better protection in larger localities. We also sug­
gest that most American states in the late twentieth century have more 
social diversity than the American republic did when Publius wrote. Ho­
mogeneous localities'in contemporary American society might be seen as 
analogous in diversity to the states that Publius wrote of. 
8. Gamble includes most but not all of these measures in her sample. 
Gay rights and AIDS issues comprise 65% of cases in Gamble's sam­
ple; however, 83% of her cases are local issues drawn from an unknown 
population. 
9. One AIDS-testing initiative applied only to a category of criminals. 
10. Thirteen of 26 measures identified can be said to have policy out­
comes that limit or restrict minority rights. Two of the measures that Gam­
ble coded as limiting rights were not included in our count as having an­
timinority results: a nonbinding advisory measure on language in 
California, and an initiative repealing busing in Colorado. She also coded 
two public accommodations referenda that Maryland voters rejected as a 
single case. We count it as two. We also do not include a 1960 initiative 
Gamble identified from Mississippi, since Mississippi did not adopt the ini­
tiative until 1991. 
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